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FOREWORD
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) not only leads the world in
space exploration and space science, but, dating back to the early space flights in the 1960s, it
has led the world in the use of computers to control complex systems. While others were
struggling to automate relatively simple business applications, NASA was stretching the
technological envelope to build real-time computer systems to control complicated spacecraft and
their support systems in programs such as Gemini, Apollo, and the Space Shuttle.
Just as the Shuttle stretched the limits of the technology of its time, current projects such
as Space Station Freedom and the Earth Observing System stretch the limits of technology today.
In order to successfully build these future space systems, NASA needs not only to be at the
technological forefront but to go beyond the state of the art and lead the world in software
engineering.
After the Challenger accident, the Rogers Commission Report made many
recommendations for change at NASA and suggested that, after a reasonable time, a National
Research Council (N-RC) Committee be formed to evaluate the progress that had been made
toward implementation of those recommendations. This latter committee was formed in 1988 and
recommended that NASA adopt Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) of the Shuttle
software. The NRC's recommendation was later echoed by other reports and NASA ultimately
instituted a fairly robust IV&V effort. Over time, that effort was reduced due to resource
constraints and because of the belief that the maturity of the software reduced the need for such
a robust oversight activity. Our committee was formed at the beginning of 1992, at the request
of NASA, to reevaluate the need for IV&V and to investigate other aspects of NASA's software
development and oversight processes.
It is, of course, easy to be critical; we want to stress that we found the software and
software development procedures for the Space Shuttle to be, in the main, excellent. However,
the requirements of space science, applications, and exploration demand that the software be as
good as possible. This report describes some ways in which we feel NASA can improve its
software oversight activities to continue the successful operation of the Space Shuttle for as long
it continues to be a part of the nation's space launch infrastructure.
Our committee met over a period of 12 months, conducting interviews, listening to
presentations, submitting questions for NASA and its contractors to answer, and reading copious
amounts of material. I would personally like to thank the members of the Committee for their
hard work.
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I would also like to thank the NASA and contractor personnel who did their best to
provide us with the information we needed for the investigation (see Appendix A). Finally, we
could never have completed this project without the hard work and dedication of the staff of the
Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board (ASEB). I would especially like to thank the Director
of the ASEB, JoAnn Clayton; the senior project assistant, Christina Weinland; the project
assistant, Mafia Kneas; and the study director, Marty Kaszubowski, whose technical expertise,
hard work, organizational skills, and sense of humor are responsible for the success of this
study.
Dr. Nancy G. Leveson
Chair, Committee for Review of Oversight Mechanisms
for Space Shuttle Flight Software Processes
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
In early 1991, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA's) Office of
Space Flight commissioned the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board (ASEB) of the
National Research Council (NRC) to investigate the adequacy of the current process by which
NASA develops and verifies changes and updates to the Space Shuttle flight software. The
Committee for Review of Oversight Mechanisms for Space Shuttle Flight Software Processes
(hereafter, the Committee) was convened in January 1992 to accomplish the following tasks (see
Appendix B):
• Review the entire flight software development process from the initial requirements
definition phase to final implementation, including object code build and final machine loading.
• Review and critique NASA's independent verification and validation process and
mechanisms, including NASA's established software development and testing standards.
• Determine the acceptability and adequacy of the complete flight software development
process, including the embedded validation and verification processes through comparison with
(1) generally accepted industry practices, and (2) generally accepted Department of Defense
and/or other government practices (comparing NASA's program with organizations and projects
having similar volumes of software development, software maturity, complexity, criticality, lines
of code, and national standards).
• Consider whether independent verification and validation should continue.
The first issue the Committee was asked to consider was the Shuttle program's decision
to eliminate the independent verification and validation (IV&V) function currently performed on
the Shuttle flight software at an annual cost of $3.2 million (out of approximately $100 million
per year for the complete software development and assurance process). The IV&V effort was
scheduled to be eliminated by October 1992. The Office of Space Flight requested that the
Committee first address whether there was a need to continue this function and later address
other aspects of the flight software development process. An interim report on the IV&V issue
only, included as Appendix C, was issued by the ASEB in July 1992.
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The IV&V was instituted, in part, as a result of recommendations by the Rogers
Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger accident; 1 an NRC committee to evaluate
post-Challenger Shuttle risk assessment and management; 2 the House of Representatives
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology; and the General Accounting Office (GAO).
Although the recommendations in the previous studies differ in their details, they were
unanimous in their belief that additional oversight of the software development process and
independent evaluation of the software is necessary to assure safe and effective operation of the
Shuttle. Despite this unanimity, NASA's Shuttle Program Office has been reluctant to continue
the use of IV&V, arguing that the risk reduction it provides does not justify the additional cost.
The Shuttle Program Office felt that the previous investigations had not had the benefit of recent
efforts to document the current verification and validation (V&V) process and had not adequately
addressed the cost of additional oversight in relation to the benefits gained.
After hearing presentations from the Shuttle Program Office and their various contractors,
and after reviewing the extensive documentation they provided, the Committee concluded that:
• . . the current IV&V process is necessary to maintain NASA's stringent safety and
quality requirements for man-rated vehicles. Therefore, the Committee does not support
NASA's plan to eliminate funding for the IV&V effort in fiscal year 1993. The
Committee believes that the Space Shuttle software development process is not adequate
without IV&V and that elimination of IV&V as currently practiced will adversely affect
the overall quality and safety of the software, both now and in the future.
As a result of this and the previous recommendations, NASA has decided to continue
IV&V in its current form as a permanent part of the program. This final report expands
somewhat on the IV&V issue but also includes an evaluation of the current process and other
safety and organizational issues associated with the maintenance and upgrade of the Shuttle flight
software that were not covered in the interim report. The report is organized in terms of findings
and recommendations with respect to the verification and validation process, safety,
organizational issues, and considerations for future NASA projects. Part 1 of the report,
Overview and Background, is a discussion of the information the Committee feels is necessary
for a reader to understand the processes used to maintain and upgrade the Shuttle software. Part
2, Findings and Recommendations, is a detailed discussion of the findings and recommendations
that resulted from the Committee's in-depth assessment of the entire Shuttle software
development process. These findings and recommendations are summarized below, but a detailed
discussion can be found in the body of the report.
The Committee's investigation, as outlined in its Statement of Task (see Appendix B),
considered all aspects of the overall software development process as it was described to the
Committee by NASA and NASA's contractors. This investigation included: the process for
Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, by William P.
Rogers, Chairman (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986).
2 Post-Challenger Evaluation of Space Shuttle Risk Assessment and Management, by the National
Research Council Committee on Shuttle Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis Audit (Washington, D.C.:
National Academy Press, 1988).
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requirements definition and specification; the processes used by the development and IV&V
contractors; the configuration management process; test case development and evaluation; system
software testing and integration; preparation of mission-specific software and data; and the
loading and verification of the f'mal flight software package. Although it did not have the time
or resources to completely exhaust all potential avenues of investigation, the Committee believes
that the overall process was addressed in sufficient detail to justify the findings and
recommendations that are discussed in this report. Additional investigation (by other committees
or internal NASA bodies) and a continuing evaluation by those involved in making the process
work may be necessary as NASA and its contractors proceed with implementation of the
Committee's recommendations, particularly the recommendations regarding better documentation
of the overall process. However, at this time the Committee feels that the evaluation provided
in the report is sufficient to help NASA improve the overall process and ensure that safe and
effective software is developed for the Space Shuttle.
Finally, the Committee recognizes that NASA must be very conscious of cost. Many of
the Committee's recommendations will not require additional cost to NASA, because they
involve only changing reporting relationships and providing additional authority (but not
necessarily additional staff) to existing organizations. Some will actually save money over the
long run by helping management better understand the overall process and thereby avoiding
unnecessary difficulties. Others will require additional staff and an associated increase in costs.
This is unfortunate but, in the Committee's opinion, necessary. The Committee was not asked,
nor was it constituted, to develop specific cost estimates for these additional activities. Instead,
the Committee has attempted to provide a coherent description of the benefits these
recommendations will provide to the Shuttle program and to NASA as a whole. The Committee
does not believe that the cost of implementing these recommendations will be excessive.
TIlE SI=IUTTLE VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION PROCESS
Although in general the Committee was impressed with the Shuttle flight software V&V
process, there is room for improvement with respect to requirements, subsystem interactions,
hardware/software platforms, off-nominal cases, and the use of potentially error-prone coding
practices.
NASA Guidelines and Standards
Finding #1: Each software development contractor provides its own development and coding
guidelines for the Shuttle software. These guidelines are not consistent among the
developers.
The Committee found generally high-quality practices by the software contractors and
NASA V&V participants. It was surprised, however, to find that NASA provides no software
development or V&V guidelines to its contractors. Different V&V procedures are used by the
various contractors, some of whom consider these procedures to be proprietary. This can lead
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to unfortunate inconsistencies among the contractors and the software components and also to
a less than optimal overall process from the NASA viewpoint.
Recommendation #1: NASA should develop guidelines for software development and V& V
procedures and should require contractors to share experiences gained
while developing NASA-contracted software.
Off-Nominal Cases
F'mding #2: V&V inspections by the development contractors pay little attention to
off-nominal cases.
During design and code inspections, off-nominal situations (i.e., crew/ground errors,
hardware failures, or software errors) are explicitly considered only for loop termination and
multipass activity (e.g., abort control sequence). 3 A study sponsored by NASA found that:
Problems associated with rare conditions emerge as the leading cause of software
discrepancies during the late testing stage in this sample. A better methodology for
treating rare conditions during design and the earlier test stages could avoid over one-half
of all failures and over two-thirds of the failures in the most severe classifications. 4
Recommendation #2: The V& V performed by the development contractors should include
off-nominal scenarios beyond loop termination and abort control
sequence actions and should include a detailed coverage analysis.
Finding #3:
System-Level Software V&V
V&V inspections by software development contractors focus on verifying the
consistency of two descriptions at different levels of detail (e.g., consistency
between a module's requirements and the design of its implementation). The
correctness of the requirements with respect to the hardware and software
platforms on which implementations run are generally not considered. As a result,
3 Loop termination is a term used for the logic and criteria by which the software determines when a
programming loop has completed an appropriate number of cycles. The term multipass activity refers to the
logic by which a count is kept of the number of times a certain part of the code is executed. Both loop
termination and multipass activities are subject to errors resulting from off-nominal situations, because the
criteria and logic they use is often based on assumptions about how the mission is to be performed and the
normal range of values the algorithm is likely to experience. Off-nominal testing is designed to identify
situations where those assumptions, and others, are not adequate.
4 Investigation of Shuttle Software Errors, by Herbert Hecht (Beverly Hills, California: SoHar
Incorporated), p 10.
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despite rigorous inspections, implementations are vulnerable to errors arising
from incorrect requirements or changes in hardware and software platforms.
Although NASA and its contractors collaborate on all aspects of the software
development process, NASA is ultimately responsible for developing flight software
requirements. The development contractors are responsible for implementing those requirements.
Incomplete consideration of some system-level issues is an important shortcoming in this division
of responsibility. NASA's description of its software development process states that the
responsibility for requirements belongs to theflight software community, where the community
seems to be composed of everyone having anything to do with the software. This is obviously
not adequate from either a managerial or technical standpoint and better system-level V&V
processes for software requirements need to be put in place. Some evidence to support this
conclusion is the aftermath of the Endeavor/Intelsat incident s in which the members of the
community all pointed fingers at each other when it came to determining responsibility for the
problem, which stemmed from erroneous requirements.
Deficiencies also exist with respect to other systems engineering issues such as
hardware/software platform V&V and interfaces. Because V&V inspections focus on the
development of software by a single contractor, inspections do not probe beyond the descriptions
of interfaces of implementations supplied by other contractors. As a result, despite rigorous
inspections, implementations are vulnerable to errors arising from assumptions about incorrectly
documented interfaces.
Recommendation #3: NASA should augment the current v&e process to expand the
consideration of system-level issues and should provide adequate funding
to allow for successful completion of these tasks.
The Independence of IV&V
Fmding #4: Independence of the IV&V contractor is limited. For example, the functions the
IV&V contractor is allowed to investigate are controlled by the Shuttle Avionics
Software Control Board, thereby reducing the IV&V contractor's ability to fully
investigate potential problems.
The independence aspect of IV&V can be evaluated along three dimensions: managerial,
technical, and financial. Technical independence implies an independent set of test and analysis
A loss of expensive hardware nearly occurred during the maiden flight of Endeavor (STS-49)
(May 12, 1992) as the crew attempted to rendezvous with and repair the Intelsat satellite. The software routine
used to calculate rendezvous firings, called the Lambert Targeting Routine, failed to converge to a solution due
to a mismatch between the precision of the state-vector variables, which describe the position and velocity of the
Shuttle, and the limits used to bound the calculation. The state-vector variables were double precision while the
limit variables were single precision. The rescue mission was nearly aborted, but a workaround was found that
involved relaying an appropriate state-vector value from the ground.
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tools and the use of IV&V personnel not involved in the development. Managerial independence
means that the IV&V responsibility is vested outside the contractor and program organizations
and that the IV&V team independently decides which areas of the system to examine, the
techniques to be used, the schedule of activities to be performed (within the overall system
schedule), and the technical issues to be acted upon. Financial independence means that the
IV&V budget is controlled by a group outside the development contractors and program
organizations.
Using these definitions, the Shuttle IV&V contractors have good technical independence
but little managerial or financial independence. In the opinion of the Committee, if the IV&V
contractor were not given its budget and direction solely from the Shuttle Program Office, its
effectiveness would be enhanced because its freedom to choose what to analyze and to what
depth would be increased.
The Committee realizes that the current implementation of IV&V is a compromise
between independence and close teamwork, and in the Committee's Interim Report (see
Appendix C) it is stated that: "despite the limited resources, the Committee has found that the
current implementation of IV&V is valuable and effective."
The Committee still believes this is true. However, it feels that the Shuttle
implementation of IV&V can be more valuable and effective (1) by expansion of its role to
include analysis of some non-critical functions (the error in the Lambert Targeting Routine that
led to the Endeavor/Intelsat incident demonstrates that sometimes non-critical functions can cause
critical situations), and (2) by giving it managerial and financial independence from the Shuttle
Program Office.
Recommendation #4: In order to provide a greater level of independence, responsibility for
IV& V should be vested in entities separate from the Shuttle program
structure and the centers involved in the Shuttle software development
and operation. However, these organizations should continue to conduct
activities supporting IV& V.
THE SILENT SAFETY PROGRAM REVISITED
NASA was the fast group outside of the military to adopt system-safety engineering and,
spurred on by the Apollo fire in 1967, established one of the best system-safety programs of the
time. Perhaps because of the success of the NASA program, the Challenger accident was a
surprise to safety professionals. Many have attributed it to a combination of complacency
(which is inherent in any successful program), politics, and budget cuts.
The Rogers Commission report on the Challenger accident identified many safety
engineering and management problems at NASA and spoke of a Silent Safety Program that had
lost at least some of its effectiveness after the Apollo flights. Important factors cited in the
Rogers Commission report were complacency and reduction of activity after the Shuttle program
became operational.
After this report, NASA fixed many of these problems. The previously mentioned NRC
report evaluated the progress made in these areas and made additional recommendations. The
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Committee did not further evaluate the current system-safety program, but did investigate the
software aspects of safety. It found that software is underemphasized in the NASA system-safety
program and that many of the same mistakes that contributed to the Challenger accident are now
being repeated with respect to software, especially with respect to the belief that safety
procedures can be relaxed for operational programs.
Software Safety Standards
F'mding//5: Current NASA safety standards and guidelines do not include software to any
significant degree. A software safety guideline has been in draft form for four
years. Decisions are being made and safety-critical software is being built without
minimal levels of software safety analysis or management control being applied.
Efforts at getting a draft software safety guideline approved have been stalled for many
years. At the same time, changes are being made to Shuttle software and new programs are
being started, such as the Space Station Freedom, without adequate standards for software safety
in place. The sticking point seems to be the NASA requirement for consensus on all standards
and guidelines. It seems odd to the Committee that those in NASA responsible for safety do not
have the authority to impose the standards that are needed to achieve it. Four years is too long
to wait for consensus.
Even if the guideline is approved, it will be possible for the various centers and programs
to tailor their software safety programs without approval from those responsible for safety in the
headquarters Safety Office. From what the Committee can determine, the headquarters Safety
and Mission Quality (S&MQ) 6 Office is limited to providing comments and conducting audits
whose results are advisory. Those with responsibility must be given the authority to carry out
their jobs.
Recommendation #5: NASA should establish and adopt standards for software safety and
apply them as much as possible to Shuttle software upgrades. The
standards should be applied in full to new projects such as the space
station. NASA should not be building any software without such
standards in place.
Recommendation #6: NASA should provide headquarters S&MQ with the authority to approve
or reject any tailoring of the software safety standards for individual
programs and minimize the differences between the safety programs
being followed at different centers within a single program.
The S&MQ office at NASA headquarters is also commonly referred to as Code Q. In this report the
Committee has avoided the term Code Q except where it appears in a document name or is otherwise more
commonly used than the S&MQ acronym.
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Software Safety Procedures
Fmding #6: The Committee found insufficient coordination between the Shuttle system-safety
program and the software activity. There is no tracing of system hazards to
software requirements and no criticality assessment of software requirements or
components (except when they are changed). There is no baseline software hazard
analysis that can be used to evaluate the criticality of software modifications and
no documentation of the software safety design rationale. There appear to be gaps
in the reporting of identified software hazards to the system-level hazard auditing
function; for example, a criticality 1 hazard can be accepted by the program
without being evaluated by the Shuttle Avionics Software Configuration Board or
the center safety office.
The Committee found evidence that safety issues with respect to software were
considered carefully during Shuttle development, and a software hazard analysis was performed.
Somehow, this concern and recognition waned after the Shuttle became operational, and attention
was turned to software maintenance and upgrades. Although the individual software developers
and the IV&V contractor have implemented some safety programs on their own, there appears
to be little direction provided by NASA and little integration with the system-safety efforts.
For proper decision making, a program must have traceability of safety requirements in
two directions--down from the system to the subsystems and from the subsystems back up to the
system level. Software is somewhat unique in that it can be considered a subsystem, but it
controls other subsystems and operates as the interface between subsystems. Therefore, software
analysis must be closely integrated into the system-safety activity.
Recommendation #7: For the Shuttle software safety process, NASA should provide a software
safety program plan (as described in the draft software safety guideline)
that is reviewed and approved by headquarters S&MQ, the Safety,
Reliability, and Quality Assurance (SR&QA) managers at the centers,
and the Shuttle program manager. This plan should describe the
organizational responsibilities, functions, and interfaces associated with
the conduct of the Shuttle software safety program.
Recommendation #8: NASA should perform a hazard analysis for the Shuttle software, as
described in the draft software safety guideline. NASA should also
implement the other appropriate aspects of the draft software safety
guideline (testing, change hazard analysis, and system-safety
requirements traceability) and provide a software safety design-rationale
document. NASA should establish (if necessary) and use reporting
channels from software to system-safety activities.
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Fmding #7: The
F'mding #8:
Personnel
SR&QA offices at the centers have limited personnel to support
software-related activities. The assignment of one civil servant to software safety
is not adequate to do more than just attend meetings.
There is little oversight or evaluation of software development activities by the
center SR&QA offices.
The 1988 NRC committee report on the Shuttle found that there was limited staff and
oversight of software activities. The present Committee found that this situation has not changed.
Recommendation #9: NASA should build up expertise on software and software safety within
the center SR&QA groups and headquarters and provide adequate
personnel to perform flight software S&MQ activities.
System-Safety Organizational Roles and Responsibilities
Finding #9: The reporting relationship between the centers and headquarters S&MQ is
ill-defined. There is little interaction between the Johnson Space Center (JSC)
SR&QA office and the software development activities within IBM and Rockwell.
Headquarters has no enforcement power (i.e., no authority for performance).
Multiple centers on the same program may be enforcing different standards and
procedures.
Several management issues arose in the investigation. First, there is a need for better
reporting relationships. Dotted-line relationships 7 between the headquarters S&MQ Office and
the centers are ill-defined in practice. Second, there is little communication between the center
safety office personnel and the safety efforts within the development contractors. The Committee
notes that other government agencies have solved this type of communication and coordination
problem through the use of working groups. Other agencies also have program-independent
safety certification boards that provide independent safety reviews. Finally, more emphasis in
the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel on software issues, perhaps in the form of a special
subcommittee to consider software safety issues, would demonstrate and give visibility to
NASA's understanding of the growing importance of software to the safe accomplishment of
7 The term dotted-line is often used to describe two organizations between which there is no formal line
of authority. The term originates from organization charts that have a solid line to indicate formal reporting
relationships and dotted lines to indicate less formal relationships. The relationship between the headquarters
S&MQ and the center SR&QA groups is informal in the sense that headquarters cannot compel the center
offices to perform specific tasks or provide information. On the other hand, the center offices receive some of
their funding from the headquarters office, so there is some incentive, albeit informal, to cooperate.
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NASA's mission, its dependence upon that software, and its commitment to resolving the issues
related to this relatively new technology.
Recommendation #10: NASA should establish better reporting and management relationships
between developers, centers, programs, and the headquarters Safety
Office.
Recommendation #11: NASA should consider the establishment of a NASA safety certification
panel or board separate from the program offices and also the
establishment of a subcommittee of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
to deal with software issues.
ORGANIZATIONAL ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
Documenting the Process
F'mding #10: The Shuttle flight software maintenance and upgrade process is not adequately
documented. There are important aspects of the process that are not described in
the available documentation. This lack of visibility represents an increased risk
of software-related problems.
The Shuttle Program Office has recently attempted to document the software V&V
process to provide some visibility into the software maintenance and upgrade process as a whole.
This was a good first step and has been valuable in helping the Committee understand the roles
and relationships of the various organizations that participate. However, the single greatest
difficulty faced by the Committee in gaining an understanding of the software and the process
by which it is maintained was in obtaining adequate descriptions of the detailed actions of the
people who perform the process. In particular, the Committee was interested in the way
decisions ate made, the coupling of authority and responsibility, and the interactions among and
between the numerous NASA organizations and their contractors. Each of these is vital to the
performance of the process and has very definitive effects on the quality of the software that is
produced.
The Committee found that, in fact, there is a great deal of information about the
day-to-day execution of the Shuttle flight software process that is not contained in any existing
document but is instead passed on from person to person in the form of accumulated knowledge
and on-the-job training. This can lead to the following problems:
• Without complete and accurate delineation of each organization's role and
responsibility, upper management cannot have the proper visibility into the process to assure that
all necessary functions are being performed.
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• If the roles and responsibilities are not completely spelled out in a form to which all
organizations have access, those organizations may be unsure of their proper roles and the roles
of others within the process.
• The program runs the risk of losing important information when the people who
understand the process retire or move on to other programs.
By undertaking an exercise to better understand and document the current process, the
Shuttle program may, independently of the other findings and recommendations of this
committee, discover areas where the process could be streamlined to reduce cost without
adversely affecting safety and performance.
Recommendation #12: NASA should continue to enhance the current effort to fully document
all aspects of the Shuttle flight software process. The effort should
clarify the responsibilities of each contractor and each part of the
NASA organization in a concise and readable format. The level of
detail of the descriptions should be commensurate with: (1) the needs
of NASA's upper management for visibility into the process, (2) the
needs of the Shuttle Program Office to understand and pass on
information regarding its procedures for administering and controlling
the process, and (3) the needs of each participant in the process to
understand the boundaries of its responsibilities and authority.
The Role of Headquarters S&MQ and the Center SR&QA Offices
F'mding #11: The headquarters S&MQ Office would have no authority to enforce established
guidelines and policies if such existed.
F'mding #12: The SR&QA offices at the centers do not have the resources, manpower, or
authority to compel the development contractors or other NASA organizations to
provide information that is sufficient to assure that the proper process is being
followed.
The S&MQ Office at NASA headquarters and the SR&QA offices at the centers are not
as effective as they should, or could, be. Because of inadequate resources and lack of authority,
they have been unable to produce NASA-wide standards for software IV&V, reliability, quality
assurance, or safety in a timely fashion. This has resulted in inconsistent and, in the
Committee's opinion, inadequate implementation of these valuable oversight functions. In
addition, there is insufficient technical expertise in the S&MQ offices at headquarters and
SR&QA offices at the centers to ensure that software oversight functions are adequately
implemented and carried out.
These problems have been mentioned above with respect to software system safety, but
they are also true in the broader context of software reliability, quality assurance, and the overall
organization and management of the program.
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The current role and authority assigned to the S&MQ offices at NASA headquarters is
counter to the recommendation of the Rogers Commission that originally resulted in the S&MQ
Office being created. The Committee believes that the spirit of this recommendation has not been
followed. The S&MQ and SR&QA offices currently lack the authority and the resources needed
to approve the manner of oversight implemented by the Shuttle program and to fully monitor
effectiveness.
Recommendation #13: The headquarters S&MQ Office should be given the authority to
approve or disapprove the program's implementation of software
oversight functions once appropriate guidelines and policies are
established.
Recommendation #14: NASA shouM increase the support for software-related SR&QA
activities at the centers and give them the authority to obtain any
information they consider necessary to adequately assure compliance
with the established process.
F'mding #13: There is a lack of visibility for potential software problems because there are few
requirements or opportunities to report software reliability, quality assurance, or
safety problems to the program-level safety organizations or to headquarters.
The Committee was told, in response to a question submitted to NASA, that the
headquarters S&MQ Office is not routinely included in the reporting of software-related
problems. In other words, there is a lack of visibility for potential software problems because
of a lack of clearly defined and implemented reporting channels for software reliability, quality
assurance, or safety problems to the program-level safety, reliability, and quality-assurance
organizations or to headquarters. For example, the Committee was told that those responsible
for tracking software errors at NASA headquarters do not have routine access to the same data
bases that the center and contractor personnel use. The Committee questions the need for
multiple data bases tracking software error information because it could lead users to lose,
confuse, or simply ignore valuable information.
Recommendation #15: The headquarters S&MQ Office and the SR&QA offices at the centers
should be given routine access to all software-related problem reports,
and all members of the flight software community should be made
aware of their responsibility to keep these oversight organizations
involved in their activities.
Community Responsibility
Finding #14: Many important functions within the flight software process appear to be assigned
to the flight software community rather than a specific NASA or contractor
organization.
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The Committee found that the responsibility for some very important functions was
assigned to what NASA terms the flight software community rather than to a specific
organization or, better yet, to a specific individual. The Committee realizes that assigning
everyone the responsibility for part of the process is an attempt on the part of NASA to show
how all members of the community are encouraged to participate, in the hope that having more
people involved in the process makes it more likely that potential problems will be found early.
However, the Committee believes that failure to assign responsibility for the performance
of a function to a specific organization opens the process up to interpretation and increases the
potential that important functions will be forgotten or ignored because responsibility for them
was left to the community. In short, the Committee's experience is that community responsibility
often results in no one taking responsibility, even in situations where safety of the crew or
performance of the mission is at stake. The Rogers Commission pointed to this type of
community responsibility as one of the factors that contributed to the Challenger accident.
Recommendation #16: NASA should assign specific responsibilities for each aspect of the flight
software process and document them accordingly. Responsibility should
be assigned to individuals or offices and not to the community as a
whole.
Policies, Guidelines, and Enforcement
F'mding #15: There is a lack of accepted policies and guidelines for appropriate implementation
of V&V, IV&V, reliability, quality assurance, and safety measures.
Several documents have been supplied to the Committee that are meant to provide
guidance in software oversight functions for NASA programs. But, in most cases, they have not
been officially adopted by NASA as standards or even officially published as guidelines for
program managers. Without clear guidelines and policies, it is very difficult for program
management to determine appropriate roles, authority, and responsibilities for these functions.
This lack of NASA-wide policies and guidelines for software has permitted a wide range of
implementations of the various oversight functions, which, in the Committee's opinion, has
resulted in an inconsistent retrieval of the benefits offered by these functions.
Recommendation #17: NASA should establish a process that provides the center and program
managers with the opportunity to comment on proposed policies and
guidelines, but also gives the appropriate headquarters personnel the
authority to approve the policies and guidelines in cases where
complete consensus cannot be reached in a reasonable amount of time.
This process should have the following features:
• The authors ofproposed policies and guidelines must respond in
writing to explain why concerns or criticisms that have been expressed
are not incorporated in the final version.
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• The process should have well-defined deadlines for submitting
comments, and the authors should be given the option of proceeding
with the approval process once those deadlines have passed.
• The process should include a provision for arbitrating disputes
at a level of management above the program offices and the
headquarters S&MQ 02_ce, i.e., to the Deputy Administrator or to the
Adtm'nistrator, if necessary.
F'mding #16: A primary reason for the lack of established policies and guidelines is the absence
of sufficient resources, manpower, and expertise devoted to developing them.
To address this situation, the Committee believes that:
Recommendation #18: NASA should provide the S&MQ O_ce at headquarters and the
SR&QA offices at the centers with the additional resources needed to
build their expertise in software IV& V, safety, reliability, and quality
assurance. The budget and personnel devoted to software safety,
reliability, and quality-assurance activities shouM be of sufficient size
to allow adequate policies and guidelines to be prepared, and
compliance with those guidelines and policies to be fully monitored.
FINAL THOUGHTS AND FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS
The Committee believes it is imperative that the "lessons learned" up to this point in the
current Shuttle program be used to guide future operation of the Shuttle and to guide the
preparation of development, assurance, and maintenance procedures for future programs.
Because the Shuttle flight software is, for a while at least, unique within NASA in its size and
years of use, the Committee believes that NASA would do itself, and the nation, a great service
if it were to capture what it has learned from this program and make it available to the Space
Station Freedom and other planned or potential programs. A great benefit would also be obtained
if these new programs made a concerted effort from their very beginning to fully document all
decisions, both formal and informal, that may have an impact on the software or the processes
used to develop it.
Recommendation #19: NASA should undertake an effort to capture the lessons learned in the
development, maintenance, and assurance of the Shuttle flight software
for use by other programs. This not only should take the form of
official documentation of the current process, but also should include
less formal reports, observations, and opinions drawn from current
personnel and as many former Shuttle program and contractor
management and technical personnel as appropriate. The same type of
docwnentation should be routinely prepared for other programs as
well.
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In this spirit, the Committee believes it would be remiss not to bring to NASA's attention
a few of the most obvious generic conclusions drawn from the Committee's investigations. These
recommendations involve observations that were true for the Space Shuttle program, in varying
degrees. The Committee believes that similar problems may occur in the Space Station Freedom
program, the Earth Observing System, and elsewhere within NASA.
Contract Reporting Requirements
There is a perception, which may or may not be fact, that the development contractors
can withhold vital information from the oversight organizations because of proprietary concerns.
Although the Committee was not constituted to address this type of dispute and did not have the
time to fully investigate all the relationships between the contractors and NASA, there is a view
by some NASA personnel and contractors that the development contractors can choose to avoid
full cooperation with the oversight activities if they determine that it is not in their best interest
to do so. The Committee saw instances where this seemed to be the case.
Recommendation #20: In future procurements, NASA should more precisely identify the
information that each development and oversight contractor is
responsible for making available to each other and to the community
as a whole.
Organizational Learning
The Committee has found a reluctance by the Shuttle program to fully implement the
recommendations of the Rogers Commission, the earlier NRC committee, the GAO, and
NASA's own Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel. This is particularly true in regard to fully
independent V&V, but the Committee has noted other instances throughout this report with
respect to issues such as better system engineering practices and the reliance on community
responsibility. In the Committee's opinion, NASA has not been as aggressive as it should have
been at implementing the recommendations given to it by the various outside panels and
committees in the area of software oversight. This is due, in large part, the Committee believes,
to the lack of a concerted effort from within NASA to educate the program managers charged
with controlling software projects on the benefits of these important oversight functions.
This same problem is likely to occur in future programs. For example, the GAO has
expressed some of the same concerns about the Space Station's software development process
as expressed by all of the groups, including this committee, that have examined the Shuttle
program. NASA should understand that the recommendations it has been offered in the past are
worthy of greater consideration than they appear to have been given.
Recommendation #21: Based on the lessons learned in the Shuttle program, NASA should put
in place the mechanisms necessary to ensure that all existing and future
programs are given the information needed to make intelligent
implementations of software oversight functions such as IV& V.
16 SPACE SHUT1LE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT PROCESSES
NASA has planned and is engaged in managing and overseeing some of the most complex
software projects ever attempted. For example, the Space Station software effort makes the
scope of the Shuttle software seem almost trivial in comparison, and it will stretch the limits of
software engineering and software management capabilities. The current plans are to develop
the software in a decentralized manner, with each of the NASA centers developing different
pieces that will later be integrated into a coherent system. Each of the centers has contractors
and subcontractors along with NASA program management at the center to manage and oversee
the development. However, there is no single prime contractor that is responsible for integrating
all the software nor is an IV&V effort planned.
To bring the Space Station software effort and others such as the Earth Observing System
Data and Information System to a successful completion, NASA will need to design and
implement aggressive software development and software system safety programs using
state-of-the-art technology and leading edge methodologies. This will require upgrading the
education and knowledge of the NASA workforce to make it a leader in software engineering
and software quality.
The Committee is concerned that the current software engineering and software system
safety capabilities within NASA may not be adequate to acquire and manage the development
of such large, complex, and safety-critical systems. The Committee believes believes the
importance of software to NASA will only increase; NASA needs to increase its in-house
expertise both at the working level and among those expected to manage future programs and
choose the contractors that will do the work.
Contractors can be expected to do their best to provide a quality product, but, ultimately,
the responsibility for the safety and functionality of the software that is put in place in future
systems, including future Shuttle upgrades, belongs to NASA. If the contractors fail to provide
a quality product or if the numerous parts of the total system do not operate together as
expected, NASA will be the one left to explain to Congress and the nation why the system
failed.
Recommendation #22: NASA should upgrade its workforce and management practices to make
it a leader in software engineering and software quality. NASA should
maintain as much in-house capability as possible to reduce its
dependence on contractors and to provide proper assurance that
contracted work is done on time and with as much attention to safety
and other qualities as future systems require and deserve.
PART 1
OVERVIEW ANDBACKGROUND

1OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY
INTRODUCTION
The Space Shuttle is one of the most complex engineering projects ever attempted by
humans. It is a rocket that is expected to carry humans and large objects into space; an orbiting
platform on which detailed scientific investigations are performed; and an aircraft that cannot
fly without active control, but which is expected to land at a specified location without power
from its engines. None of this would be possible without a very sophisticated system to control
the wide variety of aerodynamic actuators and reaction-control system jets that are used to
maintain the required atmospheric and on-orbit flight profiles. This highly complicated,
interconnected digital control system could not work without the software that is loaded into the
on-board computers during the various phases of a Shuttle mission.
The Shuttle flight software, and the avionics and control system it operates, was
conceived in the early 1970s before modern digital fly-by-wire control systems came into
common use on spacecraft, military fighter aircraft, and commercial transport aircraft. The
evolution of the design for the software was influenced by a number of factors, including what
was, by today's standards, a primitive state of the art in computer and sensor technologies, 1 and
the conservatism of the program managers who were reluctant to incorporate unproven
technology because of the possible risk to the safety, cost, and schedule of the Shuttle program.
This combination of conservatism and a low level of technology led to a premium being placed
on efficient use of the on-orbit computation and storage resources. Furthermore, numerous
stringent requirements were placed on the capabilities of the software due to the flight
characteristics of the vehicle, the types of missions the vehicle was intended to perform, and the
flight rate that was envisioned at the time. For example, the Shuttle is an unstable vehicle that
cannot fly during ascent or descent without active control from a human pilot or an automatic
system. This fact places the control system, and the development and maintenance of the
software to run it, squarely on the critical path of safety and mission performance.
The state of the art in microcomputers has progressed through several generations since the Shuttle
avionics computers were originally chosen in the early 1970s. This was long before the current 386/486 and
68000 series of computer chips were available. At the time, there did not exist a high-level language tailored for
digital avionics applications, and structured programming techniques were just beginning to be applied outside
the research environment.
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THE COMMITTEE'S TASK
In early 1991, NASA's Office of Space Flight commissioned the Aeronautics and Space
Engineering Board (ASEB) of the National Research Council (NRC) to investigate the adequacy
of the current process by which NASA develops and verifies updates to the Space Shuttle flight
software. In January 1992, the ASEB convened the Committee for Review of Oversight
Mechanisms for Space Shuttle Flight Software Processes to evaluate the adequacy of the process
from initial requirements definition to final machine loading. The Committee's task (see
Appendix B) was to:
• Review the entire flight software development process from the initial requirements
definition phase to final implementation, including object code build and final machine loading.
• Review and critique NASA's independent verification and validation process and
mechanisms, including NASA's established software development and testing standards.
• Determine the acceptability and adequacy of the complete flight software development
process, including the embedded validation and verification processes through comparison with
(1) generally accepted industry practices and (2) generally accepted Department of Defense
and/or other government practices (comparing NASA's program with organizations and projects
having similar volumes of software development, software maturity, complexity, criticality, lines
of code, and national standards).
• Consider whether or not independent validation and verification should continue.
The first issue the Committee was asked to consider was the Shuttle program's decision
to eliminate the independent verification and validation (IV&V) function currently performed on
the Shuttle flight software at an annual cost of $3.2 million. The IV&V function had been
instituted, in part, as a result of a recommendation of a previous NRC committee evaluating
post-Challenger Space Shuttle risk assessment and management. When the Committee began its
investigations, the Shuttle Program Office believed that the flight software and the processes that
were used to develop and verify updates were sufficiently mature to permit a phase-out of the
contractors that perform IV&V. Eliminating this function was primarily a cost-saving move, but
one that the Shuttle Program Office believed was justified by the overall quality of the processes
and personnel that are in place to maintain the software. In short, the Shuttle Program Office
believed that the process was adequate without IV&V and that the money would be better spent
in other ways.
The IV&V function was scheduled to be eliminated by October 1992. Hence, the Office
of Space Flight requested that the Committee first address whether there was a need to continue
this function and later address other aspects of the flight software development process. Thus,
the Committee initially focused on IV&V and issued an interim report (see Appendix C) that
described the Committee's findings and recommendations on the IV&V issue only. This final
report expands upon what was discussed in the Committee's Interim Report regarding IV&V and
examines other aspects of the flight software development process, such as management and
safety issues.
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CONTENTS OF THIS REPORT
The sections within this chapter offer a brief description of several previous studies
relevant to the Shuttle flight software and a description of the challenges that face those who
must maintain and upgrade the current software. Some information is given in the following
sections and elsewhere in the report on the pertinent characteristics of the software (e.g., its size
and complexity). However, the Committee has not attempted to provide a complete description
of the history and evolution of the software nor a complete description of its current state. The
reader is referred, instead, to the excellent report by Hanaway and Moorehead (see
Bibliography) that was prepared by NASA for those unfamiliar with the Shuttle avionics and
software system.
In addition, the Committee found it extremely difficult to reach a complete understanding
of the process that is used by NASA and its numerous contractors to update and maintain the
flight software. The process is partially described in a document, called the roadmap by NASA,
that was recently prepared by Intermetrics for the Shuttle Program Office s (see Appendix D).
However, this document is far from a complete description, and the Committee found it
necessary to request many additional documents (see bibliography) and to submit numerous
written and verbal questions to NASA and its contractors to obtain complete information.
Because of the complexity of the process, the Committee has not provided a complete
description. Instead, enough description is included to allow for an understanding of the findings
and recommendations. For a complete description, the reader is referred to the documents
included in Appendices D and E and those listed in the bibliography.
The remaining chapters of this report outline the Committee's findings, conclusions, and
corresponding recommendations regarding the adequacy of the current Space Shuttle flight
software development process. Part 1 (Chapters 1-3) contains the background necessary to
understand the processes NASA and its contractors use, and Part 2 (Chapters 4-7) contains the
details of the Committee's evaluation of those processes. Since the Committee began its
investigations in January of 1992, the Shuttle Program Office has agreed, based on
recommendations that were made in the Committee's Interim Report (see Appendix C), to
maintain the IV&V function in its current form. The Committee applauds NASA for this
decision. However, since the Interim Report did not include a complete evaluation of the
software development and assurance process, much of what was discussed in the Interim Report
is expanded upon in Chapters 2-6, and additional recommendations are made as appropriate.
Chapter 2 discusses how verification and validation (V&V) and IV&V are typically
accomplished for similar large software systems in industry and other agencies of the
government. It includes a definition of the terms used throughout the remainder of the report and
a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages generally associated with the various
implementations of contractor internal V&V, IV&V, and systems level-V&V. This discussion
includes material that relates the NASA process to similar processes in industry and government.
Chapter 3 is a very brief discussion of the current maintenance and upgrade process, which
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Space Shuttle Flight Software Verification and
Validation Requirements, NSTS-08271 (Houston, Texas: Johnson Space Center, 1991).
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includes the IV&V function and the embedded proces_ that encompasses those functions that
are not part of IV&V. The Committee's findings and recommendations begin in Chapter 4 with
ways in which the Committee believes the embedded and IV&V process could be better
implemented. Chapter 5 outlines the Committee's concerns regarding the safety program that
is currently in place for the Shuttle flight software and other NASA programs, including the
need to incorporate techniques to evaluate and track safety issues throughout the process and
over the remaining life of the software. Chapter 6 examines organizational issues that relate to
the development and assurance of appropriate changes to the Shuttle flight software, and Chapter
7 gives the Committee's thoughts on how the Shuttle flight software process relates to other
programs within NASA and the implications for future programs.
PREVIOUS STUDIES
Following the Challenger accident in 1986, a number of assessments were made of the
overall safety of the Shuttle program, many of which addressed verification and validation and
the general software process as part of their investigations. These included evaluations by the
Rogers Commission; an NRC committee; the House of Representatives' Committee on Science,
Space, and Technology; and the General Accounting Office (GAO).
The Rogers Commission 4 concentrated on the direct causes of the Challenger accident,
but Appendix E of their report included a statement by Richard Feynman, one of the members
of the commission, that pertained specifically to the flight software:
•.. there have been recent suggestions by [NASA] management to curtail.., elaborate
and expensive tests as being unnecessary at this late date in Shuttle history. This must
be resisted, for it does not appreciate the mutual subtle influences and sources of error
generated by even small changes to one part of a program on another, s
Among the recommendations of the Rogers Commission was that NASA review certain
aspects of its Shuttle risk assessment effort and: "... identify those items that must be improved
prior to flight to ensure mission success and flight safety." The Rogers Commission further
recommended that an audit panel be appointed by the NRC to verify the adequacy of the effort
and report directly to the Administrator of NASA. This audit panel was convened by the ASEB
of the NRC in 1986, and among its conclusions were:
3 The term embedded V&V was coined recently by the Shuttle Program Office in their argument to
eliminate IV&V. In the Committee's judgement, it is equivalent to what is commonly referred to by industry as
simply verification and validation.
4 Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, William P. Rogers,
Chairman (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986).
s Feynman, R. P., "Personal Observations on Reliability of Shuttle," Appendix F of the Report of the
Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, William P. Rogers, Chairman (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986).
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In general, hardware certification and verification, and software validation and
verification in STS [Space Transportation System] are managed and conducted primarily
by the same organizational elements responsible for the design and fabrication of the
units. Thus, the independence of the certification, validation, and verification processes
is questionable. For example, . . . Independent validation and verification (IV&V) of
software is carded out by the same contractor (IBM) that produces the STS software,
with some checks being made by the Johnson Space Center. 6
The NRC committee recommended that:
Responsibility for approval of hardware certification and software IV&V should be vested
in entities separate from the NSTS [National Space Transportation System] Program
structure and the centers directly involved in STS development and operation.
In March 1988, the House Committee on Science, Space and Technology, echoing the
concerns expressed in the N-RC report, recommended that NASA establish IV&V to evaluate the
development and modification of Shuttle software. Based on these two recommendations, in May
1988 NASA expanded an existing contract with Intermetrics Inc., and instituted the current
IV&V function. The original IV&V contract with Intermetrics supported 40 people; recently,
the support has been reduced to 24 people, at an approximate annual cost of $3.2 million. Table
1-1 shows the functions that were part of the original 40-person effort and those that are covered
under the current IV&V program.
In February 1990, the House Committee requested that the GAO determine NASA's
progress in improving independent oversight of Shuttle software development. The GAO
report, 7 dated February 1991, recommended that NASA:
•.. require independent V&V [Verification and Validation] for Shuttle software, bearing
in mind the views of the NRC, the House Committee, the [NASA Space Shuttle]
software steering group, s and NASA-wide guidance, and ensure that the independent
V&V organization is outside the control of the Shuttle Program Office.
Post Challenger Evaluation of Space Shuttle Risk Assessment and Management, National Research
Council Committee on Shuttle Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis Audit (Washington, D.C.: National
Academy Press, 1988).
7 United States General Accounting Office, Space Shuttle: NASA Should Implement Independent
Oversight of Software Development (Washington, D.C.: United States General Accounting Office, 1991).
s The software steering group consisted of officials from the Johnson Space Center, the Kennedy Space
Center, the Marshall Space Flight Center, NASA headquarters, the software development contractors, and the
Space Transportation System Operations Contractor. The group met once to address the need to bring about
changes in NASA's software development and assurance processes but did not produce formal
recommendations.
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TABLE 1-1 Functions Covered by IV&V
IV&V Functions
Ascent guidance, navigation, and control
Entry guidance, navigation, and control
On-Orbit guidance, navigation, and control
Sequencing
Data processing system
Main engine controller
Systems management/payload
Redundancy management
Launch processing systems
Documentation-only Change Requests
Flight software tools
Reconfiguration
Downlist
I-Load to K-load Change Requests
"Living" Change Requests
IV&V Functions at
Start of IV&V
Contract
(40 full-time
workers)
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Current IV&V
Functions (24
full-time
workers)
X
X
X
X
X
X
Source: Intermetrics, Inc.
In requesting the current review of the Shuttle flight software development process, the
Shuttle Program Office has stated that if funding were not an issue they would continue with a
robust IV&V program. However, if it could be shown that the current implementation of IV&V
does not appreciably reduce risk, or that its cost could not be justified by the risk it avoids, it
could reasonably be eliminated. The Shuttle Program Office did not believe that these issues
were adequately addressed by previous studies, which did not have the benefit of recent efforts
to document the current V&V process. 9
To investigate the question of whether to continue IV&V, the Committee heard
presentations from the Shuttle Program Office, the software development contractors, the current
IV&V contractors, and several outside organizations and experts, including the U. S. Air Force
and Navy. The Committee also reviewed extensive documentation and data provided by NASA
and the contractors describing both the independent and embedded verification and validation
processes. The Interim Report (see Appendix C) presented the findings of the Committee along
with the following recommendation regarding the continuation of IV&V on the Shuttle software.
9 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Space Shuttle Flight Software Verification and
Validation Requirements, NSTS-08271 (Houston, Texas: Johnson Space Center, 1991). This document was
prepared by Intermetrics for NASA to describe the process by which changes to the flight software are agreed
upon and implemented. It also describes each organization's role m the verification and validation of those
changes.
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• . • the Committee concluded that the current IV&V process is necessary to
maintain NASA's stringent safety and quality requirements for man-rated vehicles.
Therefore, the Committee does not support NASA's plan to eliminate funding for
the IV&V effort in t't_al year 1993. The Committee believes that the Space Shuttle
software development process is not adequate without IV&V and that elimination
of IV&V as currently practiced will adversely affect the overall quality and safety
of the software, both now and in the future.
As mentioned previously, based on this recommendation and the recommendations found
in the previous studies described above, NASA has decided to continue IV&V in its current form
as a permanent part of the program.
It should be noted, however, that the current form of IV&V does not conform to the
recommendations set forth by the previous studies described above, in that it does not report to
an organization outside the control of the Shuttle Program Office. Instead, the IV&V contractors
report to the Shuttle Program Office directly, but at the same level as the software development
contractors.
THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE CHALLENGE
Digital flight control systems of varying sophistication, and the software that ties them
together, have existed on aerospace vehicles for decades, including digital flight control on the
Apollo spacecraft. However, when it was originally conceived, the Shuttle flight software
represented a significantly different set of functions than those that were implemented in earlier
launch vehicles or aircraft. At that time, no suitable off-the-shelf microcomputers were available,
structured software development techniques were just coming into common use, and no aircraft
had been produced with digital fly-by-wire controls. NASA developed the High-order Assembly
Language (HAL/S) specificaUy for the Shuttle flight software and chose a computer (the IBM
AP-101) that had been used on several other flight programs, but which required extensive
modifications for use on the Shuttle. Because of the unique nature of the programming language
and computers used for the flight software, it takes a good deal of time for new employees to
develop expertise in this application and environment. This means that it is imperative to retain
the appropriate corporate knowledge to avoid losing the expertise once it is obtained.
The Shuttle flight software controls most aspects of the ascent, descent, and on-orbit
operations of the Shuttle based on assumptions about the physical state of the vehicle and the
atmosphere through which it flies. It does so in real-time, often requiring appropriate reactions
to the changing environment in fractions of a second. This involves sensing the environment
during each phase of flight and coordinating the aerodynamic control surfaces and the reaction
control systems jets in order to maintain proper attitudes and flight profiles. Because the
computers do not have enough memory for all the software to be resident at any time, multiple
software loads are used for various phases of the mission. Recent updates to the computers have
alleviated the storage problems somewhat, but the continued growth of the software requires that
every machine cycle and bit is used. This complicates the software coding and maintenance
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problems. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that additional upgrades in on-board memory or speed
will occur in the remaining lifetime of the Shuttle.
The software to accomplish this task consists of approximately 400,000 lines of code in
over 1,500 compilable units, t° while the backup software is approximately 90,000 lines of
code. At the time it was developed, this was very large. It also was expensive--the software has
evolved over many years of development and operation to require a complex maintenance and
upgrade process involving numerous contractor and NASA organizations at a cost of well over
$100 million per year. n In the ten years in which the software has been operational, it has
undergone numerous upgrades (approximately one per year) to provide new functions, to account
for errors that have been discovered, and to account for the unique characteristics of new
hardware components on the Shuttles and new computers. Table I-2 shows the number of lines
of source code that were changed in each update (called operational increments or OIs) during
the ten years of Shuttle operations. The two most recent upgrades (OI-20 and OI-21) included
very significant changes to the code (a total of 60,000 lines of code were changed). As discussed
in the Committee's Interim Report (see Appendix C), this process of continual upgrade and error
resolution, combined with the magnitude of the necessary changes, was one the primary
arguments for continuing the IV&V effort.
The Shuttle flight software, and the processes used to develop and maintain it, are of very
high quality, but they are not as good as the Committee believes they could, and should, be.
This report describes several areas where, in the opinion of the Committee, changes are
warranted to assure the continued safe and effective operation of the Shuttle.
,0 In the Committee's Interim Report, it was stated that the primary software was made up of over 400
compilable units. After publication of the Interim Report the Committee was informed that there are 1522
compilation units, and 2646 distinct software modules in the Primary Avionics Software Systems (PASS)
developed and maintained by IBM.
" The Committee was told that the yearly cost for the flight software development contractors (new
development, maintenance, soRware configuration control, etc.) was approximately $60 million. Operation of
the Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory, which is used to test the flight software, requires approximately
$24 million per year. This total does not include costs for software reconfiguration, development and
maintenance of Space Shuttle Main Engine software, and other support contractors.
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TABLE 1-2 Operational Increment Change History
Operational
Increment
OI-2
O1-3
O1-4
OI-5
O1-6
OI-7
OI-7C
OI-8A
OI-8B
OI-8C
OI-8D
OI-SF
O1-20
O1-21
Description
Rendezvous software, Spacelab software
Red__gn of main engine controller
Payload re-manifest capabilities
Crew enhancelI2_ts
Experimental orbit autopilot, Enhanced
ground checkout
Year of
Incorporation
1983
1983
1984
1984
1985
Western test range, enhanced propellant 1985
dumps
Centaur 1985
Post 51-L safety changes 1987
Post 51-L safety changes, Bailout capability 1988
System Improvements
Abort enhancements
Upgrade of general purpose computer (GPC)
Extended landing sites, Trans-Aflantic alxn't
code
Redesign of abort sequencer, l-engine auto-
contingency aborts, hardware changes for
new Orbiter
1988
1989
1989
1990
1991
Lines of code
changed
10,600
8,000
11,400
5,900
12,200
8,800
6,600
6,300
1,100
7,200
12,000
1,700
28,000
32,000
Source: NASA Office of Space Flight

2INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION
OF CRITICAL SOFTWARE
INTRODUCTION
Numerous definitions and perceptions of verification and validation (V&V) and
independent verification and validation (IV&V) exist in industry, and the Committee's
communication problems were compounded by the coining of new terminology by the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). In order to provide a frame of reference for the
findings and recommendations of the Committee, this chapter attempts to establish definitions
for key terms used throughout this report and to provide a sense of the advantages and
disadvantages offered by different approaches to software assurance.
The basic objectives in modern software verification and validation are to identify and
help resolve software, hardware, and system problems early in a system's development
life-cycle. Verification (derived from the Latin veritas, or truth) are those activities associated
with proving that the software being built corresponds to what was specified. Validation (derived
from the Latin valere or to be worth) are those activities associated with proving that the system
meets the operational goals. Today, software practitioners do not try to separate their activities
into verification and validation, but rather implement V&V as a single concept aimed at making
sure the software will function as required. In general, IV&V has three primary objectives:
1. Demonstrating the technical correctness, including safety and security,
system/software;
2. Assessing the overall quality of the system/software products; and
3. Ensuring compliance with the development-process standards.
of the
The actual number of discrepancies discovered during the V&V process, although an
important indicator, is not the sole measure of how successful the V&V effort has been. The
greatest value of V&V lies in the interaction between the developer and V&V organizations. The
independent technical activities conducted by the V&V organizations in parallel with the
development team's efforts generates a path of constant feedback that ensures that quality and
safety are built into the system from the beginning.
29
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IV&V is practiced on most critical Department of Defense projects. In a presentation by
representatives from the Air Force Aeronautical Systems Division, the Committee was told that
the experience of the Air Force is that IV&V adds significant value to the quality of the
developed system. 1V&V as applied on Air Force programs has discovered errors and
deficiencies that would have been overlooked if IV&V had not existed. Furthermore, the Air
Force believes that the mere presence of a capable IV&V team provides a significant incentive
to the developer to assure quality development and maintenance processes and products. At the
same time, they have found that the timeliness of findings is inversely proportional to the
separation of the IV&V team from the development team, that is, the farther removed the IV&V
organization is from the day-to-day activities, the longer it takes to get needed information back
into the development stream.
Strictly speaking, everyone involved in writing requirements, coding a module, or
performing a test is engaged in V&V, including the software developers themselves. For the
purposes of this report, however, the Committee has concentrated on the portion of the total
V&V effort that is performed by organizations that axe in some way independent of the
developers. For simplicity, the Committee labels this IV&V. IV&V is defined broadly enough
to include everyone involved in the broader V&V effort except the developers themselves.
A specific implementation of V&V or IV&V can be characterized along three
dimensions: orientation, scope, and independence.
ORIF_2_ATION
IV&V activities typically focus on either the software development process or the
products produced by that process. Process-oriented IV&V typically involves participation in
systems and software requirements reviews, design and code inspections, and test monitoring
and audits. Technical review of the development process takes place, most often, within the
system and software development environment and ensures that standards and procedures are
followed. Product-oriented IV&V involves an independent analysis of the developer's products
(system and software requirements, design, code, and test plans and procedures) and independent
testing and test planning of the software as a separate item and as part of the entire system.
Product-oriented IV&V may take place during development and after delivery.
Most implementations of IV&V perform a combination of both process-oriented and
product-oriented assurance. Focusing solely on the development process without a detailed
technical review of the product does not guarantee a quality product. For large, complex systems
involving many different development organizations and software and system interfaces, it is
impossible to know beforehand all of the issues that a review of the development process must
address. Focusing only on the development process causes issues to slip through the cracks
unless the software products are continually reviewed and integrated. At the same time,
maintenance of high-quality products is difficult without a high-quality process. Furthermore,
an exhaustive review of the product is too costly to implement and review of the process helps
to provide additional confidence in the quality of the product.
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SCOPE
Although the scope of IV&V can range along a continuum, it is convenient to identify
three levels: comprehensive, focused, and limited. The most effective implementation of IV&V
involves in-depth, technical analysis and an integrated view across all areas of software and
hardware functions. This comprehensive approach includes a close interaction among all
members of the software and system development and review teams that continually provides
feedback and recommendations into the development process to improve both the process and
the product.
Due to limited resources or other constraints, a comprehensive IV&V may not be
feasible. A focused IV&V considers only a small set of software and/or system functions using
a process-oriented or product-oriented approach. In-depth technical analysis is performed on
those functions that are deemed to be the most critical for safety, reliability, or some other
important aspect of the software.
When resources are extremdy limited, a cursory monitoring of the process or limited
testing that the software meets some minimal standards may be all that is implemented. Such a
limited scope does not provide much assurance against errors resulting from the design of the
process, nor does it provide assurance that the software will continue to perform correctly in
off-nominal situations.
Ideally, the scope of IV&V should be determined by what is needed to ensure a quality
product and not based strictly on the available resources. However, in the real world, the scope
of coverage is often a function of the available funds, the consequences of missing scheduled
launches or program milestones, and the consequences and likelihood of latent errors. If the cost
of an undiscovered error is high (as measured by safety, mission effectiveness, or financial
considerations), and especially when the magnitude of software changes is large and deadlines
are critical, the scope of coverage should be increased, regardless of the cost, to provide
adequate assurance that as many potential problems as possible are addressed prior to putting
the software into use. Unfortunately, critical deadlines, in combination with budget constraints,
can pressure management into reducing, rather than enhancing, IV&V.
INDEPENDENCE
Independence is the third, and most misunderstood, distinguishing characteristic of
IV&V. Independence concerns the freedom of the IV&V team to operate without interference
or restraint and can be evaluated along three dimensions: technical, managerial, and financial.
Technical independence requires that the IV&V team utilize personnel who are not
involved in the development of the software and system. An effective IV&V team has members
with knowledge of the system or with related experience and engineering background that gives
them the ability to quickly learn about it. To maintain technical independence, the IV&V team
must, in all instances, formulate their understanding of the problem and their proposed solution
without influence from the development team. This technical independence (or fresh viewpoint)
is critical to the team's ability to detect the subtle requirements, design, and coding errors that
escape detection, for example, by development testing and quality-assurance reviews.
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Technical independence also requires that the IV&V team use or develop its own set of
test and analysis tools separate from the developer's tools. Sharing of tools, however, is common
where it is impractical to build an independent version of the computer support environment
(e.g., compilers, assemblers, utilities), system simulations, or test platforms. In this case, the
IV&V team should conduct appropriate additional qualification tests on those tools shared with
the development team to ensure that common tools do not mask errors in the software being
analyzed and tested.
Managerial independence requires that the IV&V responsibility be vested in an
organization outside the contractor and program organizations that develop the software systems.
Managerial independence also requires that the IV&V team independently decides (1) which
areas of the system to analyze and test, (2) the techniques to be used in the IV&V, (3) the
schedule of activities to be performed (within the framework of the system schedules), and (4)
the technical issues to be acted upon. For maximum effectiveness, a managerially-independent
IV&V team should present its findings simultaneously to both the development team and the
systems management.
Financial independence requires that control of the IV&V budget be vested in an
organization outside the contractor and program teams that develop the system. Financial
independence avoids situations where the IV&V team is precluded from completing its duties
because funds have been diverted or situations where adverse financial pressures or influences
axe exerted on the IV&V team that serve to degrade its effectiveness.
Four forms of IV&V are typically practiced today (see Figures 2-1a through 2-1d):
1. Classical IV& V is characterized by technical, managerial, and financial independence.
The IV&V team is outside the development contractor's organization and is typically a contractor
hired by the customer or, sometimes, a team from within the customer's own organization. Most
importantly, the IV&V team reports to a part of the customer's organization that is not directly
involved with the development of the software, although, typically, a close working relationship
is formed between the IV&V and development teams to ensure that IV&V results and
recommendations are integrated rapidly back into the development process. The U.S. Navy, for
example, implements classical IV&V on its Trident submarine program by having one of its
Naval laboratories develop software while a separate, independent Naval laboratory performs
IV&V. This approach successfully separates management, financial, and technical efforts so as
not to compromise the integrity of the IV&V activities. Classical IV&V is typically employed
for highly critical, software-intensive systems where the consequences of a software error could
cause loss of life, loss of mission, or significant social or financial loss.
2. Modified IV& V is a tailored form of classical W&V in use in many large programs
today where software is a central element that ties together large, complex systems. In modified
IV&V there is an organization called the prime integrator that manages the entire hardware and
software system development, including the software IV&V. The prime integrator can be the
customer itself or a contractor hired by the customer to manage the development of the system.
Usually, one or more contractors are chosen by the prime integrator to do the actual software
development, and another contractor is chosen to perform the IV&V. In the modified form,
complete technical and managerial independence does not exist because the IV&V team receives
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its direction and funding from the same organization within the prime integrator as the
development teams. However, since IV&V and development are performed by separate
companies, the IV&V effort retains some measure of technical and managerial independence
through the contracting mechanisms employed by the prime integrator.
3. Internal IV& V is performed by the same company that develops the software, which
can be the prime integrator or one of its subcontractors. Within the company, however, the
IV&V team reports to a different management level than does the development team. In this
case, true managerial and financial independence is lost, at least from the customer's
perspective, but there remains some degree of technical and managerial independence between
the IV&V and development teams, albeit subject to the pressures of corporate profit and
expediency. In particular, the technical independence of this form of IV&V is vulnerable to
errors of omission because the development and IV&V teams are subject to the same
organization, environment, and corporate culture. The internal IV&V team must also contend
with direct and indirect peer pressures that may adversely influence the timely reporting of
results. The benefit of an internal IV&V team is that there is greater availability of staff familiar
with the system, thus minimizing the staff learning curve, gaining efficiency, and reducing cost.
This form is often simply called V& V, but for the purposes of this report the Committee prefers
the term internal IV& V because it expresses the fact that there can be some independence even
when a single company performs both the IV&V and the development.
4. Embedded IV&V _ can only barely be thought of as independent because the IV&V
team is part of the development contractor and reports directly to the same level of management
as the development team. Thus, it does not strictly include any of the three independence
parameters. In this form, the IV&V team works alongside the development team, sharing the
same checklists and procedures and attending the same walk-throughs, inspections, and reviews
as the developers, thus ensuring that the development procedures and standards are followed.
Any independence that is provided emanates solely from the diligence and integrity of the IV&V
team and not from external management or financial clout or the ability to develop alternative
technical solutions. The advantage of this form is that it further enhances the communication
between the development and IV&V teams, thereby increasing the timeliness of the feedback
obtained from the IV&V team. However, like internal IV&V, the embedded IV&V team is
subject to peer pressure and runs the risk of unconsciously approving faulty group decisions
when a truly independent solution is required.
' NASA uses the term embedded to describe the entire software development process, including the
internal activities of the development contractors and the activities of the various NASA organizations that are
involved in reviewing and approving changes to the software, but excluding the IV&V activities of lLntermetries
and Smith Advanced Technoloev. NASA's use of this term in its broader sense has proven very confusing to
the Committee. Here the term applies strictly to the activities within a development contractor or prime
integrator to run a check on its own process or products.
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I A"higher I
authority"
within the
custom r
Customer's
system/software
development
organization
,,9 .1_
Customer's quality
assurance
organization
Software
development
Close relationship
between developers
and IV&V IV&V
contractor
Figure 2-1a Classical IV& V is characterized by the IV&V
team reporting to a different part of the customer's
organization than that responsible for the software
development.
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"Prime Integrator" (may be
a part of the customer's
organization or a
contractor)
[i development ]
Close relationship
between developers
and IV&V
IV&V
contractor
Figure 2-1b Modified IV&V has reduced technical and
managerial independence because, even though they axe not
the same company, the IV&V and development teams report
to the same level of management (the prime integrator).
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Customer's system development
organization
T
"Prime Integrator" (may be part
of the customer's organization or
a contractor)
Figure 2-1c Internal IV&Vis performed by the development
contractor, but the IV&V and development teams report to
different management levels within the company.
INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION OF CRITICAL SOFTWARE 37
Customer
I
"Prime Integrator" (may be part
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a contractor)
Figure 2-1d Embedded IV&V does not include any of the
independence parameters. The IV&V team works alongside
the development team and reports directly to the same
management.
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IV&V IN THE SHU'ITLE PROGRAM
Details of the approach used by Intermetrics and Smith Advanced Technology to provide
software IV&V, as well as the overall NASA approach to flight software V&V, are described
in Appendix D and Appendix E, respectively. To summarize, NASA's current practice of
software IV&V on the Shuttle program consists of a combination of a modified form of IV&V
performed by Intermetrics and Smith Advanced Technology, along with an internal form used
by the development contractors.
Each development contractor has a managerially-independent IV&V team that oversees
the team that develops the software. For example, the IBM development team and internal
IV&V team report to different organizations within the company. The development contractors
perform a rigorous internal IV&V to assure that they axe following their own established
processes correctly and that the delivered product meets the given requirements.
The IV&V contractors, Intermetrics and Smith Advanced Technology, report to NASA
at the same level as the development contractors. The IV&V effort by Intermetrics and Smith
Advanced Technology is focused and product oriented. For example, Intermetrics concentrates
on the ascent and descent phases of the software. Other parts are occasionally addressed, but
only after the program identifies them as a pressing issue. In response to written questions from
the Committee, the headquarters Safety and Mission Quality (S&MQ) Office described the
IV&V process as follows:
IV&V is defined as a process whereby the products of the software development life
cycle phases are independently reviewed, verified, and validated by an organization that
is neither the developer nor the acquirer of the software. IV&V differs from V&V only
in that it is performed by an independent organization. 2
The Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance (SR&QA) Office at the Johnson Space
Center (JSC) reports directly to the center director, not to the Shuttle program or the NASA
headquarters S&MQ Office, and so it is managerially independent of the Shuttle program.
However, the funds needed for the SR&QA Office to perform its IV&V related activities are
obtained in part from the Shuttle Program Office (and the headquarters S&MQ Office) so it is
not financially independent from the Shuttle Program Office.
A third level of independence, which is not used by NASA for the Shuttle program but
which is sometimes used by the Air Force and Navy, would be provided by having the IV&V
contractor report to a group completely outside the Shuttle program (e.g., the NASA
headquarters S&MQ Office).
In addition, the Astronaut Office and various contractors and NASA organizations also
participate in the evaluation of the process and the product it ultimately produces. Because of
the complexity of the process, it is described separately in Chapter 3.
2 NASA headquarters Safety and Mission Quality Office (Code Q) letter of 13 January 1992:
Clarification of NASA's Independent Verification and Validation (IV& V) Perspective.
3THE SPACE SHUTTLE FLIGHT SOFTWARE
DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
INTRODUCTION
The Space Shuttle avionics system controls, or assists in controlling, most of the Shuttle
systems including: automatic determination of the vehicle's status and operational readiness;
implementation sequencing and control for the solid rocket boosters and external tank during
launch and ascent; performance monitoring; digital data processing; communications and
tracking; payload and system management; guidance navigation and control; and electrical power
distribution for the orbiter, external tank, and solid rocket boosters.
This chapter describes the numerous parts of the complete flight software development
and upgrade process. Chapters 4-7 discuss the Committee's findings and recommendations that
resulted from the investigation of the complete process.
THE SOFTWARE
The software programs are written in High-order Assembly Language (HAL/S), which
was developed especially for the Shuttle, and are executed on the General Purpose Computers
(hereafter simply referred to as the computers or GPCs).
Two essentially independent software systems have been developed to operate the orbiter
avionics system:
* The Primary Avionics System Software (PASS) consists of application software, which
performs the actual functions that are required to fly and operate the vehicle, and operating
system software, which controls the computer operations and provides the facilities to ensure that
the application software can execute. The operating system software is always resident. On the
other hand, since the applications software is too large to fit into a computer at one time, it is
divided up into separate functional overlays. The overlays are stored on Mass Memory Units and
are loaded into the on-board computers as they are needed for each phase of flight (descent,
orbit, and entry).
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• The Backup Flight Software (BFS) provides backup capability for the critical phases
of a mission and therefore contains only the software necessary to complete ascent or entry
safely, maintain vehicle control on orbit, and perform the systems management function during
ascent and entry (when there is no PASS systems management). Because its functions are
limited, all the BFS software can fit into a computer at the same time and need never access
mass memory (although a copy of the BFS software is loaded into the mass memory unit so that
another computer could take over the functions of the backup computer in case of a backup
computer failure). The BFS is designed to monitor everything that PASS does during ascent and
entry.
The application flight software (and occasionally system software) has to be changed as
a result of changes in Shuttle hardware (including an upgrade in the computers used), detected
errors, and decisions to add functionality. As stated earlier, these major updates to the software
are called Operational Increments (OIs) and occur approximately once a year. As can be seen
in Figure 3-1, each operational increment takes up to 28 months to develop, so the development
of different operational increments proceeds in parallel.
In addition to the basic software, each mission has specific requirements that relate to the
activities to be carried out on that flight. The software development contractors deliver the OI
base to the Space Transportation System Operations Contractor (STSOC), who configures it for
the mission by adding mission-specific (payload) data, initialization data, telemetry format data,
and flight software patches (corrections in response to late change requests and discrepancy
reports) to produce a final integrated mass memory load.
THE PROCESS
The process for Shuttle software development and V&V is more complex than is practical
to present completely here. In addition, a number of the internal processes used by the
development contractors axe deemed proprietary. Although the Committee was given access to
much of this proprietary information, it is not appropriate for publication in this report. Instead,
the Committee has included documents in Appendices D and E that provide detailed but
non-proprietary information. The Committee feels it is helpful in understanding the findings and
recommendations, however, to have an overall view of the process.
Figures 3-2a through 3-2c (Figures 5-1 through 5-3 of the roadmap document included
in Appendix E) show the development-process steps, and the V&V activities associated with each
step, for the PASS and BFS software developed at JSC. Figures 3-3a through 3-3d are similar
descriptions of the process steps and V&V activities for the Block 1 Space Shuttle Main Engine
Controller (SSMEC) developed by the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). The Block 1
SSMEC roadmap differs from the roadmap used at JSC for the PASS and BFS. In addition,
there has recently been a major upgrade to the SSMEC (again developed by Rocketdyne for
MSFC), called Block 2, which uses a third roadmap that is similar, but not identical, to the
Block 1 roadmap. Also, each of the software development contractors (IBM, Rockwell/Downey,
and Rocketdyne) have their own internal software development and V&V processes that are not
shown on any of the roadmaps.
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Many groups are involved in the development and V&V efforts (NASA calls this the
flight software community):
• The Space Shuttle Engineering Integration Office (by assignment to the Space Shuttle
Avionics Office) has primary responsibility for the entire process of software verification and
validation.
• The Shuttle Program Office has the final authority for all flight software requirements.
Within this office, the Shuttle Avionics Software Control Board (SASCB) prioritizes and
evaluates all Change Requests (CRs) and Discrepancy Reports (DRs). Change packages are
approved by the Program Requirements Control Board with the SASCB recommendation and
then their implementation is managed by the SASCB.
• The Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) at JSC develops the operational
requirements for a Shuttle mission and uses the Shuttle Mission Simulator located at JSC for
validating mission plans and procedures and to train the flight and ground crews.
• The JSC Engineering Directorate (ED) has systems engineering responsibility for the
total Shuttle hardware and software systems and evaluates the capability of each system to
accomplish planned mission objectives. The JSC Flight Data Systems Division (FDSD) reviews
each change in the flight software using the Software Development Facility (SDF) at JSC to
perform verification tests prior to an OI release and uses the Software Production Facility (SPF)
to generate and verify all patches to OIs after delivery. Engineering Directorate personnel, with
support from Rockwell/Downey, use the Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory (SAIL) to
analyze hardware and software interfaces and operations.
• The SR&QA Office at JSC has a voting member on the SASCB (software control
board) and tracks Operation Notes, User Notes, and waivers associated with flight software
discrepancies. The SR&QA Office at MSFC performs a similar function for assuring the quality
and safety of the SSMEC.
• The Flight Software Development Contractors, IBM, Rockwell/Downey, and
Rocketdyne, develop the PASS, BFS, and the SSMEC respectively. Within its own company,
each contractor uses managerially-independent organizations, Internal IV&V, to review and
examine the flight software at each stage of development. A requirements group ensures that the
specified requirements axe understood and that the flight software module designs incorporate
the intent of these requirements. The programming group ensures that the flight software module
designs axe coded properly according to approved development standards. The test group verifies
that the code executes properly and accomplishes the functions stated in the requirements. The
build group ensures that only approved flight software modules are used in OI loads released for
verification and final delivery. The SSMEC is delivered to the Shuttle Program Office at JSC
as a finished package, i.e., as government furnished equipment.
• The Flight Crew Operational Directorate (FCOD) at JSC assesses each change or
discrepancy for flight safety and operational impacts using desktop review or simulators.
• The Space Transportation System Operations Contractor (STSOC) supports JSC's
MOD and Reconflguration Management Directorate. Using government furnished equipment,
flight data, and software patches from development contractors to install late corrections to fix
problems documented in DRs, the STSOC reconfigures the OI loads for use on specific
missions. The STSOC is currently a division of Rockwell International (and several
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subcontractors) based in Houston, separate from the Rockwell/Downey personnel who build the
BFS. The STSOC performs mission-specific tests (Level 8 testing) to verify the performance of
the reconfigured system and prepares the Initialization Loads (I-Loads) _ that are unique to each
mission. Other IBM and Rockwell/Downey personnel independently build PASS/BFS software
loads and perform bit-level comparisons with the newly built OI load.
• The Systems Design Contractors, Rockwell, Lockheed, and Charles Stark Draper Labs,
design tests and use the SAIL to verify that both the PASS and BFS flight software loads are
compatible with hardware interfaces, perform as designed, and conform to the mission
requirements. Results of each test are compared with those generated by independent offline
simulations performed by the IV&V and development contractors.
Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) is performed by Intermetrics for the
PASS and BFS and by Smith Advanced Technologies for the SSMEC. The role of the IV&V
contractors in assuring the software was discussed in Chapter 1, and their current functions are
shown in Table 1-1 (see also Appendix D). In general, the IV&V contractor concentrates on
software used during the most critical phases of flight, particularly the ascent and descent
phases. The contractor typically evaluates the CRs and DRs that are submitted to cover changes
in the software. However, they also often submit CRs and DRs themselves and use their
specialized tools and expertise to perform a detailed evaluation of the software itself (see
Appendix D for a discussion of the tools used).
J I-Loads are a large number of data sets that contain mission parameters such as ascent and descent
profiles, wind data, payload mass information, unique characteristics of the orbiter being used for a given
mission, etc. These data sets are updated for each mission and are even updated on the day of launch in certain
eases. They are not strictly a part of the flight software, but without this initializing data the software would not
run properly. The Committee did not consider the processes by which I-Loads are determined, controlled,
tested, or assured.
PART 2
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4THE SPACE SHIYIWLE FLIGHT SOFTWARE
VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION PROCESS
INTRODUCTION
The primary task of the Committee was to attempt to understand and evaluate the
processes by which NASA and its contractors write and assure the quality of the Shuttle flight
software. As shown and discussed in Chapter 3, the Committee addressed: (1) the process for
requirements definition and specification; (2) the processes used by the development and IV&V
contractors; (3) the configuration management process; (4) test case development and evaluation;
(5) system software testing and integration; (6) preparation of mission-specific software and data;
and (7) the loading and verification of the final flight software package.
As was mentioned in the opening chapter of this report, NASA has claimed for some
time that its embedded V&V process (see Appendix E) is adequate without the current IV&V
function. The Committee's Interim Report (see Appendix C) was primarily a discussion of why
this committee felt that the current implementation of IV&V is necessary to ensure the quality
and safety of the software. As promised in the Interim Report, though, there were other areas
within the embedded process that the Committee believes are worthy of greater attention, and
the Committee has additional comments regarding IV&V.
IBM's software quality measures show that its internal V&V discovers approximately 80
percent of errors before each new OI is built and 98 percent of errors before each OI is first
released. Since 1981, 16 severity 1_ DRs have been written against released OI versions.
However, only eight errors remained in code that was used in flights and none of those eight
errors was ever encountered in-flight. An additional 12 errors of severity 2, 3, or 4 have
occurred in the PASS during flight. None of these threatened the crew; three threatened the
mission, but the other nine were worked around. There were 50 waivers 2 written against the
' Shuttle flight software errors are categorized by the severity of their potential consequences without
regard to the likelihood of their occurrence. Severity 1 errors are defined as errors that could produce a loss of
the Space Shuttle or its crew. Severity 2 errors can affect the Shuttle's ability to complete its mission objectives,
while severity 3 errors affect procedures for which alternatives, or workarounds, exist. Severity 4 and 5 errors
consist of very minor coding or documentation errors. In addition, there is a class of severity 1 errors, called
severity IN, which, while potentially life-threatening, involve operations that are precluded by established
procedures, are deemed to be beyond the physical limitations of Shuttle systems, or are outside system failure
protection levels.
2 A waiver represents a decision on the part of the Shuttle program to recognize a condition, such as a
known software error, as an acceptable risk. Thus, a condition that receives a waiver is set aside, sometimes
fixed at a later date when time and resources permit, but is not considered sufficient cause to hold up a flight.
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PASS on the STS-523 mission, all of which had been in place since STS-47. Three of the
waivers cover severity 1N errors.
Despite a generally good V&V process, however, there are still some gaps with respect
to requirements analysis, subsystem interactions, new hardware/software platforms, and
off-nominal cases. The findings here pertain most specifically to the PASS and BFS development
processes performed at JSC. In the following text, the Committee refers to IV&V when it means
the independent verification and validation activities performed by Intermetrics and Smith
Advanced Technology. These activities correspond to the Modified form of IV&V defined in
Chapter 2 (see Figure 2-1b). The Committee will use the label V&V to mean the activities
performed by NASA and its development contractors (what NASA calls embedded V& V). These
activities include the Internal and Embedded forms of IV&V used by the development
contractors (see Figures 2-1c and 2-1d).
Due to time constraints and difficulty in getting needed background material, the
Committee was not able to completely evaluate the activities of Rocketdyne in developing the
SSMEC at MSFC. The Committee believes, however, that the recommendations given below
are sufficiently general that if they are not already being applied at MSFC, they should be.
NASA GUIDELINES AND STANDARDS
Finding #1: Each software development contractor provides its own development and coding
guidelines for Shuttle software. These guidelines are not consistent among the
developers.
The Committee's review of the development and V&V processes showed that, in general,
those processes are well thought out. For example, when errors are detected, IBM not only
reworks the software to remove the error, but also initiates an audit to determine if similar
errors exist in other parts of the software. IBM then examines and, when appropriate, changes
its upstream review processes to eliminate the practices that allowed the error to go undetected.
Three of the severity 1 DRs identify errors that were overlooked in the review process. As a
result, current design and code reviews explicitly require checks for the types of problems that
were described in the DRs.
Although the current processes are good, the Committee was surprised to find that NASA
provides no software development or V&V guidelines to its contractors. Different V&V
procedures are used by the various contractors, some of whom regard their procedures as
proprietary. As an example, the Endeavor/Intelsat rendezvous problem resulted from a
questionable coding practice: binding single-precision values to double-precision variables and
comparing single-precision variables with double-precision variables. IBM's proprietary Detailed
Design and Code Inspection Process (ASEDV-DCI-001A) currently contains no prohibition
3 Each Shuttle flight is given a designation of the form STS-XX where XX is the number of Shuttle
flights planned since the first flight in 1982 (the first flight was STS-1, the most recent flight [January 1993]
was STS-54).
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against these practices, whereas Rockwell's BFS coding standard requires written justification
before any assignment of a double-precision or mixed-precision expression to a single-precision
variable.
Reconmaendation #1: NASA should develop guidelines for software development and V& V
procedures and should require contractors to share experiences while
developing NASA-contracted software.
OFF-NOMINAL CASES
F'mding #2: V&V inspections by the development contractors pay little attention to
off-nominal cases.
Another weakness the Committee discovered in the current V&V inspections performed
by the development contractors is that they pay little attention to off-nominal cases. During
design and code inspections, off-nominal situations (i.e., crew/ground error, hardware failure,
or software error conditions) are explicitly considered only for loop termination and multipass
activity (e.g., abort control sequence) 4 questions. The Shuttle has flown with nine severity 1
DRs resulting from errors arising from scenario-dependent events (i.e., off-nominal cases
resulting from multiple failures).
This problem was pointed out in an earlier NASA-sponsored study of DRs written against
OI-8b and OI-20. Herbert Hecht found that:
Problems associated with rare conditions emerge as the leading cause of software
discrepancies during the late testing stage in this sample. A better methodology for
treating rare conditions during design and the earlier test stages could avoid over one-half
of all failures and over two-thirds of the failures in the most severe classifications. 5
The IV&V contractor has discovered seven severity 1 errors on abort scenario definition
and verification. The contractor authored one DR and the other six errors were waivered.
' Loop termination is a term used for the logic and criteria by which the software determines when a
programming loop has completed an appropriate number of cycles. The term multipass activity refers to the
logic by which a count is kept of the number of times a certain part of the code is executed. Both loop
termination and multipass activities are subject to errors resulting from off-nominal situations because the
criteria and logic they use is often based on assumptions about how the mission is to be performed and the
normal range of values the algorithm is likely to experience. Off-nominal testing is designed to identify
situations where those assumptions, and others, are not adequate.
s Investigation of Shuttle Software Errors, by Herbert Hecht (Beverly Hills, California: Sohar
Incorporated) p 10.
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Recommendation #2: The V& V performed by the development contractors should include
off-nominal scenarios beyond loop termination and abort control
sequence actions, and should include a detailed coverage analysis.
SYSTEM-LEVEL soFrWARE V&V
Finding #3: V&V inspections by software development contractors focus on verifying the
consistency of two descriptions of modules at different levels of detail (e.g.,
consistency between a module's requirements and the design of its
implementation). The correctness of the requirements with respect to the
hardware and software platforms on which implementations run are generally not
considered. As a result, despite rigorous inspections, implementations are
vulnerable to errors arising from incorrect requirements or changes in hardware
and software platforms.
NASA is responsible for developing flight software requirements, and the development
contractors are responsible for implementing those requirements. The Endeavor/Intelsat
rendezvous problem illustrates shortcomings in this division of responsibility. If the arithmetic
precision of a variable is not specified, then single precision is used because memory has always
been considered a scarce resource on Shuttle computers. The precision of the Lambert variables
was specifically stated in the requirements so that, despite the fact that the software was unable
to give a crucial response when needed, the development contractors were able to conclude:
"Tests show the software had been properly coded by IBM and therefore passed all
preflight tests," according to Ted Keller, senior technical staff member at the IBM
Shuttle Project Coordination Office, Houston. e
Although the memory in the on-board computers has increased from 104K on the first
Shuttle flight to 256K, there seems to have been no consideration given to the idea of eliminating
some mixed-precision assignments by changing variables from single to double precision. Had
all the Lambert variables been double precision, convergence would have occurred.
In addition to IV&V, Intermetrics also supplies the compiler used for the avionics
software. When the software's original 16-bit addressing was changed to a new 20-bit format,
programmers incorrectly used address bits that were reserved for the processor's microcode.
Executing these instructions would have caused branches to unknown locations. The IV&V
contractors authored five DRs (101043, 103259, 103539, 103542, and 103886) that identified
illegal use of address fields. These errors were classified as severity 4 and severity 5 errors since
their resolution involved only changes to documentation and non-flight software (i.e., the HAL/S
compiler).
However, had the issue not been addressed, and the potential of causing branches to
unknown locations remained, a more severe situation could have occurred. According to
'_Aviation Week & Space Technology Magazine, June 8, 1992, p 69.
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presentations given to the Committee, Intermetrics authored three DRs on errors in HAL/S
run-time library functions and corrected three other errors as part of their IV&V effort.
V&V inspections focus on the development of software by a single contractor. Inspections
do not probe beyond the descriptions of interfaces of implementations supplied by other
contractors. As a result, despite rigorous inspections, implementations are vulnerable to errors
arising from assumptions about incorrectly documented interfaces or misguided requirements.
During the design, identified interfaces are documented on Interface Forms so all
programmers work from common understanding. In code inspections, interfaces are examined
to verify consistency of variable names, units, range, operational sequence available and impacts
of operational sequence transitions, update rates, initialization, and cleanup.
The Shuttle flew with a severity 1 DR (51057) resulting from a failure to sufficiently test
the PASS/BFS interface. The IV&V contractor authored four severity 1 reports on problems
occurring between the PASS and the BFS. One of these involved a scenario that could have
caused shutdown of all the Shuttle's main engines. The other three involved errors that could
have caused the loss of the orbiter and crew if the backup software was needed during an ascent
abort maneuver.
The Committee believes that an inadequate approach is being taken to assuring the quality
of the interface between the PASS and BFS and the appropriateness of the requirements that are
given to the development contractors. The program relies on the flight software community,
which is made up of numerous NASA and contractor organizations, to identify incomplete or
misguided requirements before they are passed on to the software development contractors. The
program then relies on multiple tests performed by the flight software community and the IV&V
contractor to adequately identify problems once the software is delivered. The Committee could
not identify a coordinated system-level analysis to identify potential problems before the
requirements are coded or after the software is delivered and integrated. The previous NRC
study committee made a recommendation with respect to better systems-engineering analysis:
A top-down integrated systems engineering analysis, including a system-safety analysis,
that views the sum of the STS elements as a single system, should be performed to help
identify any gaps that may exist among the various bottom-up analyses centered at the
subsystem and clement levels.
The errors that have been uncovered in the implementation of the PASS/BFS interface,
and those that have resulted from inadequate consideration of requirements, illustrate why the
previous NRC committee recommended an integrated, system-level approach. The current
committee believes that failure to implement the previous committee's recommendation has
increased the risk of errors not caught by the current V&V process.
Recommendation #3: NASA should augment the current V&V process to expand the
consideration of system-level issues and should provide adequate funding
to allow for successful completion of these tasks.
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THE INDEPENDENCE OF IV&V
Finding #4: Independence of the IV&V contractor is limited. For example, the functions the
IV&V contractor is allowed to investigate are controlled by the Shuttle Avionics
Software Control Board (SASCB), thereby reducing the IV&V contractor's ability
to fully investigate potential problems.
As a result of a DR (104477) about problems of precision in arithmetic computation, the
SASCB issued an Action Item to the developers and Intermetrics to identify other occurrences
of mixed-precision problems. According to a response to one of the Committee's questions,
Intermetrics performed this task as part of their systems-engineering analysis, as distinct from
their role as the IV&V contractor, because the task:
• . . was not involved with normal software development life cycle IV&V, required
substantial systems engineering skills to determine the potential ranges of values of
variables involved in such equations, and demanded a systems understanding of the
possible scenarios that the equations might be exercised within. In general, the analysis
required a systems view of the subject module and often demanded that the analysis trace
variables and their potential ranges across many principal function interfaces as well as
among general guidance, navigation, and control functionality.
In response to this Action Item, Intermetrics built a tool to analyze mixed-precision
assignments and identified over 3,400 occurrences of such assignments in the PASS. Because
of schedule and resource limitations, Intermetrics did not perform a similar analysis on the BFS.
Assignments were classified into three groups characterizing the effects of assigning values on
the right sides of assignment statements to variables on the left sides: most significant bits lost,
least significant bits lost, and no loss. Although all assignments in the first two categories were
analyzed, detailed investigations of the loss-of-precision problems in the Lambert code were not
undertaken because, again due to resource constraints, a decision was made prior to the STS-39
flight to reduce the analysis to safety-critical functions. The Lambert task is not considered
safety critical and so was not a part of the analysis.
In the opinion of the Committee, had the IV&V function not been given its budget and
direction from the Shuttle Program Office proper ( i.e., the SASCB) its effectiveness would have
been enhanced because its freedom to choose what to analyze, and to what depth, would have
been greater. Had Intermetfies been allowed to continue its analysis, it may well have discovered
the Lambert error, or at least recommended that all precision mismatches be resolved
satisfactorily. Instead, because of direction from the program office, in an attempt to save
money, the analysis was curtailed.
The Committee believes that this situation has the potential to gradually reduce the
effectiveness of the IV&V, since it places the IV&V contractor in the position of having no
higher authority if it finds something it truly believes requires attention. The Committee realizes
that the current implementation of IV&V is a compromise between independence and close
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teamwork, and in the Committee's Interim Report (see Appendix C) it is stated that "... despite
the limited resources, the Committee has found that the current implementation of IV&V in the
Shuttle program is valuable and effective."
The Committee believes that IV&V can be more valuable and effective if its role is
enhanced to include analysis of non-critical functions. The Lambert error indicates that
sometimes non-critical functions can cause critical situations. IV&V should have managerial and
financial independence from the SASCB.
The previous NRC committee recommended that:
Responsibility for approval of hardware certification and software IV&V should be vested
in entities separate from the NSTS Program structure and the centers directly involved
in STS development and operation. However, these organizations should continue to
conduct activities supporting certification and IV&V.
The current committee concurs with the previous recommendation; it has yet to be
implemented with respect to software.
Recommendation #4: In order to provide a greater level of independence, responsibility for
IV& V should be vested in entities separate from the Shuttle program
structure and the centers involved in the Shuttle software development
and operation. However, these organizations should continue to conduct
activities supporting IV& V.

5THE SILENT SAFETY PROGRAM REVISITED
INTRODUCTION
Although industrial safety engineering has a long history, system-safety engineering is
a relatively new discipline that grew out of the aviation and missile systems of the 1950s. The
potential destructiveness of such systems and their cost and complexity made it clear that the old
approach offly-fix-fly would no longer be adequate. Instead, system-safety attempts to anticipate
and avoid accidents through the application of scientific, managerial, and engineering principles.
Conditions that could lead to accidents (i.e., hazards) are identified before accidents occur and
then eliminated or controlled to an acceptable level.
NASA was the first group outside of the military to adopt system-safety engineering and,
spurred on by the Apollo fire in 1967, established one of the best system-safety programs of the
time. The General Electric Company and others were commissioned to develop policies and
procedures that became models for civilian aerospace activities. Specialized safety efforts were
given a prominent role in the top levels of NASA and throughout the centers and programs.
The NASA approach to safety assigns responsibility for risk management to the program
and line management while the safety organizations are responsible for providing the support
necessary for program-management decision making. The safety staff provides this support
through risk assessment and hazard analyses and by assuring that the activities associated with
controlling risk are carded out and documented.
One of the analyses that NASA uses to ensure reliability is Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis (FMEA). This is used to identify hardware items that are critical to the performance
and safety of the vehicle and the mission, and to identify items that do not meet design
requirements. Each possible failure mode of a hardware component is identified and then
analyzed to determine the resulting performance of the system and to ascertain the worst-case
effect that could result from a failure in that mode. All the identified critical items are then
categorized according to the worst-case effect of the failure on the crew, the vehicle, and the
mission. If the worst-case effect is loss of life or vehicle, the item is categorized as criticality 1
(1R if the error is redundant). Criticality 2 and 2R are cases where loss of mission could result.
A Critical Items List (CIL) is produced that contains information about all criticality 1
components.
While the FMEA/CIL is basically a bottom-up reliability analysis that examines the effect
of every type of component failure, hazard analyses are top-down safety analyses that start from
a hazard (i.e., state that could lead to an accident) and attempt to determine what conditions
could cause that hazard. NASA hazard analyses consider not only the failures identified in the
FMEA process but also other potential threats posed by the environment, crew/machine
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interfaces, arid mission activities. They examine cross-system causes and effects rather than
single subsystems. Identified hazards and their causes are analyzed to fred ways to eliminate or
control the hazard.
Although many of the ideas originally developed by the military and NASA were adopted
by other industries, none of the industry programs have approached the quality of the military
and aerospace programs. Perhaps because of the success of the NASA program, the Challenger
accident was a surprise to safety professionals. What happened? Some safety professionals have
cited a combination of complacency (which is inherent in any successful program), politics, and
budget cuts.
The Rogers Commission report I on the Challenger accident identified many safety
engineering and management problems at NASA and speaks of a Silent Safety Program that had,
for some reason, lost at least some of its effectiveness after the Apollo flights. As the report
says:
The unrelenting pressure to meet the demands of an accelerating flight schedule might
have been adequately handled by NASA if it had insisted upon the exactingly thorough
procedures that were its hallmark during the Apollo program. An extensive and
redundant safety program comprising interdependent safety, reliability, and quality-
assurance functions existed during and after the lunar program to discover any potential
safety problems. Between that period and 1986, however, the program became
ineffective. This loss of effectiveness seriously degraded the checks and balances essential
for maintaining flight safety.
The major factors in the NASA safety organization that the Rogers Commission cited as
contributing to the accident were
• reductions in the safety, reliability, and quality-assurance work force;
• lack of independence, in management structure, of safety organizations from the
organizations they are to cheek;
• inadequate problem reporting requirements and failure to get information to the proper
levels of management;
• inadequate trend analysis of failures;
• misrepresentation of criticality; and
• lack of involvement of safety personnel in critical discussions.
An important factor cited in the Rogers Commission report was complacency and
reduction of activity after the Shuttle program became operational.
Following successful completion of the orbital flight test phase of the Shuttle program,
the system was declared to be operational. Subsequently, several safety, reliability, and
Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, William P. Rogers,
Chairman. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986).
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quality-assurance organizations found themselves with reduced and/or reorganized
functional capability ....
The apparent reason for such actions was a perception that less safety, reliability, and
quality-assurance activity would be required during routine Shuttle operations. This
reasoning was faulty. The machinery is highly complex, and the requirements are
exacting. The Space Shuttle remains a totally new system with little or no history. As the
system matures and the experience changes, careful tracking will be required to prevent
premature failures. As the flight rate increased, more hardware operations were involved,
and more total in-flight anomalies occurred. Tracking requirements became more rather
than less critical because of implications for the next flight in an accelerating
program ....
The inherent risk of the Space Shuttle program is defined by the combination of a
highly dynamic environment, enormous energies, mechanical complexities, time-
consuming preparations and extremely time-critical decision making. Complacency and
failures in supervision and reporting seriously aggravate these risks.
Rather than weaken safety, reliability, and quality-assurance programs through
attrition and reorganization, NASA must elevate and strengthen these vital functions. In
addition, NASA's traditional safety, reliability, and quality-assurance efforts need to be
augmented by an alert and vigorous organization that oversees the flight safety program.
After this report, NASA fixed many of the problems identified by the Rogers
Commission. An NRC report, in 1988, evaluated the progress made in these areas and made
additional recommendations. Our Committee did not further evaluate the current system-safety
program but concentrated only on the software aspects of safety.
SOFTWARE SYSTEM SAFETY
Safety is a system property, not a component property. Handling software safety issues
at the system level is somewhat different than for other components since the software usually
acts as a controller. That is, the software not only has interfaces with other components, but it
is often responsible for controlling the behavior of other hardware components and the
interactions between components. Therefore, software can have important ramifications for
system safety and must be included in system-safety analyses.
Software can affect system safety in two ways: (1) the software can fail to recognize or
handle hardware failures that it is required to control or to respond to in some way or (2) the
software can issue incorrect or untimely outputs that contribute to the system reaching a
hazardous state. Both of these types of software safety issues must be handled in an effective
system-safety program.
Software does not have random failure modes as does hardware: it is an abstraction, and
its failures are, therefore, due to logic or design errors. Once software is loaded and executed
on a computer, however, the software becomes essentially the design of a special purpose
machine (to which the general purpose computer has been temporarily transformed, e.g., a
guidance machine or an inertial navigator). Like any other machine, the hardware components
64 SPACE SHUTTLE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT PROCESSES
may fail. The primary protection against this in the Shuttle is the use of multiple (four)
computers running the PASS (i.e., the standard hardware technique of n-fold modular
redundancy) for certain critical operations during liftoff and reentry. A fifth computer, running
a different version of the software, the BFS, provides a monitoring and standby sparing role.
A computer can also behave in an incorrect fashion due to logic errors in the software
(i.e., the design of the special purpose machine). These logic errors can result from:
• The software being written from incorrect requirements (i.e., the code matches the
requirements but the behavior specified in the requirements is not that desired from a system
perspective), or
• coding errors (i.e., the requirements are correct but the implementation of the
requirements in a programming language is faulty and, therefore, the behavior of the code does
not satisfy the behavior specified in the requirements).
Both of these types of errors must be considered when attempting to increase software reliability
and safety.
There are three ways to deal with software logic errors. The first, and most obvious,
approach is just to get the requirements and code correct. This is an enticing approach since it
is theoretically possible compared with the impossibility of eliminating wear-out failures in
hardware devices. Many people have realized, however, that, although perfect software could
be constructed theoretically, it is impossible from a practical standpoint to build complex
software that will behave exactly as it should under all conditions, no matter what changes occur
in the other components of the system (including failures), in the environment, and in the
software itself. Of course, getting correct software is an appropriate and important goal, but
engineers (software, system, and safety) need to consider what will happen in case the goal is
not achieved.
A second approach to dealing with logic errors in software is to enhance software
reliability by making the software fault-tolerant through the use of various types of redundancy.
On the Shuttle, the primary use of logical redundancy is the use of the BFS to backup the PASS
for some critical operations. Since the requirements and algorithms used for PASS and BFS are
the same, protection is not provided for errors resulting from incorrect requirements or
algorithms, only for coding errors (errors in the translation of the requirements and algorithms
into a programming language). Even this is limited since experiments testing this approach have
shown that programmers often make the same mistakes, and independently coded software does
not necessarily fail in an independent manner. _ Mathematical analysis and models have
demonstrated limitations in the actual amount of reliability improvement possible using this
approach.
The previous two approaches attempt to increase safety by increasing software reliability.
Although this is appropriate, it must be realized that, just as for hardware, increasing reliability
may not be adequate. Accidents have happened in systems where there were no failures or where
the reliability was very high. In software this often occurs when the software correctly
2 Although, strictly speaking, software cannot fail by the usual engineering definition of this term,
software failure is usually defined as the production of incorrect or untimely outputs.
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implements the requirements but the requirements include behavior that is not safe from a system
standpoint. In fact, this is the most common cause of accidents that have involved software.
However, it is possible to make systems safe despite failures and despite a relatively low
reliability level of individual components.
Instead of attempting merely to increase software reliability, a third approach to dealing
with software errors applies techniques commonly used in system-safety engineering. For
example, the identified system hazards can be traced to particular software requirements (and
from there to particular software modules). Those requirements and modules are then subjected
to special analysis and testing to make them extra reliable. Another approach, also using the
system-hazard analysis, is to identify the particular software behaviors that can lead to system
hazards and either protect the system against those types of behavior through changes to the
system design (e.g., the use of hardware interlocks) or to build in special protection against them
within the software itself, such as using special software interlocks, fail-safe software, and
software monitoring or self-checking mechanisms.
NASA, in the Shuttle software, has emphasized the first two approaches, although early
development efforts did attempt to include the software in the system-safety design efforts and
especially to evaluate the requirements from a system-safety viewpoint. For example, in 1979
TRW performed a software hazard analysis that identified 38 potentially hazardous software
behaviors. For some reason--perhaps budget cuts or perhaps because it was erroneously believed
that such an activity was not necessary once the software was completed--this effort ended in
1979. The current approach to software safety appears to focus almost exclusively on getting the
software upgrades correct and eliminating any requirements or logic errors that are found. The
Committee could find no evidence of the recent use of the TRW hazard analysis (in fact, the
software developers appear to be unaware of its existence) or any current attempts to update it
or use similar techniques. Currently, the system-safety effort appears to have little connection
to the software development and maintenance effort.
In summary, NASA established an excellent system-safety program during the Apollo
program. After Apollo, however, NASA seemed to grow complacent with success, until learning
from Challenger, it corrected many of its previous mistakes. However, software has been and
still is under-emphasized in the NASA system-safety program and many of the same mistakes
that contributed to the Challenger accident are now being repeated with respect to software,
especially with respect to the belief that safety procedures can be relaxed for operational
programs.
SOFTWARE SAFETY STANDARDS
Finding #5: Current NASA safety standards and guidelines do not include software to any
significant degree. A software safety guideline has been in draft form for four
years. Decisions are being made and safety-critical software is being built without
minimal levels of software safety analysis or management control being applied.
After the Challenger accident, a complete reevaluation of safety in NASA programs
occurred with an increased awareness, by some, of the need to include software in the safety
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efforts. New standards and guidelines were drafted, which include methodologies for software
safety analyses and requirements for the conduct of NASA software safety activities.
Although some details may differ, the draft software safety guideline is similar to the
major defense software safety standard, MIL-STD-882B, which is widely used both inside and
outside the defense community. The goal of both is to identify potential software-related system
hazards early in the development process and to establish requirements and design features to
eliminate or control the hazards. Both also recognize that the software safety activity, to be
effective, must be implemented as a part of the overall system-safety effort with direct channels
of information and coordination between them.
The draft NASA software safety guideline identifies the major safety activities to be
accomplished in each phase of the software development and maintenance life cycle and the
subtasks of the system-safety analyses that are related to software. These are
• Preliminary Hazard Analysis;
• System-Hazard Analysis;
• Subsystem-Hazard Analysis; and
• Operating-System-Hazard Analysis.
For example, as a subtask of the preliminary hazard analysis, a preliminary software
hazard analysis is conducted to identify (1) parts of the software that are safety-critical, (2) any
contribution of the software to potential system mishaps, and (3) software safety design criteria
that are essential to control safety-critical software commands and responses. Later in the life
cycle, analyses are conducted to determine (1) the potential contribution of software, as designed
and implemented, to the safety of the system; (2) that the safety criteria in the software
specifications have been satisfied; and (3) that the method of implementation of the software
design and corrective actions has not impaired or degraded system safety nor introduced new
hazards. In addition, several specific software hazard analysis tasks are identified:
• Software Requirements Hazard Analysis: The purpose of the Software Requirements
Hazard Analysis is to (1) identify required and recommended actions to eliminate identified
hazards or reduce their associated risk to an acceptable level and (2) establish preliminary testing
requirements. This analysis ensures an accurate flow-down of the system-safety requirements
into the software requirements.
• Top-Level Design-Hazard Analysis: Top-level design-hazard analysis relates the
identified hazards from the Subsystem Hazard Analysis, the Preliminary Hazard Analysis, and
the Software Requirements Hazard Analysis to the software components that may affect or
control the hazards. It also includes a definition and analysis of the safety-critical software
components.
• Detailed Design-Hazard Analysis: Detailed design-hazard analysis verifies the correct
implementation of the safety requirements and compliance with safety criteria. Hazards are
related to the lower-level software components defined in the detailed design, safety-critical
computer software units are identified, and the code developers are provided with explicit
safety-related coding recommendations and safety requirements.
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• Code-Level Software Hazard Analysis: Code-Level Software Hazard Analysis examines
the actual source and object code to verify the implementation of safety requirements and design
criteria.
• Software User Interface Analysis: Software user interface analysis ensures the system
can be operated in a safe manner.
The guideline includes requirements for special software safety testing if the normal
development testing is not adequate to ensure safety. Finally, the software developer must take
positive measures to be sure that all safety objectives and requirements have been included in
the software design (requirements traceability). These measures must be documented and
trace.able from the system-level specifications through each level of lower-tier software
documentation including actual code-level implementation.
Efforts at getting this draft software safety guideline approved have been stalled for many
years. At the same time, changes are being made to Shuttle software and new programs are
being started, such as the Space Station Freedom, without adequate standards for software safety
in place. The sticking point seems to be the NASA requirement for consensus on all standards
and guidelines. It seems odd to the Committee that those responsible for safety do not have the
authority to impose the standards that are needed to achieve it. Four years is too long to wait
for consensus.
The Committee understands that there is a good chance the NASA draft software safety
guideline may be approved soon. However, even then, it will be possible for the various centers
and programs to tailor their software safety programs without approval from those responsible
for safety at headquarters. From what the Committee can determine, the headquarters S&MQ
Office is limited to providing comments and conducting audits whose results are advisory.
Again, those with responsibility must be given authority to carry out their job. The current
situation does not appear to meet the original Rogers Commission recommendation to set up this
headquarters group, which specifically stated that the S&MQ Office should have direct authority
for safety, reliability, and quality assurance throughout the agency.
Recommendation #5: NASA should establish and adopt standards for software safety and apply
them as much as possible to Shuttle software upgrades. The standards
should be applied in full to new projects such as the space station. NASA
should not be building any software without such standards in place.
Recommendation #6: NASA should provide headquarters S&MQ with the authority to approve
or reject any tailoring of the software safety standards for individual
programs and minimize the differences between the safety programs
being followed at different centers within a single program.
Funding #6:
SOFTWARE SAFETY PROCEDURES
The Committee found insufficient coordination between the Shuttle system-safety
program and the software activity. There is no tracing of system hazards to
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software requirements and no criticality assessment of software requirements or
components (except when they are changed). There is no baseline software hazard
analysis that can be used to evaluate the criticality of software modifications and
no documentation of the software safety design rationale. There appear to be gaps
in the reporting of identified software hazards to the system-level hazard auditing
function; for example, a criticality 1 hazard can be accepted by the program
without being evaluated by the Shuttle Avionics Software Configuration Board or
the center safety office.
The Committee found evidence that, during the development of the Shuttle, safety issues
with respect to software were considered carefully, and a software hazard analysis was
performed. Somehow, this concern waned after the Shuttle became operational and attention was
turned to software maintenance and upgrades. Although the individual software developers have
implemented some safety programs on their own, there appears to be little direction provided
by NASA and little integration with the system-safety efforts.
For proper decision making, a program must have traceability of safety requirements in
both directions--down from the system to the subsystems and from the subsystems back up to
the system level. Software is somewhat unique in that it can be considered a subsystem, but it
controls other subsystems and operates as the interface between subsystems. Therefore, software
analysis must be closely integrated into the system-safety activity.
The first step in any software safety program is the generation of a baseline hazard
analysis that identifies potential hazardous behavior of the software that could contribute to
system hazards. The Committee independently discovered that TRW was under contract in 1979
to do a Software Hazard Analysis for the Shuttle. The reports generated include Initial
Identification of Software Hazards (38 were identified for the orbiter), Software Hazard
Analysis, and Software Fault-Tree Analysis of Data Management System Purge Ascent and
Entry Critical Functions. The TRW approach included:
potentiat
a critical-functions analysis by subsystem for pre-launch, ascent, on-orbit, and landing;
a list of the critical commands (what are the undesired events and what are the
hazards);
a Fault-Tree Analysis on the critical functions;
a check for coding errors;
an examination of software interfaces; and
• an examination of the hardware/software interface and determination if the software
could cause a hardware failure or vice versa.
Except for one person in the headquarters S&MQ Office (who had worked on the
analysis while previously employed by TRW), none of the people involved in the software
development seemed to be aware of this effort when the Committee inquired about it. The results
are apparently not used today. Instead, criticality levels are assigned to software changes
presented to the SASCB in a seemingly ad hoc fashion, starting the analysis basically from
scratch each time. The program needs a baseline software hazard analysis to use in this process.
The hazards should then be traced to the software requirements and the software modules,
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identifying the requirements and modules that are criticality 1 and 2. The analysis itself may
identify some necessary changes to the software, but its primary use would be to help make
decisions on proposed changes to the Shuttle software in the SASCB. The original TRW
software hazard analysis might serve as a starting point for this effort if it is still relevant to the
current design.
The current process relies too heavily on corporate memory and individual expertise,
which allows for the possibility of mistakes and redundant effort. Although the Committee found
that careful design rationales exist for the original software and hardware design decisions with
respect to safety, these have not been documented and are being lost when personnel changes.
Without this crucial information, changes can be inadvertently made that undo important safety
design considerations. NASA should document these design-rationale decisions. The resulting
documentation should be used when deciding about potential changes to the software.
The previous NRC committee recommended consideration of performing FMEAs on
software. The current committee does not believe that this is a practical or useful approach.
However, since DRs are currently being assigned criticality levels, they need to be related to
the CIL or system hazards in some way. Furthermore, decisions are being made about changes
and enhancements to the software, and these also must be evaluated with respect to their safety
implications. In response to a written question, JSC and MSFC both stated that system-level
hazards (i.e., items on the CIL) are not traced to software requirements, components, or
functions.
Although FMEAs on software do not make sense, hazard analyses that determine the
critical outputs and behavior of software and trace from system hazards to software requirements
and modules could be very useful. They have been performed on software for many years and
in many different applications, and they are included in the draft software safety guideline. The
Shuttle program goes through this process informally every time a change is assigned a criticality
level (usually by the developer). The process needs to be formalized. By doing a Software-
Change Hazard Analysis based on the information contained in the baseline hazard analysis,
redundant effort will be eliminated and, more important, the chance for errors will be reduced,
and the oversight ability of the NASA S&MQ staff will be enhanced.
Communication and traceability must also proceed in the other direction, from the
software change activities to the system-safety activity. The Committee could not find a clear
reporting channel from the SASCB to the Level 2 boards responsible for system safety.
Communication is apparently through the center SR&QA software representative, who has joint
membership on several boards, and through Safety Assessment and Hazard Analysis Reports,
which do not appear to be used consistently throughout the program. Very few hazard reports
are ever written for software. This might be justified for software errors that are removed (and,
thus, are no longer hazards) but does not apply to accepted software hazards and software-related
problems for which the resolution is a User Note 3 rather than a software change.
3 A User Note is a document that is included in the description of the software for use by the crew
during training and during a mission. These notes typically describe situations that have been recognized as
anomalies in the software, but that have been deemed to be sufficiently benign that they do not require an
immediate fix, or for which adequate software is not possible.
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The Committee found little formal (documented) information flowing upward and little
coordination between the SASCB and the Level 2 safety boards (the System-Safety Review Panel
and the Payload Safety Review Board). When asked how software changes are noted or reported
to those responsible for system-hazard auditing, JSC replied, "All proposed software changes
and detected errors are reviewed by the SASCB." However, the SASCB is the software
configuration management control board and not the group responsible for system-hazard
auditing. MSFC answered that they sent Safety Assessment and Hazard Analysis Reports to the
higher levels, but did not describe how often or how thoroughly they are used. Furthermore, the
Committee found evidence that not all detected errors or hazards in the software are reviewed
by the SASCB.
For example, the Committee (accidenfly) found three instances of acceptance of a
software hazard related to the avionics software that were not officially reported either to the
SASCB or to higher-level boards. These three DRs were originally assigned a severity of 1 or
1N and were downgraded to 5 (the designation that corresponds to No DR) and signed off only
by the Flight Data Systems Division flight software manager, not the SASCB.
The first of these three DRs, 101041 (Premature Solid Rocket Booster Separation), was
determined to be a valid problem that had been previously unrecognized. The contractor and the
Flight Data Systems Division manager decided that the hazard was covered by an existing
FMEA/CIL-accepted hazard and so it was signed off. However, the existence of another path
to this hazard (through software) was never reported to those responsible for the FMEA/CIL
auditing. Thus, the hazard was accepted at an inappropriate level without documentation in the
FMEA/CIL database and without official examination or concurrence by the SASCB or JSC
Safety Office.
In another case, DR 103752, the severity 1 problem was judged unsolvable by software
means and the disposition recommended that a new User Note be created. However, this DR
was never seen by the SASCB and apparently never evaluated by the center SR&QA software
staff. The only way for the SR&QA Office to have been assured that the User Note was actually
added would have been for them to have found this DR in one of the several databases used to
track this type of information. Other DRs that resulted in changing the User Notes (e.g.,
105706, Entry Guidance Drag Reference Divergence) also were never seen by the SASCB or
higher-level safety boards. In this case, an assigned severity 3 error (no check seems to have
been made on the assigned level by anyone other than the contractor), was acknowledged as a
problem for the crew. The DR form says that it was decided, rather than to change the
algorithm, to handle the problem procedurally by modifying the User Notes and adding a
discussion of the problem to the specification. The Committee cannot understand why such DRs
are never reviewed by or reported to the SASCB and the Safety Office except through an entry
in one of the many data bases.
In a third severity 1 DR, 105711 (Multiple Post-MECO Events Cause A/C power failure),
the problem is noted as being recognized as a valid concern by the Shuttle Community, and as
prompting a power-load and timing analysis that concluded that the problem does not occur.
However, this problem was never dispositioned or signed off by the SASCB and there is no
indication that the Safety Office was involved in or reviewed the evaluation.
These three incidents were discovered by the Committee during an unrelated examination
by the Committee of several DRs. The Committee does not know how many other examples
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exist. Putting such DRs in one of the several data bases used throughout the program is not
sufficient to assure proper visibility.
The previous NRC committee examining the Space Shuttle process recommended that
"NASA take firm steps to ensure a continuing and iterative linkage between the formal risk
assessment process (e.g., FMEA/CIL and HA) and the STS engineering change activities." This
has yet to be done with respect to the STS software change activities.
Recommendation #7: For the Shuttle software safety process, NASA should provide a software
safety program plan (as described in the draft software safety guideline)
that is reviewed and approved by headquarters S&MQ, the SR&QA
managers at the centers, and the Shuttle program manager. This plan
should describe the organizational responsibilities, functions, and
interfaces associated with the conduct of the Shuttle software safety
program.
Recommendation #8: NASA should perform a hazard analysis for the Shuttle software, as
described in the draft software safety guideline. NASA also should
implement the other appropriate aspects of the draft software safety
guideline (testing, change hazard analysis, system-safety requirements
traceability) and provide a software safety design-rationale document.
NASA should establish (if necessary) and use reporting channels from
software to system-safety activities.
PERSONNEL
Finding//7: The SR&QA offices at the centers have limited personnel to support
software-related activities. The assignment of one civil servant to software safety
is not adequate to do more than just attend meetings.
Finding #8: There is little oversight or evaluation of software development activities by the
center SR&QA offices.
The 1988 NRC committee report on the Shuttle reported that:
Members of the Committee were told by JSC representatives that, because of limited
staff, the JSC SR&QA organization now provides little independent review and oversight
of the software activities in the NSTS program ....
There is little involvement of the JSC SR&QA organization in software reviews, due to
the limitations on staff. As a result, there is little independent QA [quality assurance] for
software.
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The present committee found that this situation has not changed. At JSC, there is one
civil service employee and four contractors to support the flight software activities in the Safety
Division of SR&QA. The same number support the Reliability Division, and the Quality
Division has the equivalent of one and one half Civil Service employees and four and one half
support contractors. This makes for a total of sixteen staff supporting Shuttle flight software (out
of a total of nearly 400 working in SR&QA at JSC). At MSFC, Software Safety has one civil
service employee and the equivalent of one half of a support contractor. The number is the same
for Software Reliability, and Software Quality Assurance has two civil service employees and
one support contractor, which makes a total of six in the SR&QA Division.
It may not be possible to immediately implement the Committee's recommendations due
to lack of adequate, trained personnel. The Committee recommends that, while the in-house
expertise is being established, NASA contract separately with software safety evaluation
contractors using the concept of designated NASA representatives as defined in the draft
software safety guideline. The use of designated representatives is similar to what is currently
done by the FAA in the certification of commercial aircraft.
Reeonmaendation//9: NASA should build up expertise on software and software safety within
the center SR&QA groups and headquarters and provide adequate
personnel to perform flight software S&MQ activities.
SYSTEM-SAFETY ORGANIZATIONAL ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
Finding #9: The reporting relationship between the centers and headquarters S&MQ is
ill-defined. There is little interaction between the JSC SR&QA Office and the
software development activities within IBM and Rockwell. Headquarters has no
enforcement power (i.e., no authority for performance). Multiple centers on the
same program may be enforcing different standards and procedures.
The Committee found that the headquarters Safety Office has responsibility for safety
without the authority to do what is necessary to ensure it. The headquarters Safety Office
appears to be limited, for the most part, to making recommendations. There also appear to be
ill-defined reporting relationships. For example, the dotted-line 4 relationship (see Figure 5-1)
between the headquarters Safety Office and the center S&MQ offices is undefined and
ambiguous in practice. In answer to a written question by the Committee about the relationship
between headquarters S&MQ and the centers, NASA replied, "Code Q [headquarters S&MQ]
is responsible for providing NASA policies, standards, and guidance. They are not on the
4 The term dotted-line is often used to describe two organizations between which there is no formal line
of authority. The term originates from organization charts that have a solid line to indicate formal reporting
relationships and dotted lines to indicate less formal relationships. The relationship between the headquarters
S&MQ and the center SR&QA groups is informal in the sense that headquarters cannot compel the center
offices to perform specific tasks or provide information. On the other hand, the center offices receive some of
their funding from the headquarters office and so there is some incentive, albeit informal, to cooperate.
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distribution for reports on verification and validation, software QA [quality assurance], and
software reliability from the centers." This appears to contradict the original recommendation
of the Rogers Commission for establishing this office:
NASA should establish an Office of Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance to be
headed by an Associate Administrator, reporting directly to the NASA Administrator. It
would have direct authority for safety, reliability, and QA throughout the agency. The
office should be assigned the work force to ensure adequate oversight of its functions and
should be independent of other NASA functional and program responsibilities. The
responsibilities of this office should include:
• the SR&QA functions as they relate to all NASA activities and programs; and
• direction of reporting and documentation of problems, problem resolution, and
trends associated with flight safety.
The relationship between the safety office at each center and the safety efforts within the
development contractors appears also to be nonexistent or indirect (i.e., through the SASCB).
This is in contrast to the practice of most military system-safety programs that use System-Safety
Working Groups and Software System-Safety Working Groups to coordinate safety efforts in
complex systems. The System-Safety or Software-Safety Working Group is a functional
organization with the objective of ensuring that the interactions between the agency safety efforts
and its contractors and subcontractors are effective. Members are usually the agency safety
manager, the integration contractor safety manager, representatives from appropriate offices
within the agency, and the safety managers within the contractors and subcontractors. Members
of the group are responsible for coordinating the efforts within their respective organizations and
reporting the status of issue resolutions. The Committee believes that such a group or groups
within the Shuttle program would help to solve communication problems and provide a more
coherent software safety program.
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Figure 5-1 The dotted-line relationship between the Headquarters Safety and Mission Quality
(S&MQ) Office and the center Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance (SR&QA) offices is
undefined and ambiguous in practice and appears to contradict the original recommendation of
the Rogers Commission for establishing these offices.
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The Committee is also concerned about the safety certification process in NASA. The
Committee notes the existence of program-independent safety certification boards in other
agencies. For example, the Navy Weapon System Explosives Safety Review Board must assure
the incorporation of explosives safety criteria in all weapon systems. This is accomplished
through reviews conducted throughout all life-cycle phases of the weapon system. This board
reviews system-safety and software-safety analyses that include:
lessons
• identification of hazards;
• identification of causal links to software;
• identification of safety-critical computer software components and units;
• development of safety design requirements;
• identification of generic safety design requirements from generic documents and
learned;
• tracing of safety design requirements;
• identification and analysis of critical source code and methodology chosen;
• results of detailed safety analyses of critical functions;
• analysis of design-change recommendations for potential safety impacts; and
• final assessment of safety issues.
The Weapons Review Board is supported in these tasks by a Software Systems Safety
Technical Review Board. An important feature of these boards is that they are separate from the
programs and, thus, allow an independent evaluation and certification of safety.
There is no equivalent program-independent review board in NASA. The Aerospace
Safety Advisory Board does not consider programs at this level of detail and does not have the
responsibility to certify the safety of particular programs. The Level 2 System-Safety Review
Panel and Payload Safety Review Board review only hazard reports and do not evaluate or
certify the safety-related software activities and products. Such an independent certification board
would best be established under the control of the headquarters Safety Office.
Finally, the use of senior managers, scientists, and engineers on high-level peer
committees is one measure of the quality of and commitment to a safety program. NASA and
the U.S. Congress set up an Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) after the Apollo
Command Module fire in 1967 to act as a senior advisory committee to NASA. The panel's
charter states:
The panel shall review safety studies and operations plans referred to it and shall make
reports thereon, shall advise the Administrator with respect to the hazards of proposed
operations and with respect to the adequacy of proposed or existing safety standards, and
shall perform such other duties as the Administrator may request.
The panel provides independent review and an open forum for NASA and contractor
personnel to air technical strengths and weaknesses to a group that reports directly to the NASA
Administrator and Congress. The ASAP does not supersede the efforts of the various NASA
safety, reliability, and quality-assurance organizations nor interfere with them, but it adds weight
to management's emphasis on safety that is not obtainable in other ways because of the panel's
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position in the organizational matrix, the members' individual and collective expertise, their
independence, and their impartiality.
Thus, such a panel provides additional benefits to those provided by the ongoing safety
efforts: independence and lack of involvement in internal politics, additional confidence that
nothing falls through the cracks from a safety viewpoint, accountability to management and the
public, and a means for an open forum and expanded communications for all levels and types
of technical and administrative personnel.
Although software should be part of the normal ASAP activities, special expertise is
needed to deal with software issues. A special subcommittee of the ASAP to consider software
safety issues could demonstrate and give visibility to NASA's understanding of the growing
importance of, and dependence upon, software to the safe accomplishment of NASA's mission
and its commitment to resolving the issues related to this relatively new technology.
Recommendation #10: NASA should establish better reporting
relationships between developers, centers,
headquarters Safety Office.
and management
programs, and the
Recommendation #11: NASA should consider the establishment of a NASA safety
certification panel or board separate from the program offices and
also the establishment of a subcommittee of the Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel to deal with software issues.
6ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES
INTRODUCTION
The process by which NASA maintains and upgrades the Shuttle flight software involves
a very complicated network of NASA organizations and contractors, with numerous formal and
informal relationships between the program, the centers, and headquarters. The purpose of this
chapter is to bring together several of the specific findings and recommendations that have been
alluded to in previous chapters regarding the interaction of these various organizations.
The organizational problems that the Committee has identified can be summarized as
follows:
• The relationships among the various members of theflight software community are not
well defined, despite the program's recent attempts to do so. The Committee believes this lack
of visibility could result in inadequate monitoring of the process and inadequate reporting and
resolution of problems. This increases the chance that problems will be overlooked.
• The reporting, management, communication, and oversight relationships between the
various members of theflight software community need to be improved.
• The S&MQ Office at NASA headquarters and SR&QA offices at the centers are not
as effective as they should, or could, be. Because of inadequate resources and lack of authority,
they have been unable to produce NASA-wide standards for software IV&V, reliability, quality
assurance, or safety in a timely fashion. This has resulted in inconsistent and, in the
Committee's opinion, inadequate implementation of these valuable oversight functions. In
addition, there is insufficient technical expertise in the S&MQ offices at headquarters and at the
centers to ensure that software oversight functions are adequately implemented and carried out.
As a result of these issues, the Committee believes that potentially removable elements
of risk remain in the NASA Shuttle program.
The sections that follow in this chapter describe the specific findings of the Committee
regarding the organization of the Shuttle flight software process, and the corresponding
recommendations that will help ensure proper control over the process.
DOCUMENTING THE PROCESS
As mentioned previously, the Shuttle Program Office has recently attempted to document
the software V&V process to provide some visibility into the software maintenance and upgrade
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process as a whole. This was a good first step and has been valuable in helping the Committee
understand the roles and relationships of the various organizations that participate. However, as
evidenced by its numerous additional questions about various organizations and their
responsibilities, the Committee does not feel that the complete process is adequately documented.
In fact, based on discussions with NASA and contractor personnel, and based on the
Committee's own experience with the Shuttle program, the Committee believes that there is a
great deal of information about the day-to-day execution of the Shuttle flight software process
that is not contained in any existing document but is instead passed on from person to person
in the form of accumulated knowledge and on-the-job training.
Fmding #10: The Shuttle flight software maintenance and upgrade process is not adequately
documented. There are important aspects of the process that are not described in
the available documentation. This lack of visibility represents an increased risk
of software-related problems.
An example of this lack of important documentation came to the Committee's attention
when it asked to see the process by which DRs are dispositioned. There was no single document,
or even small group of documents, that could be readily provided to describe this process. To
respond to the Committee's question, it was necessary for the Shuttle Program Office to write
a description from scratch, using the accumulated knowledge of various people in several
different organizations. The Committee considers the DR dispositioning process to be a vital
piece of the overall maintenance and upgrade process and a prime example of an important
function that should be captured for all to see and understand. There are other examples of
which the Committee is aware, and, undoubtedly, several instances that have escaped its
attention, precisely because they lack the visibility that would be afforded by more complete
documentation.
This situation is an artifact of the evolution of the process over the lifetime of the Shuttle;
the Shuttle flight software process is nearly unique in its age, the number of people and
organizations that are involved, and the size and complexity of the software. While the
Committee believes that most of the people who are responsible for managing and assuring the
execution of the process understand how all the pieces fit together, the situation will only get
worse as experienced personnel leave the program over the ensuing years. An effort must be
made to step back from the day-to-day execution of the process and get the details down in
writing. The Committee believes it is time for the Shuttle program to do so for the following
three reasons:
1. Without complete and accurate delineation of each organization's role and
responsibility, upper management cannot have the proper visibility into the process to assure that
all necessary functions are being performed.
2. If the roles and responsibilities are not completely spelled out in a form that all
organizations have access to, those organizations may be unsure of their proper roles and the
roles of others within the process.
3. The program runs the risk of losing important information when the people who
understand the process retire or move on to other programs.
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The end result of failing to fully capture the details of the process will be an increased
risk of software, requirements, and process errors causing delays and potential safety problems.
The Committee also believes that by undertaking an exercise to better understand and document
the current process, the Shuttle program will, independently of the other findings and
recommendations of this committee, discover areas where the process could be streamlined to
reduce cost without adversely affecting safety and performance.
Recommendation #12: NASA should continue to enhance the current effort to fully
document all aspects of the Shuttle flight software process. The
effort should clarify the responsibilities of each contractor and
each part of the NASA organization in a concise and readable
format. The level of detail of the descriptions should be
commensurate with: (1) the needs of NASA's upper management
for visibility into the process, (2) the needs of the Shuttle Program
Office to understand and pass on information regarding its
procedures for administering and controlling the process, and (3)
the needs of each participant in the process to understand the
boundaries of its responsibilities and authority.
ORGANIZATIONAL ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
The Committee submitted numerous questions to NASA in an attempt to clarify the
relationships among headquarters S&MQ, the program offices at the centers, the center S&MQ
offices, and the contractors. The Committee also spent a great deal of time and effort with the
documentation that purports to describe the process, trying to understand the lines of authority
and responsibility within what NASA refers to as the flight software community. The
information obtained from the Comn_ittee's investigations, the responses obtained to the
Committee's questions, and information gleaned from corresponding discussions held with
representatives from the various organizations uncovered several areas of concern regarding the
responsibility and authority of various organizations, and the manner in which potential problems
are brought to light for consideration by the community.
Chapter 3 and Appendix E describe the various organizational relationships that make up
the flight software community. A few of the key relationships that the Committee has considered
are
• Headquarters S&MQ reports to the NASA Administrator and has only a dotted-line
relationship with the S&MQ offices at the centers (i.e., headquarters S&MQ funds the center
activities but the centers do not report to headquarters).
• The S&MQ offices at the centers report to the center director, but interact with the
Shuttle program at the working level and through their participation at SASCB meetings.
• The IV&V contractor reports directly to the Shuttle program through the SASCB.
• The software development effort at MSFC interacts with the rest of the flight software
community through the SASCB.
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These relationships form the framework for the findings and recommendations that
follow.
The Role of S&MQ
F'mding #11: The headquarters S&MQ Office would have no authority to enforce established
guidelines and policies if such existed.
Finding #12: The SR&QA offices at the centers do not have the resources, manpower, or
authority to compel the development contractors or other NASA organizations to
provide information that is sufficient to assure that the proper process is being
followed.
The Committee investigated the approach used to provide oversight (i.e., IV&V, safety,
reliability, and quality assurance) for software development and maintenance in the U.S. Air
Force and the U.S. Navy. The Committee found that, in general, it is the responsibility of a
program manager to tailor the implementation of these oversight functions based on the
particular needs and constraints of his/her program. This should be done within guidelines that
are supplied, approved, and monitored by a quality-assurance organization outside the control
of the program.
Within NASA, the Shuttle program management is also responsible for determining the
best implementation of these functions, but, as discussed later in this chapter, there axe no
approved policies or guidelines to move the program toward an effective implementation.
Furthermore, there is no authority vested in the S&MQ Office to approve and monitor the
particular approach chosen by the program. In other words, the Shuttle program does not
conform to the model followed by the U.S. Air Force and Navy because there are no policies
or guidelines for the programs to follow, and no authority or manpower to enforce them if they
existed. Instead, the Shuttle program itself is responsible for implementing software oversight
functions, while the S&MQ Office at headquarters and the SR&QA offices at the centers have
been relegated to an advisory role.
The Committee has also found, through its discussions with various NASA personnel,
that the headquarters S&MQ Office and the SR&QA Office at JSC do not have the manpower
needed to fully monitor the process. In addition, the Committee understands that the number of
people within the S&MQ and SR&QA offices who have the technical expertise to consider issues
that are unique to software is very limited, especially considering the number of people and
organizations involved in developing the software. Great concern was expressed to the
Committee regarding the ability of the SR&QA offices at JSC and MSFC to obtain from the
development contractors the type and volume of information needed to properly monitor
compliance to the process. For example, the SR&QA Office at JSC does not have the authority
to compel contractors to provide the information needed, nor would they have the manpower to
fully utilize the information if it were provided. Instead they rely on their ability to maintain a
good working relationship with the contractors and the program itself. The Committee endorses
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the idea of maintaining good working relationships but stresses the need to have other avenues
of enforcement when, as often happens, those relationships become strained.
In summary, as quoted previously in Chapter 5, the current role and authority assigned
to the S&MQ offices at NASA headquarters and the SR&QA offices at the centers is counter
to the recommendation of the Rogers Commission that resulted in the S&MQ Office being
created.
The Committee believes the spirit of this recommendation has not been followed. This
is evidenced by the fact that the S&MQ and SR&QA offices lack the authority or the resources
needed to approve the manner of oversight implemented by the Shuttle program and to fully
monitor their effectiveness.
Recommendation #13: The headquarters S&MQ Office should be given the authority to
approve or disapprove the program's implementation of software
oversight functions once appropriate guidelines and policies are
established.
Recommendation #14: NASA should increase the support for software-related SR& QA activities
at the centers and give them the authority to obtain any information
they consider necessary to adequately assure compliance with the
established process.
Finally, the Committee was told, in response to a question submitted to NASA, that the
headquarters S&MQ Office is not routinely included in the reporting of software-related
problems. In addition, it became clear during discussions with the S&MQ personnel that much
of their effort is spent trying to obtain important information from the program, simply because
they are not on the normal distribution list. In fact, more than one member of the S&MQ staff
stated to the Committee that they greatly appreciated being invited to the Committee's meetings
so they could find out what is happening in the Shuttle flight software program. The Committee
was also told that there are no requirements for routine reporting of software issues to higher-
level program boards that are responsible for safety of the overall Shuttle system. In other
words, software issues are not given the same visibility within the Shuttle program as hardware
issues.
F'mding #13: There is a lack of visibility for potential software problems because there are few
requirements or opportunities to report software reliability, quality assurance, or
safety problems at the program-level safety organizations, or to headquarters.
Recommendation #15: The headquarters S&MQ Office and the SR&QA offices at the centers
should be given routine access to all software-related problem reports,
and all members of the flight software community should be made
aware of their responsibility to keep these oversight organizations
involved in their activities.
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Community Responsibility
The issue of community, or collective, responsibility arose during the Committee's
attempts to understand precisely which organizations are responsible for each stage of the Shuttle
flight software proce_. Early in this investigation the Committee was struck by the lack of
detailed information on the various organizational roles and responsibilities throughout the
process despite the recent attempts by the Shuttle program to provide better documentation. The
Committee had expected to find a detailed delineation of each function that is performed, with
a specific NASA or contractor organization given responsibility for that function. In most cases,
this was the case. However, the Committee found that the responsibility for some very important
functions was assigned to what NASA terms the flight software community.
Finding//14: Many important functions within the flight software process appear to be assigned
to the flight software community rather than a specific NASA or contractor
organization.
Figure 6-1 shows a chart from the NASA-approved description of the software
development process 1 that shows the flight software community as being responsible for such
important activities as generating CRs and analyzing and inspecting requirements. Other, similar
charts from the same document show theflight software community as participants in activities
where the responsibility lies with specific contractors or a specific NASA organization.
The Committee realizes that the document from which Figure 6-1 is taken is an attempt
to condense a great deal of information about a very complicated process into a relatively short
description, and it understands that NASA, and particularly the Shuttle Avionics Office at JSC,
is ultimately responsible for all aspects of the Shuttle flight software. The Committee further
realizes that assigning the flight software community responsibility for part of the process is an
attempt on the part of NASA to show how all members of the community are encouraged to
participate, in the hope that having more people involved in the process makes it more likely that
potential problems will be found before they are implemented in the software. This is a valid
goal, and the Committee believes it should be encouraged. However, specific task accountability
and safety goals cannot be reached unless there axe specific organizations, and thus specific
people, within the flight software community who are given responsibility for performing each
function. The Committee believes that failure to assign responsibility for the performance of a
function to a specific organization opens the process up to interpretation and increases the
potential that important functions will be forgotten or ignored because responsibility for them
was left to the community. In short, community responsibility often results in no one taking
responsibility, even in situations where safety of the crew or performance of the mission is at
stake. This type of community responsibility, for example, was one of the factors that
contributed to the Challenger accident.
t This discussion pertains primarily to the information found in the often quoted roadmap of the V&V
process, Space Shuttle Flight Software Verification and Validation Requirements, NSTS-08271.
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The Committee believes the way to ensure that all aspects of the process are performed
with diligence and integrity is to assign each part of the process to a specific organization, with
the appropriate Shuttle Program Office given ultimate responsibility. However, because the
Committee also believes that much can be gained by having the community evaluate the
software, the flight software community should continue to be encouraged, and in many cases
required, to participate. Both approaches can, and should, be implemented. Also, the Committee
cautions against relying too heavily on the ultimate responsibility that is vested in the program
itself. The NASA organizations that make the final decision to fly the Shuttle cannot be expected
to fully understand all the issues involved; they must rely on the good advice of the
organizations that built and tested the software. The best way to make sure the program gets
good advice is to make sure that all the developers and evaluators have specific responsibilities
that must be performed before the process can proceed.
Recommendation #16: NASA should assign specific responsibilities for each aspect of the flight
software process and document them accordingly. Responsibility should
be assigned to individuals or offices and not to the community as a
whole.
POLICIES, GUIDELINES, AND ENFORCEMENT
The fact that this and other studies have been necessary indicates that the benefits of
IV&V, software reliability, software quality assurance, and software safety have not been fully
impressed upon the Shuttle program management. This is partially a failure of the program
management to realize these benefits, but it is also a failure by NASA headquarters to provide
the program management with the appropriate cost-versus-benefit information and the
appropriate policies and guidelines for implementation of these oversight functions.
F'mding #15: There is a lack of accepted policies and guidelines for appropriate implementation
of software V&V, IV&V, reliability, quality assurance, and safety.
In general, the Shuttle Program Office is responsible for tailoring the implementation of
these oversight functions in a way that is appropriate for the program, given the funds available
and the perceived benefits to be gained.
Several documents have been given to the Committee that are meant to provide guidance
to NASA programs in these areas hut, in most eases, they have not been officially adopted by
NASA as standards or even officially published as guidelines for program managers. Without
clear guidelines and policies, it is very difficult for program management to determine
appropriate roles, authority, and responsibilities for these functions. This lack of NASA-wide
policies and guidelines has permitted a wide range of implementations of the various oversight
functions which, in the Committee's opinion, has resulted in an inconsistent retrieval of the
benefits offered by these functions. If headquarters were to better educate program managers in
the benefits of software IV&V, reliability, quality assurance, and safety, NASA's programs,
including the Shuttle program, would surely benefit. This education process, however, requires
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a consistent and coherent description of the benefits and the associated costs followed up by
appropriate policies and guidelines.
The Committee was told that the two primary reasons such policies and guidelines have
not been published is a lack of sufficient personnel to develop them and the cumbersome process
by which NASA-wide approval is obtained. In brief, the Committee found that several very
useful documents were held up from being officially accepted by NASA because of the
requirement to obtain complete consensus from all the centers. In some cases, this consensus
process took years to complete. The delays resulted in part from conflicts between the centers
and in part from personnel responsible for granting approval simply missing the deadlines
established by headquarters for providing comments on the documents under consideration.
This consensus-building process is a worthy goal but should not be used as an excuse for
failing to issue policies in a timely fashion. Without enlisting the centers and program personnel
to determine the best implementations of the oversight functions, headquarters runs the risk of
fostering distrust and outfight opposition. On the other hand, the requirement for complete
agreement before these documents can be accepted allows for possible filibusters or simply
passive resistance that results in no policies being established. The Committee believes that a
process must be put in place that forces headquarters to solicit, in good faith, the opinions of
those managers at the centers who will be responsible for implementing the proposed oversight
functions and yet gives headquarters the authority to break any impasse that may result.
Recommendation #17: NASA should establish a process that provides the center and program
managers with the opportunity to comment on proposed policies and
guidelines, but also gives the appropriate headquarters personnel the
authority to approve the policies and guidelines in cases where complete
consensus cannot be reached in a reasonable amount of time. This
process should have the following features:
• The authors ofproposed policies and guidelines must respond in
writing to explain why concerns or criticisms that have been expressed
are not incorporated in the final version.
• The process should have well-defined deadlines for submitting
comments, and the authors should be given the option of proceeding
with the approval process once those deadlines have passed.
• The process should include a provision for arbitrating disputes
at a level of management above the program offices and the
headquarters S&MQ Office, i.e., to the Deputy Administrator or to the
Administrator, if necessary.
Finding #16: A primary reason for the lack of established policies and guidelines is the lack of
sufficient resources, manpower, and expertise devoted to developing them.
Based on discussion with the S&MQ personnel at NASA headquarters and the SR&QA
offices at the centers, and also based on the Committee's observations of the time required to
develop and obtain approval for appropriate policies and guidelines, the Committee believes that
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there have been inadequate resources devoted to software IV&V, reliability, quality assurance,
and safety efforts within the SR&QA offices at the centers and at headquarters. The lack of
sufficient personnel with knowledge of the unique aspects associated with software is at least
partially responsible for delays in getting consistent policies and guidelines prepared and
disseminated. This, in turn, has resulted in the centers being forced to make difficult choices
between the needed oversight functions and other pressing activities in the absence of complete
information about the benefits these various oversight activities offer.
The Committee realizes that there is great pressure from within NASA and from
Congress to cut costs, particularly in the Space Shuttle program; when resources are limited
these oversight functions are often the first to be targeted for elimination. However, it is the
belief of this Committee that if a commitment were made by NASA headquarters and Shuttle
program management to adequately support the oversight functions with the funds and personnel
needed, and if a consistent NASA-wide policy were prepared, considerable benefits could be
realized that would justify any additional cost. Furthermore, the Committee believes that an
effective case could be made to Congress and to the administration, based on the long-term
savings realized by avoiding expensive overruns and failures, that would help lessen the pressure
to reduce costs.
The Committee also realizes that the more prominent role played by software in modem
flight systems is relatively new and that engineering procedures have not entirely caught up with
the need. At the very least, the budget for the S&MQ and SR&QA offices for software-related
activities should be increased above the threshold level needed to produce appropriate guidelines
and policies and to adequately track compliance with those policies and guidelines within the
programs that are affected.
Recommendation #18: NASA should provide the S&MQ Office at headquarters and the SR&QA
offices at the centers with the additional resources needed to build their
expertise in software IV& V, safety, reliability, and quality assurance.
The budget and personnel devoted to software safety, reliability, and
quality-assurance activities should be of sufficient size to allow adequate
policies and guidelines to be prepared and compliance with those
guidelines and policies to be fully monitored.
7FINAL THOUGHTS AND FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS
INTRODUCTION
There is currently a great deal of discussion within Congress, NASA, and the Federal
Executive Branch regarding the future of the Space Shuttle program. There are those who
believe the Shuttle is a well-tested and well-understood transportation system and, with
appropriate upgrades of new technology and more capable and reliable subsystems, should
continue to fly well into the next century. There are also those who believe it is time to begin
developing the next generation of manned space transportation systems and that Shuttle
operations should be curtailed or eliminated once a new system is operational. In either case,
the Committee believes it is imperative that the "lessons learned" to this point in the current
Shuttle program be used as a guide, whether for future operation of the Shuttle or for preparing
the development, assurance, and maintenance procedures for other space programs.
GATHERING THE LESSONS LEARNED
It is the Committee's belief that NASA and the current group of development,
integration, and IV&V contractors are best positioned to gather all the detailed lessons learned
from years of day-to-day operation of the Shuttle. This includes the on-going attempt to
document the current processes as fully as possible, as recommended in Chapter 6. It should also
include an effort by the current Shuttle program personnel, and as many people who have gone
on to other programs as possible, to begin to draw some conclusions based on their experiences
and to gather them into a form that future software managers and developers can use to guide
their efforts.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Committee has found the report written by Hanaway and
Moorehead I to be valuable because of its discussion of the history and evolution of the Shuttle
avionics system. The report includes personal observations and even some candid statements
regarding the decisions that were made early in the program. In the opinion of the Committee,
this type of document is necessary if useful information is to be passed from one program to
another. Unfortunately, this report does not include a detailed discussion of the software
development and maintenance process or, more importantly, a discussion of the decisions that
t Hanaway, John F., Robert W. Moorehead, Space Shuttle Avionics System, NASA SP-504, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (Washington D.C.: National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
1989).
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were made early in the program regarding that process and their eventual impact on the
performance, safety, and robustness of the software. The Committee believes that there are
numerous areas within the software process, many involving more technical detail about the
history of the process and the software, that should be captured in a similar fashion.
The Committee has mentioned several times in this report, and in its Interim Report, the
need to capture the knowledge of the current Shuttle program personnel prior to their retirement
or transfer to other programs. This same concern applies to programs such as Space Station
Freedom (SSF) and the Earth Observing System (EOS). The SSF program, for example, is
already far enough advanced that people at all levels of management and technical support are
retiring despite the fact that there are still almost four years before the first element of the Space
Station reaches orbit. The complete software system for SSF will not be in place until 1999. To
avoid the condition that the Committee has found so difficult to deal with in its investigation of
the Shuttle processes, the decisions that are being made now about the software that will fly on
SSF, EOS, and other potential platforms must be captured before the programs get even farther
downstream and more of the original decision-makers retire.
The Committee realizes that it is difficult and tedious to take time to document a process
while it is being developed, especially while under pressure to design and build a safe and
effective system. But that is precisely when it is most effectively done, because the people who
are making the important decisions are still attached to the program on a daily basis. If, instead,
these programs are allowed to continue in the same manner as the Shuttle program, there will
almost certainly be another committee, similar to this one, convened sometime in the future and
asked to investigate the adequacy of the SSF or EOS software development and upgrade
processes without adequate documentation. Because the Shuttle flight software is, for a while
at least, unique within NASA in its size and years of use, the Committee believes that NASA
would do itself, and the nation, a great service if it were to capture these lessons learned and
make them available to the SSF program and other planned, or potential, manned programs. A
great service would also be performed if these new programs made a concerted effort from their
very beginning to fully document all decisions, both formal and informal, that may impact the
software or the processes used to develop it.
Recommendation #19: NASA should undertake an effort to capture the lessons learned in
the development, maintenance, and assurance of the Shuttle flight
software for use by other programs. This not only should take the
form of official documentation of the current process but also
should include less formal reports, observations, and opinions
drawn from current personnel and as many former Shuttle program
and contractor management and technical personnel as appro-
priate. The same type of documentation should be routinely
prepared for other programs as well.
Given the above recommendation, the Committee believes that it would be remiss if it
did not bring to NASA's attention a few of the most obvious conclusions drawn from its
investigations. The following findings and recommendations should be taken in the generic
sense, that is, the Committee has found them to be true of the Space Shuttle program, in varying
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degrees, and believes the possibility exists that similar problems will occur in the SSF program,
EOS, and elsewhere within NASA.
CONTRACT REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
There is the perception, which may or may not be correct, that the development
contractors can withhold vital information from the oversight organizations because of
proprietary concerns. There were a number of instances during the Committee's investigations
when it was told that NASA and its IV&V contractor are unable to routinely obtain sufficient
documentation of the development contractor's processes because of disputes over proprietary
information. While this committee was not constituted to address this type of dispute and did not
have the time to fully investigate the numerous relationships between the contractors and NASA,
there is the perception among many who spoke to the Committee that the development
contractors can choose to avoid full cooperation with the oversight activities if the contractors
determine that it is in their best interest to do so. Unfortunately, it is impossible for a committee
of this type to ascertain whether there is any truth to this perception; only the people who are
involved in the day-to-day activities of the software development process can know for sure.
However, the Committee can offer the recommendation in future contracts, both in the Shuttle
program and in future procurements for SSF, EOS, etc., that NASA be more complete in
spelling out the type and level of information that must be provided from the developers to the
oversight organizations. By further formalizing the information that is transferred from one
organization to another, NASA will gain greater confidence that proper information is available
to all who need it. Furthermore, the potential for conflict due to corporate competition may be
reduced once each company is made aware of precisely what information they are responsible
for providing to the rest of the flight software community.
Recommendations #20: In future procurements, NASA should more precisely identify the
information that each development and oversight contractor is
responsible for making available to each other and to the community
as a whole.
ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING
The Committee has recommended that NASA better document the current process and
try to capture the accumulated wisdom of current and past Shuttle personnel. A related issue is
the reluctance shown by the Shuttle program to fully implement the recommendations of the
Rogers Commission, the earlier NRC committee, the GAO, and NASA's own Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel, particularly in regards to the recommendations for fully independent V&V. In
the Committee's opinion, NASA has not been as aggressive as it should have been in
implementing the recommendations given to it by the various outside panels and committees in
the area of software oversight. This is due in large part, the Committee believes, to the lack of
90 SPACE SHUT'ILE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT PROCESSES
a concerted effort from within NASA to educate the program managers charged with controlling
software projects on the benefits of these important oversight functions.
The conclusion drawn by this committee is that the Shuttle program has not fully
understood the value of oversight functions such as IV&V and has a limited understanding of
the variety of ways they can be implemented to bring about a satisfactory compromise between
cost and benefit. The Committee feels the root cause for this limited understanding is that NASA
as a whole, and the S&MQ Office in particular, does not make an adequate effort to provide the
program with the information needed to make intelligent choices regarding the cost and benefit
of software oversight. As mentioned in the previous chapter, if the S&MQ Office were given
the resources and manpower necessary to fully educate the program managers, they could help
alleviate the problem for the current Shuttle process. This same problem is likely to occur in
future programs such as SSF and EOS and may well recur in the Shuttle program as more of
the current decision-making personnel at NASA and its contractors retire or move on to other
programs. A case in point is the recent report by the GAO 2 that discusses the Space Station
programs's software development process. It concludes:
• . . NASA has not incorporated truly independent V&V into the program for its most
critical software. What NASA labels as independent V&V is generally conducted by the
same organization that builds the software and does not provide an added level of
assurance over basic V&V activities. Program officials believe that little measurable
value would be realized from using an independent V&V agent and that such a practice
could be cosily. For a critical and expensive software undertaking such as that for the
Space Station, however, whether to employ independent V&V should not be based solely
on the judgement of program officials without data and analysis of additional costs and
risks.
The report also says:
Two management techniques key to controlling safety and cost risks associated with
developing software.., are independent V&V and a systematic approach to software
risk management. However, NASA has not incorporated these techniques into the [SSF]
program. As a result, safety concerns about mission failure or loss of life due to a
software failure are increased, as are concerns about higher long-term costs resulting
from not implementing these mechanisms.
These are the same concerns expressed by this committee regarding the Shuttle software
process, and much the same as were expressed by the Rogers Commission, the earlier NRC
Committee, the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, and the GAO. While this present committee
had access to several documents that were not available to previous investigations, if NASA had
had an effective mechanism in place for educating program managers on the benefits of software
2 The U.S. General Accounting Office, Space Station: NASA's Software Development Approach
Increases Safety and Cost Risks, (GAO/IMTEC-92-39) (U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C.,
1992).
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oversight, this committee's investigation may not have been necessary. NASA should understand
that the recommendations it has been offered in the past are worthy of greater consideration than
they appear to have been given.
Recommendation #21: Based on the lessons learned in the Shuttle program, NASA should put
in place the mechanisms necessary to ensure that all existing and
future programs are given the information needed to make intelligent
implementations of software oversight functions such as IV& V.
ESTABLISHING STATE-OF-THE-ART CAPABILITIES WITHIN NASA
NASA has planned some of the most complex software projects ever attempted. The
software to support the computers on board the Space Station, for example, is expected to
consist of over a million source lines of code. The supporting ground software will likely consist
of several times that. Like the Shuttle software, it will be a real-time system controlling
numerous life-critical subsystems. Perhaps more importantly, the current plans are to develop
the software in a very decentralized manner, with each of the NASA centers that participate in
the Space Station program developing different pieces that will later be integrated into a coherent
system. Each center has a prime contractor and numerous subcontractors, all of whom will be
responsible for designing and building software. The NASA program management at the center
will be responsible for managing and overseeing the development. There is no single prime
contractor that is responsible for integrating all the software, nor is an IV&V effort planned.
This project makes the scope of the Shuttle software seem almost trivial in comparison, and it
will stretch the limits of software engineering capabilities. To bring the Space Station software
effort, and others such as the EOS Data and Information System (EOSDIS), to a successful
completion, NASA will need to design and implement aggressive software development and
software-system-safety programs. The software safety programs must take advantage of
state-of-the-art technology and leading edge methodologies to build safety into the software and
the system while enhancing software development capabilities. This will require upgrading the
education and knowledge of the NASA workforce to make it a leader in software engineering
and software quality.
The Committee is concerned that the current software engineering and software-system-
safety capabilities within NASA may not be adequate to properly acquire and manage the
development of such large, complex, and safety-critical systems. The Committee believes that
the importance of software to the success of future NASA programs will only increase; NASA
should undertake an effort to keep pace by increasing its in-house expertise both at the working
level and among those expected to manage future programs and choose the contractors that will
do the work.
Ultimately, the responsibility for the safety and functionality of the software that is put
in place on future systems, including future Shuttle flight software upgrades, belongs to NASA.
Contractors can be expected to do their best to provide a quality product because not doing so
affects the future profit and reputation of their company. If, however, the contractors fail to
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provide a quality product, or if the numerous parts of the total system fail to operate as
expected, NASA will be the one left to explain to Congress and the nation why the system
failed. NASA owes it to itself and to the nation to maintain as much in-house capability as
possible to reduce its dependence on contractors and to provide proper assurance that contracted
work is done on time and with as much attention to safety as these future systems require and
deserve.
Recommendation #22: NASA should upgrade its workforce and management practices to
make it a leader in software engineering and software quality. NASA
should maintain as much in-house capability as possible to reduce its
dependence on contractors and to provide proper assurance that
contracted work is done on time and with as much attention to safety
and other qualities as future systems require and deserve.
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APPENDIX B
STATEMENT OF TASK
Committee for Review of Oversight Mechanisms
for Space Shuttle Flight Software Processes
The Committee will review and critique NASA's Shuttle Flight-Software validation and
verification process, by assessing the entire Flight Software development process from the initial
requirements definition phase to final implementation, including object code build and final
machine loading.
The Committee will review and critique NASA's independent and embedded validation
and verification process and mechanisms, including those mechanisms for enforcement of
NASA's established software development and testing standards. It will take into consideration
the process document prepared by Intermetrics, Inc., the recent GAO report, and NASA's
recommendations in response to the GAO report.
The Committee will determine the acceptability and adequacy of the embedded validation
and verification processes through comparison with (1) generally accepted industry practices, and
(2) generally accepted Department of Defense and/or other government practices (comparing
organizations/projects with similar volumes of software development, software maturity,
complexity, criticality, lines of code, national standards, etc.).
The Committee will consider whether or not independent validation and verification
should continue. It will consider the role an IV&V contractor might play, but it will not assess
the performance of Intermetrics, Inc.
The Committee will document the results of its assessment of NASA's V&V in a
progress report to accompany a briefing to the NASA Headquarters management. A final report
on the adequacy and acceptability of the entire software-development process will be prepared
as well, and a briefing to Headquarters management will be delivered. Recommendations, if any,
will be prioritized and include supporting rationale. The reports will undergo normal NRC report
review processes.
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NOTES ON THE COMMITTEE'S INTERIM REPORT
1 The Committee's Interim Report generated a great deal of interest from within
NASA and its contractors. Following its publication, the Committee was made
aware of several instances where it was felt, particularly by IBM, that the
Committee's statements were either inaccurate or misleading. The source of much
of this reaction was, in the Committee's view, a misinterpretation by IBM and
others of the scope and intent of the statements involved. For example, IBM,
Rockwell, and the Marshall Space Flight Center each expressed concern about the
following statement from the Executive Summary of the Interim Report:
The Committee believes that the Space Shuttle software-development process
is not adequate without IV& V and that elimination of IV& V as currently
practiced will adversely affect the overall quality and safety of the software,
both now and in the future.
Each of the organizations that objected to the above passage did so because they
felt that the evidence did not warrant such a conclusion for their particular 0art
0f the process. In other words, these organizations read this passage and were
concerned only with their individual responsibilities instead of considering the
process as a whole, as was the Committee's intent.
Several similar instances were also brought to the Committee's attention. In each
case, an organization read a passage and assumed it was aimed at their particular
part of the process instead of the process as a whole. While the Committee
understands the pressures that exist to maintain reputations, and understands that
such statements should not be made lightly, the Committee, nonetheless, stands
by its statements as they were published. We believe that if the Interim Report
is read with the understanding that each NASA organization and contractor is
only one part of the complete process, the statements in question accurately
reflect the current state of software development within the Shuttle program.
The Committee further wishes to express their hope that this parochial attitude,
wherein every organization looks out for its own interests and fails to see the
greater issues at stake, is not indicative of the approach taken to developing and
assuring the Shuttle flight software.
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o The Committee was originally told that there are over 400 compilable units in the
Shuttle on-board software. After publication of the Interim Report the Committee
was told that the number is closer to 1500. This is reflected in the description of
the software found in Chapter 1 of this Final Report.
o There was concern expressed by representatives of the development contractors
regarding the following statement that appears in the Interim Report:
For example, the current flight-software IV&V contractor has been
particularly active in addressing issues that relate to the interface between
the primary avionics software (developed by IBM) and the backup flight
software (developed by Rockwell) . . .
This statement apparently left the impression in the minds of some that the
Committee found errors in the Interface Control Document (ICD) that defines the
interaction between the PASS and BFS. This was not the case. The Committee
has not considered the ICD between the PASS and BFS. The concern here is that
there are errors in the implementation of those interface requirements that have
not been adequately driven out of the software through the testing done by the
development contractors. The IV&V contractor has been active in testing this
interface in an attempt to find those errors.
Independent Verification and Validation
for Space Shuttle Flight Software
Committee for Review of Oversight Mechanisms for Space Shuttle Flight Software Processes
Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board
Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems
National Research Council
July 1992
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Independent Verification and Validation for
Space Shuttle Flight Software
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Committee for Review of Oversight Mechanisms for Space Shuttle Flight Software was
asked by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Office of Space Flight
to determine the need to continue independent verification and validation (IV&V) for Space
Shuttle flight software. 1 The Committee found that the current IV&V process is necessary to
maintain NASA's stringent safety and quality requirements for man-rated vehicles. Therefore,
the Committee does not support NASA's plan to eliminate funding for the IV&V effort in fiscal
year 1993. The Committee believes that the Space Shuttle software development process is not
adequate without IV&V and that elimination of IV&V as currently practiced will adversely affect
the overall quality and safety of the software, both now and in the future. Furthermore, the
Committee was told that no organization within NASA has the expertise or the manpower to
replace the current IV&V function in a timely fashion, nor will building this expertise elsewhere
necessarily reduce cost. Thus, the Committee does not recommend moving IV&V functions to
other organizations within NASA unless the current IV&V is maintained for as long as it takes
to build comparable expertise in the replacing organization.
INTRODUCTION
In early 1991, NASA's Office of Space Flight commissioned the Aeronautics and Space
Engineering Board of the National Research Council (NRC) to investigate the adequacy of the
current process by which NASA develops and verifies Space Shuttle flight software. In January
1992, the Board convened the Committee for Review of Oversight Mechanisms for Space Shuttle
Flight Software Processes to evaluate the adequacy of the process from initial requirements
definition to final machine loading. The Committee was given until the end of 1992 to complete
its investigation and prepare a final report.
One of the issues the Space Shuttle program office requested that the Committee specifically
consider was the office's pending decision to eliminate the IV&V function currently performed
i It should be noted that the Committee was specifically asked not to evaluate the performance of the current
IV&V contractor, Iatermetrics, or its subcontractor at the Marshall Space Flight Center, Smith Advanced
Technologies, but rather to concentrate on the need to continue the function they serve.
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on the Shuttle flight software at an annual cost of $3.2 million. The IV&V function was
instituted, in part, as a result of a recommendation of a previous NRC committee evaluating
post-Challenger Space Shuttle risk assessment and management. The Shuttle program office now
believes that the flight software and the processes that are used to develop and verify updates
are sufficiently mature to permit a phase-out of the contractors that perform IV&V. Eliminating
this function is primarily a cost-saving move, but one that the Shuttle program office believes
is justified by the overall quality of the processes and personnel that are in place to maintain the
software. In short, the Shuttle program office believes that the process is adequate without IV&V
and the money may be better spent in other ways.
Because the IV&V function is currently scheduled to be eliminated by October 1992, the
Office of Space Flight requested that the Committee first address whether there is a need to
continue this function and later address other aspects of the flight software development process.
Thus, the Committee focused on this issue in its first four meetings, and this report addresses
the Committee's findings and conclusions on this one issue. The final report, which will examine
other aspects of the flight software development process, will be available near the end of 1992.
BACKGROUND
Flight software is defined as the software that is loaded into the on-board computers for
control of the Shuttle during launch, on-orbit operations, entry, and landing. The primary flight
software consists of approximately 500,000 lines of source code in almost 400 compilable units,
while the backup software is approximately 90,000 lines of code. The software has evolved over
many years of operation to require a complex maintenance and upgrade process involving
numerous contractor and NASA organizations at a cost of well over $100 million per year. 2
Upgrades are performed on a continuing basis (approximately one per year) to provide new
functions and to fix the errors that are still being identified. Because it controls so many aspects
of the Shuttle's operations, flight software is deemed by the Shuttle program to be a critical item
for safety and reliability.
Following the Challenger accident in 1986, a number of assessments were made of the
overall safety of the Shuttle program, many of which addressed software verification and
validation as part of their investigations. These included evaluations by the Rogers Commission;
an NRC committee; the House of Representatives' Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology; and the General Accounting Office (GAO).
2The Committee was told that the yearly cost for the flight software development contractors (new development,
maintenance, software configuration control, etc.) was approximately $60 million. Operation of the Shuttle Avionics
Integration Laboratory, which is used to test the flight software, requires approximately $24 million per year. This
total does not include costs for software reconfiguration, development and maintenance of Space Shuttle Main
Engine software, and other support contractors.
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The Rogers Commission 3 concentrated on the direct causes of the Challenger accident, but
Appendix F of their report included a statement by Richard Feynman, one of the members of
the commission, that pertained specifically to the flight software, "... there have been recent
suggestions by [NASA] management to curtail . . . elaborate and expensive tests as being
unnecessary at this late date in Shuttle history. This must be resisted, for it does not appreciate
the mutual subtle influences and sources of error generated by even small changes to one part
of a program on another."4
Among the recommendations of the Rogers Commission was that NASA review certain
aspects of its Shuttle risk assessment effort and "... identify those items that must be improved
prior to flight to ensure mission success and flight safety." It further recommended that an audit
panel be appointed by the NRC to verify the adequacy of the effort and report directly to the
Administrator of NASA.
This audit panel was convened by the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board of the
NRC in 1986, and its final report, dated January 1988, concluded that NIn general, hardware
certification and verification, and software validation and verification in STS [Space
Transportation System] are managed and conducted primarily by the same organizational
elements responsible for the design and fabrication of the units. Thus, the independence of the
certification, validation, and verification processes is questionable. For example,
'Independent' validation and verification (IV&V) of software is carried out by the same
contractor (IBM) that produces the STS software, with some checks being made by the Johnson
Space Center. "5
The N-RC committee recommended that _Responsibility for approval of hardware
certification and software IV&V should be vested in entities separate from the NSTS [National
Space Transportation System] Program structure and the centers directly involved in STS
development and operation."
In March 1988, the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, echoing the
concerns expressed in the NRC report, recommended that NASA establish IV&V to evaluate the
development and modification of Shuttle software. Based on these two recommendations, in May
1988 NASA expanded an existing contract with Intermetrics, Inc., and instituted the current
IV&V function. The original IV&V contract with Intermetrics supported 40 people; recently,
the support has been reduced to 24 people, at an approximate annual cost of $3.2 million. Table
1 shows the functions that were encompassed by the original 40-person effort and the
corresponding functions addressed by the present, reduced level of effort. The current plan by
NASA will completely eliminate IV&V for all the functions shown in Table 1.
In February 1990, the House Committee requested that the GAO determine NASA's
progress in improving independent oversight of Shuttle software development. The GAO
3 Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, by William P. Rogers,
Chairman (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986).
4 Feynman, R. P., "Personal Observations on Reliability of Shuttle," Appendix F of the Report of the
Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, by William P. Rogers, Chairman (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986).
5 Post Challenger Evaluation of Space Shuttle Risk Assessment and Management, by Alton D. Slay, Chairman
of the Committee on Shuttle Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis Audit (Washington, D.C.: National Academy
Press, 1988).
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TABLE 1 Functions Covered by the IV&V Contractors
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report, e dated February 1991, recommended that NASA "require independent V&V
[Verification and Validation] for Shuttle software, bearing in mind the views of the NRC, the
House Committee, the [NASA Space Shuttle] software steering group, 7 and NASA-wide
guidance, and ensure that the independent V&V organization is outside the control of the Shuttle
program office."
In requesting the current review of the IV&V process, the Shuttle program office has stated
that if funding were not an issue they would continue with a robust IV&V program. However,
if it can be shown that the current implementation of IV&V does not appreciably reduce risk,
or that its cost cannot be justified by the risk it avoids, it can reasonably be eliminated. The
Shuttle program office does not believe that these issues were adequately addressed by previous
studies, which did not have the benefit of recent efforts to document the current V&V process.
United States General Accounting Office, Space Shuttle: NASA Should Implement Independent Oversight of
Software Development (Washington, D.C.: United States General Accounting Office, 1991).
The software steering group consisted of officials from the Johnson Space Center, the Kennedy Space Center,
the Marshall Space Flight Center, NASA Headquarters, the software development contractors, and the Space
Transportation System Operations Contractor. The group met once to address the need to bring about changes in
NASA's software development and assurance processes but did not produce formal recommendations.
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To investigate the question of whether to continue IV&V, the Committee heard
presentations from the Shuttle program office, the software development contractors, the current
IV&V contractors, and several outside organizations and experts, including the U. S. Air Force
and Navy. The Committee also reviewed extensive documentation and data provided by NASA
and the contractors describing both the independent and "embedded "s verification and validation
processes. The following sections present the findings of the Committee along with a
recommendation regarding the continuation of IV&V on the Shuttle software. It should be noted
that the Committee was specifically asked not to evaluate the performance of the current IV&V
contractor, Intermetrics, or its subcontractor at the Marshall Space Flight Center, Smith
Advanced Technologies, but rather to concentrate on the need to continue the function the
contractors serve. This proved to be a difficult restriction because the argument for continued
IV&V hinges partly on the capabilities these two companies bring to the process.
Based on this investigation, the Committee concluded that the current IV&V process
is necessary to maintain NASA's stringent safety and quality requirements for man-rated
vehicles. Therefore, the Committee does not support NASA's plan to eliminate funding for
the IV&V effort in fiscal year 1993. The Committee believes that the Space Shuttle software
development process is not adequate without IV&V and that elimination of IV&V as
currently practiced will adversely affect the overall quality and safety of the software, both
now and in the future.
This report focuses solely on the need to continue IV&V. A complete discussion of the
embedded process will appear in the Committee's final report. Regarding the issue of continuing
IV&V, the Committee's evaluations axe based on answers to the following questions:
1. Does the current approach to IV&V improve the quality of the software beyond what
the embedded process alone provides?
2. Does the improvement justify the cost?
3. Will NASA's proposed alternatives to IV&V provide the same benefits for a lower
cost?
The following sections present the Committee's findings and recommendations with respect
to these questions.
8 The term "embedded V&V" was coined recently by the Shuttle program office in their argument to eliminate
IV&V. In the Committee's judgement, it is equivalent to what is commonly referred to by industry as simply
"verification and validation."
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THE BENEFITS OF IV&V
The flight software development process is described in detail in a document recently
prepared by Intermetdcs and approved by the Space Shuttle program office. 9 This document
discusses what NASA calls its "embedded _ process, which excludes the IV&V effort. It is the
understanding of the Committee that if the IV&V function were to continue, it would do so in
addition to the embedded process described in the above document.
The embedded process provides a number of checks and rigorous configuration control
mechanisms. Ultimately, however, the embedded process relies on the development
contractors _° to perform their internal verification and validation correctly, and on an extensive
set of system integration test simulations to expose any potential problems. Once a change to the
software u is agreed upon by all members of the flight software community) 2 the development
contractors perform their work according to their own established procedures. Later, when the
development contractors have completed their internal tests, the software is released to the flight
software community for additional testing. The Committee believes that the organizations
involved axe truly concerned with producing the best software possible and has found them
willing to discuss any and all aspects of the process (within bounds of proprietary information)
at any time. The Committee was particularly struck by the degree of teamwork that is shown
in addressing problems and believes this emphasis on openness and consensus is one of the
strengths of the process. Furthermore, the process is relatively mature and each organization
knows its role and has much experience performing it. The Committee's full report will include
a complete discussion and evaluation of the embedded process.
In examining the need for continuing the IV&V function, the Committee identified four
areas where the embedded process clearly benefits from the on-going independent technical
assessment. The Committee believes that the current implementation of IV&V:
Provides a broad perspective: As mentioned above, the embedded process relies heavily on the
development contractors (IBM, Rockwell, and Rocketdyne) to perform their internal verification
9 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Space Shuttle Flight Software Verification and Validation
Requirements, NSTS-08271 (Houston, Texas: Johnson Space Center, 1991).
_0IBM is the development contractor for the primary avionics software system, Rockwell develops the backup
flight software, and Rocketdyne is responsible for the main engine controller software.
u Changes are implemented through Change Requests (CRs), which are requested to enhance the functionality
of the software, and Discrepancy Reports (DRs), which describe errors in the software that require action.
12The flight soflxvare community includes all the organizations within the Shuttle program that have an interest
in the development, verification, or performance of the software. This includes representatives from the Mission
Operations, Flight Crew, and Engineering Directorates at the Johnson Space Center; NASA's Safety and Mission
Quality Office; the software development contractors (IBM and Rockwell International); the operations contractors
(also IBM and Rockwell); the Shuttle system design contractors (Lockheed and Charles Stark Draper Labs); and
the IV&V contractor (Intermetrics). At the Marshall Space Flight Center, this includes the NASA personnel, the
development contractor (Rocketdyne), and the IV&V contractor (Smith Advanced Technologies) that develop the
Space Shuttle main engine controller software.
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and validation correctly. This is appropriate and reflects the approach used throughout the
industry, as well as in the U. S. Air Force and Navy software development procedures.
However, the development contractors have incentive to consider only those components with
which they axe specifically concerned. This lack of broad perspective makes it more likely that
errors will slip through in areas that do not fit any particular organization's responsibility. The
IV&V function is specifically chartered to provide this broad perspective. For example, the
current flight software IV&V contractor has been particularly active in addressing issues that
relate to the interface between the primary avionics software (developed by IBM) and the backup
flight software (developed by Rockwell) and has identified several potentially serious errors
(discussed in the next section) that were not caught by the embedded process.
Maintains vigilance over the quality of the process: The Committee believes that the reliance
on the development contractors to perform their internal process is appropriate. Also, except for
the previous comment regarding a broad perspective, the embedded process includes numerous
checks on the development contractor's products to ensure that safe, reliable software is
produced. For these checks to work, however, they must continue to be performed with
diligence, aggressiveness, skill, and integrity. Unfortunately, there is increasing risk that the
quality of the software will degrade as it is changed. Over a long period of time, a mechanism
that provides an independent technical review will significantly enhance the embedded process.
Offsets the erosion of expertise: Developing software, particularly software as complex and
specialized as that for the Shuttle avionics, requires considerable specific expertise and
correspondingly sophisticated tools. It is not enough to design a process that covers all aspects
of the problem, the expertise and capabilities that are built up over a period of years need to be
maintained, ta Many of the original developers of the Shuttle flight software have already gone
on to other projects, and the perception that the flight software is mature indicates that in the
future it will be difficult to retain many of the highly competent software engineers and
managers that are currently involved in the process. According to statements by several of the
NASA and contractor managers interviewed during the Committee's investigation, programs that
involve a greater degree of new development, such as the Space Station Freedom and the
National Launch System, will likely continue to attract experienced personnel away from the
Shuttle program. Continued steps must be taken to maintain skills and provide additional checks
on the process. Independent oversight is a partial solution, but only if the group that performs
the oversight also provides a significant level of experience and technical capability.
Avoids bias and peer pressure: The emphasis on consensus that is evident in the embedded
process is admirable, but the Committee believes it brings with it the possibility that individual
assessments of important issues can be stifled through peer pressure, through the desire to
t3 In discussions with the Committee, IBM has estimated that it takes at least two years for new employees to
adequately understand the Shuttle flight software. Estimates obtained from the contractors regarding the experience
of their current personnel specific to Shuttle software are as follows: IBM has 153 workers with an average
experience of 13 years, Rockwell has 85 workers with an average of 7.8 years of experience, and Intermetrics has
24 people who average 6.7 years of experience with Shuttle systems and 14.9 years of avionics/software experience.
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protect organizational interests, or through the simple desire to make the process run smoothly.
Furthermore, when a problem is recognized and an initial solution is proposed, particularly when
it is proposed by a customer, it often serves to bias further thinking on the subject towards that
initial solution. While the Committee has found no instances where this type of contamination
or stifling has occurred, it believes that the risk is significant without some degree of oversight
that is explicitly designed to be independent.
IV&V IN THE SPACE SHUTrLE PROGRAM
Independent verification and validation of software has been used by industry for over
twenty years in many different formsntailored by the user's need, the complexity of the system,
the criticality of the system's application, and budget and schedule constraints. In NASA's
current implementation of IV&V in the Space Shuttle program, the contractors responsible for
IV&V are involved in the process from the beginning, provide a high level of technical expertise
and knowledge of the software, and are specifically charged to consider the safety and quality
of the product, as opposed to simply checking the performance of the process. Because of this,
they are able to provide an in-depth evaluation of the components they inspect. Unfortunately,
due to the limited funding available, the full potential benefits have not been realized. Still,
despite the limited resources, the Committee has found that the current implementation of IV&V
in the Shuttle program is valuable and effective. The NASA Shuttle program office
acknowledges that the IV&V effort, as practiced on the Shuttle flight software, has been valuable
and effective.
The IV&V contractors have identified errors, including several Severity 1 errors, a,_that
were not found by the embedded process. Among the 37 Discrepancy Reports authored or
prompted by the IV&V contractors since the beginning of their contract, there were 12 Severity
1 errors and 3 Severity 1N errors. Also, the development contractors and NASA personnel
interviewed by the Committee agree that other errors have been found or avoided through the
close interaction of the IV&V teams with the software developers throughout the development
process. Although the IV&V contractors are, by definition, independent, they interact with the
software developers and other members of the flight software community throughout the process
through their evaluation of Change Requests and Discrepancy Reports, through routine
discussions with the developers, and ultimately through participation in the Shuttle Avionics
Software Control Board, which is the final arbiter of software changes.
14Shuttle flight software errors are categorized by the severity of their potential consequences without regard
to the likelihood of their occurrence. Severity 1 errors are defined as errors that could produce a loss of the Space
Shuttle or its crew. Severity 2 errors can affect the Shuttle's ability to complete its mission objectives, while
Severity 3 errors affect procedures for which alternatives, or workarounds, exist. Severity 4 and 5 errors consist
of very minor coding or documentation errors. In addition, there is a class of Severity 1 errors, called Severity 1N,
which, while potentially life-threatening, involves operations that are precluded by established procedures, are
beyond the physical limitations of Shuttle systems, or are outside system failure protection levels.
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Although the current IV&V personnel are an integral part of the team, and so may be
subject in part to peer pressure and potentially faulty group solutions, they provide a broad-based
viewpoint and are specifically chartered to question group solutions from an independent stance.
For example, the IV&V function specifically maintains an effort to examine the ways in which
various parts of the primary and backup software interact. Included in the 37 Discrepancy
Reports mentioned above were 4 Severity 1 reports on problems occurring between the primary
and backup software. One of these involved a scenario that could have caused shutdown of all
the Shuttle's main engines. The other three involved errors that could have caused the loss of
the orbiter and crew if the backup software was needed during an ascent abort maneuver.
Ultimately, the value of the IV&V function, as it relates to the embedded process, is
dependent on the aggressiveness and skill (e.g., the expertise, tools, and corporate knowledge)
with which the IV&V contractors perform their work and their ability to remain independent and
unbiased. The Committee understands that NASA's current plan is to eliminate the IV&V
function but to retain a small portion of the systems engineering capability currently performed
by the IV&V contractors. It is clear, however, that much valuable and probably irreplaceable
expertise will be lost in scaling down to a lower level of effort, and the ability of the process
to identify errors and determine appropriate solutions will be reduced. The Committee questions
whether there are enough people assigned to this task at the present time. If the personnel are
reduced further, the result may be that the entire effort becomes ineffective.
COST/BENEFIT CONSIDERATIONS
Even if a process is effective, there may be justifiable cost/benefit reasons for eliminating
it. If the cost of the service exceeds its value, it should be eliminated. Clearly, the cost of the
Intermetrics contract (which encompasses the work done by Smith Advanced Technologies) is
a factor in the pending decision to eliminate IV&V. In an era when NASA is experiencing little
real growth in its overall budget, and given the internal pressure to reduce costs associated with
the Shuttle program, it is understandable that the Shuttle program office would seek to unburden
itself of the current $3.2 million annual cost for IV&V. However, a true definition of the cost
of eliminating IV&V must include the consequences of a failure of the software that results in
a loss of life, causes the loss of a Shuttle, t5 produces a stand-down of Shuttle operations, or
causes the loss of expensive hardware. In proportion to the potential losses, the cost of IV&V
is clearly justified. The question reduces to one of determining where risk reduction resources
are best placed when competing uses are possible.
_sNASA has estinmted that the Shuttle Endeavor, which was a replacement for Challenger, cost approximately
$2 billion.
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Accurately assessing the risk of software-related accidents, or judging the risks of such
accidents in comparison with other possible sources of risk, is not possible. Because a single
error is sufficient to cause a serious accident, a decrease in the number of software errors
detected is not a valid measure for confidence in the safety of the software or the process. Nor
is the fact that no Shuttle accidents have resulted from software errors a cause for complacency.
A more valid measure of risk is the fact that the IV&V effort has detected potentially
catastrophic errors not caught by the embedded process. The recent incident aboard Endeavor _6
should serve as a warning that software, even at this stage in its life, can contain critical errors
and that new errors can be introduced whenever the software is altered. Accidents, including,
in particular, Challenger, result at least in part from complacency arising from lack of problems
in the past and the corresponding relaxation of protection mechanisms and procedures.
Overconfidence in software is common and usually unwise.
The fact that the Shuttle software has yet to cause a serious loss is due primarily to the
diligence of NASA and its contractors. Without this diligence, software could easily have caused
serious, perhaps life-threatening and program-threatening problems. The Committee believes that
elimination of IV&V at this stage in the program would serve to erode this diligence.
The potential risk reduction functions of IV&V are particularly important in light of the
proposed changes 17 to Shuttle hardware and operations and the likely effects on the software.
Although it may seem that software reliability and safety should increase over time, this is not
necessarily true; as software changes, its structure degrades and, over time, the people who were
responsible for initial development of the software move on to other programs or retire. These
two factors make it increasingly difficult to change the software without introducing errors.
Each new release of the Shuttle flight software includes significant additions to increase
functionality or to fix errors that have been identified. Table 2 shows the number of lines of
source code that were changed in each update (called "operational increments," or OIs) during
the ten years of Shuttle operations. The two most recent updates (OI-20 and OI-21) included
very significant changes to the code (4.7 percent and 5.4 percent of the total, respectively). The
error experienced on the recent mission of Endeavor was introduced into the software as part
_eA loss of expensive hardware nearly occurred during the recent (5/12/92) maiden flight of Endeavor (STS-49)
as the crew attempted to rendezvous with and repair the Intelsat satellite. The software routine used to calculate
rendezvous firings failed to converge to a solution due to a mismatch between the precision of the state-vector
variables, which describe the position and velocity of the Shuttle, and the limits used to bound the calculation. The
state-vector variables were double precision while the limit variables were single precision. The rescue mission was
nearly aborted, but a workaround was found that involved relaying an appropriate state-vector value from the
ground.
_ In response to a written question from the Committee, NASA has stated that over the next five years several
major changes to Shuttle hardware will be made. These include: the Advanced Solid Rocket Motor to replace the
current solid rocket motor; the Multi-function Electronic Display System to replace the current displays and
keyboards; implementation of the Global Positioning System (GPS) for on-orbit navigation; and numerous upgrades
to implement Extended Man-Tended Capability to allow for much longer missions. Details regarding the changes
to the software due to these hardware changes cannot be completely known until the hardware designs are
completed. NASA has stated, however, that the upgrades will require changes to the ascent software, a new
navigation program to process GPS data, and additions to the autoland program.
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Rendezvous software, Sp_elab software
Redesign of main engine controller
1983
1983
1984Payload re-manifest capabilities
Crew enhancements 1984
Experimental orbit autopilot, Enhanced 1985
ground checkout
Western test range, enhanced propellant 1985
dumps
Centaur 1985
Post 5 I-L safety changes
Post 51-L safety changes, Bailout
capability
System Improvements
1987
1988
1988
10,600 (1.8%)
8,000 (1.4%)
11,400 (1.9%)
5,900 (1.0%)
12,200 (2.1%)
8,800 (1.5%)
6,600 (1.1%)
6,300 (1.1%)
1,100 (0.2%)
7,200 (1.2%)
Abort enhancements 1989 12,000 (2.0%)
Upgrade of general purpose computer 1989 1,700 (0.3 %)
(GPC)
1990 28,000 (4.7 %)Extended landing sites, Trans-Atlantic
abort code
1991Redesign of abort sequencer, 1-engine
auto-contingency aborts, hardware
changes for new Orbiter
32,000 (5.4%)
SOURCE: NASA Office of Space Flight
• Percentages based on the combined approximate sizes of the primary avionics software system
(500,000 lines of code) and the backup flight software (90,000 lines of code).
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of OI-21. In addition, both modified and aging hardware can create conditions not accounted for
in the software. Experience has shown that it is in this environment that errors are most likely
to be introduced and that off-nominal situations are most likely to arise. For example, when the
software's original 16-bit addressing was changed to a new 20-bit format to take advantage of
capabilities in the new general purpose computer (OI-SF), programmers incorrectly used address
bits that were reserved for the processor's microcode. Executing these instructions would have
caused branches to unknown locations. The IV&V contractors authored 5 Discrepancy Reports
that identified illegal use of these address fields, n Thus, although it seems paradoxical, the risk
of a software-related accident may very well increase as software evolves.
Considering the continued risk of a software failure, the consequences of a failure, and the
benefits gained through IV&V, the cost of maintaining IV&V is small. Furthermore, the
Committee has heard no specific proposals for alternative uses of the money that would be wiser
than continuing IV&V as it is currently implemented. Proposals presented to the Committee,
such as the implementation of the new HAL/S compiler and the Enhanced Software Product
Assurance program proposed by the Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance office at the
Johnson Space Center, were judged to be less important. Thus, it is the opinion of the
Committee that the current implementation of IV&V provides important, low-cost insurance to
the Shuttle program that materially reduces the risk of a software failure and, thus, of a
software-related accident.
ALTERNATIVES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF IV&V WITHIN NASA
The primary reasons given by the Shuttle program office for wanting to eliminate the IV&V
function, which they admit has been useful and effective, involve cost savings. The Committee
has argued, in the previous section, that the cost versus benefit tradeoff justifies continued use
of an appropriate form of IV&V. However, this does not address whether the same benefits
could be achieved without using an IV&V contractor. This question of whether similar capability
can be provided by organizations within NASA for lower cost prompted the Committee to
investigate avenues other than the IV&V provided by Intermetrics and Smith Advanced
Technologies.
Various members of the flight software community provide some degree of independence
and technical capability. In particular, the Safety and Mission Quality Office at NASA
Headquarters has the charter to oversee the safety and quality of Shuttle systems, including
software. Accordingly, the Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance Office at Johnson Space
Center has proposed a plan for taking over some, but not all, of the functions that axe now
performed as part of the IV&V effort. The Committee recognizes that the proposed plan is not
meant to be a replacement for IV&V. The proposed plan emphasizes form over content and
process over product. Under this plan, NASA personnel would check that the development
is These errors were classified as Severity 4 and Severity 5 errors since their resolution involved only changes
to documentation and non-flight software (i.e., the HALLS compiler). However, had the issue not been addressed,
and the potential of causing branches to unknown locations remained, a more severe situation could have occurred.
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contractor's processes were followed, but would not evaluate the software itself. Although such
quality assurance activities can be valuable, they do not provide the same benefits as IV&V.
A possible option, although not one that the Committee recommends, would be for the
Safety and Mission Quality Office to take over all the functions currently being performed by
the IV&V contractors and, thereby, provide the same service. There are two reasons why, in
the opinion of the Committee, this is not a viable approach.
First, the Committee was informed that neither the Safety and Mission Quality Office at
Headquarters nor the Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance Office at Johnson Space Center
have the personnel, the expertise, or the tools to replace the capabilities of the current IV&V
effort. Thus, if an attempt were made to fully duplicate the IV&V function, there would
necessarily be a significant time lag between the phase-out of the current IV&V function and the
development of a corresponding capability elsewhere in the agency. For example, the plan
presented to the Committee, which includes replacing only part of the current IV&V functions,
will not be in place until well after the time when the current IV&V is scheduled to be
eliminated.
Second, if another organization within NASA were to attempt to duplicate the capabilities
provided by the current IV&V effort, they would be required to increase their personnel
accordingly, develop or acquire software verification and validation tools similar to those used
by the IV&V teams, _9 and provide appropriate facilities for housing the personnel and
equipment. While the Committee was not constituted to evaluate the relative expense of
developing and maintaining such capability within NASA, it fails to see how making such a
change could result in a net savings.
The Committee was told that no organization within NASA has the expertise or the
manpower to replace the current IV&V function in a timely fashion, and the Committee believes
that building this expertise elsewhere will not necessarily reduce cost. Thus, the Committee
does not recommend moving IV&V functions to other organizations within NASA unless
the current IV&V is maintained for as long as it takes to build comparable expertise in the
replacing organization.
RECOMMFA_ATIONS
Based on evaluation of the presentations and documents given to the Committee, and
considering the Committee's own industrial and academic experience and knowledge, the
Committee concludes that the current IV&V process, as defined and practiced for the Space
Shuttle software, is effective and that cost/benefit and risk considerations do not justify its
elimination from the fiscal year 1993 budget. Furthermore, the Committee concludes that the
Space Shuttle software development process is not adequate without current IV&V practices and
19Intermetrics has acquired or developed numerous tools specifically for Shuttle software. These include tools
tailored for the IV&V task that cheek cross-references and data dependencies, compare source code listings, and
identify absolute addresses. Intermetrics also has several tools that apply to the specific programming languages
(HAL/S and AP101 assembler) used in Shuttle software development.
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their elimination will adversely affect the overall quality and safety of the software, both now
and in the future.
Accordingly, the Committee recommends that NASA:
1. maintain the currently implemented independent verification and validation for
Space Shuttle flight software; and
o not transfer IV&V functions to other organizations within the agency unless the
current IV&V effort is maintained for as long as it takes to build comparable
expertise in the replacing organization.
Further recommendations regarding the development process for Shuttle flight software,
including an evaluation of the embedded V&V process and a comparison with other, similar
processes, will be contained in the Committee's final report.
APPENDIX D
Overview of
ASET IV&V Methodology
Brief'mg Document Given to the Committee
By Intermetrics, Inc.
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APPENDIX D
OVERVIEW OF ASET IV&V METHODOLOGY 1
INTRODUCTION
This paper presents a general description of the technical analysis process used by
Intermetrics in performing independent verification and validation (IV&V) of Shuttle flight
software under the NSTS Avionics System Engineering Task (ASET) contract. Attachments
provide further details on key elements of this methodology.
BACKGROUND
The Intermetrics ASET IV&V effort has, as its principal objective, the identification of
potential safety-of-flight issues from within the ongoing flow of Shuttle flight-software changes.
Intermetrics is charged with applying a multi-disciplinary, systems perspective to find safety
problems that might otherwise go unrecognized. This perspective complements the expertise of
the various Shuttle engineering subgroups which concentrate on their particular subsystems or
engineering disciplines.
The primary focus of ASET IV&V is on two Shuttle problem reporting and change
instruments--Space Shuttle Orbiter Avionics Software Discrepancy Reports (DRs) and Shuttle
Software Change Requests (CRs). While these instruments are directed at software, the IV&V
analysis of them takes into account the software's effects on, and interrelationships with, other
elements of the avionics system with which the software interacts. This includes the on-board
guidance, navigation, and control (GN&C) systems in general, as well as with crew and ground
procedures. The principal value added by the ASET IV&V effort is independent technical
findings deriving from in-depth understanding of the nature and ramifications of these problems
and changes.
The principal technical interface of ASET IV&V is with the Shuttle Avionics Software
Control Board (SASCB), which reviews and approves or disapproves all fiight-software DRs and
CRs. There are typically numerous DRs and CRs considered for each new software build, or
Operational Increment (OI), for multiple shuttle flights, and a lesser number that apply to
individual flights. The ASET IV&V provides written briefings to the SASCB in the form of
Software IV&V Reports (SIRs), and the IV&V personnel routinely attend Board meetings to
provide supporting information. These briefings describe the problem or proposed change from
a systems standpoint, and present a risk assessment to aid the Board in making its approval
decision.
Briefing document given to the Committee by lntermetrics, Inc. A few format changes have been made.
Attachments are not included in this Appendix.
133
i /- ] /_
134 SPACE SHUTILE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT PROCESSES
The ASET IV&V analysts also routinely interact with the general Shuttle flight software
and engineering communities. This includes participating in technical reviews and special task
force groups working software/avionics problems. In some cases these groups address issues
raised by Intermetrics. When warranted, the ASET IV&V analysts will write DRs on safety
issues they have found. For changes approved by the SASCB that carry significant risk, follow-
up analyses are performed to evaluate the correctness of the implementation and the adequacy
of testing. Updated SIRs are submitted to document these foUow-up analyses.
STANDARDIZED METHODOLOGY
Central to the process summarized above is a standardized approach to safety analysis
adopted by the ASET IV&V organization. This approach has been devised and ref'lned over the
four-year duration of the ASET contract. The framework for the standardized analysis is the
Analysis Checklist, Attachment 1. 2 The checklist, in turn, contains a key element--Risk
Assessment--that is defined in attachment 2. Both are described in the context of a multi-level
IV&V concept.
LEVELS OF IV&V ANALYSIS
The ASET IV&V process entails three levels of analysis that correspond to the scope
parameters described earlier in this chapter--limited, focused, and comprehensive. These are
cumulative in the order presented, that is, focused goes beyond limited, and comprehensive goes
beyond focused. For those CRs and DRs that are within scope (as defined below), a risk
assessment is performed to determine which level of effort will be applied to a given CR or DR.
Due to the volume of changes and the resource limitations of the ASET contract, it is not
possible to perform a complete, comprehensive IV&V on every Shuttle flight-software CR and
DR. And, for the same reason, certain categories of problems or changes are ruled out of scope,
such as those dealing exclusively with Vehicle Utility (VU) software, System
Management/Payload (SM/PL) software, and software development tools. For those CRs and
DRs that are within scope, such as the ascent GN&C, entry GN&C, on-orbit GN&C,
sequencing, data processing system, and main engine controller, established criteria are applied
in selecting the level of analysis to be performed. The criteria and the nature of the analysis are
defined below for each of the three levels.
LIMITED ANALYSIS
A Limited analysis consists of determining answers to five basic questions. Listed under
the section heading that appear on the SIR, these are as follows:
2 Attachments are not included in this Appendix.
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(a) Problem/Change Description
What is the true nature of the problem being described by a DR or the change being
proposed by a CR?
(b) System Impact Analysis
What is the effect of the problem or the change on the overall Shuttle system?
(c) Requirements Analysis
For a DR, what requirements/constraints axe being violated? For a CR, are the
prescribed requirements changes appropriate, correct, and complete?
(d) Risk Assessment
For a CR, and for a DR resulting in changes, what are the implementation and
safety risks associated with implementing the change versus not implementing it?
For a DR for which no change is proposed, what is the risk of not finding the
problem?
(e) Disposition Analysis
Is the proposed disposition appropriate?
A Limited analysis is performed on every CR and DR that is within the ASET IV&V
scope. From this it is determined if further analysis, in the form of a Focused or Comprehensive
analysis, needs to be performed. Limited analysis is deemed sufficient if the CR or DR is low
in risk, needs very little or no testing, and requires no code change. Examples of items that fall
into this category axe DRs that axe closed with a program note or waiver. Such DRs may
eventually require a Focused or Comprehensive analysis on a later OI when a software change
is implemented.
A key portion of this first stage of analysis is risk assessment, as it both aids the SASCB
in its approval decision and serves as a basis for determining what further analysis is required.
Risk assessment consists of evaluating two types of risk--safety risk and implementation risk.
Safety risk is the risk that the system will be less safe with a change than without.
Implementation risk is the risk that the change will not be done correctly due to its complexity
or other factors. Assessment categorizes both kinds of risk as to whether they are low, medium,
or high.
FOCUSED ANALYSIS
A Focused analysis consists of Limited analysis plus determination of answers to the
following additional questions:
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(f) Code Analysis
Have the code changes been correctly implemented, and do they create any new
problems or risks?
(g) Level 6/7 Test/Verification Analysis
Has development testing, Levels 6 and 7 (the first two levels of official qualification
test) demonstrated the correctness and safety of the changes?
(h) Documentation Assessment
Have all affected documents been changed and are those changes correct and
complete as prescribed?
(i) Safety Assessment
What safety-of-flight issues were revealed by the analysis and what other ones
(already known to the program) exist?
A Focused analysis is performed on all CRs of moderate or greater risk and on DRs that
require code changes. Focused analysis is generally deemed sufficient for changes that are
adequately tested during software development (Levels 6 and 7), that have easily understood
requirements, and that do not significantly impact Shuttle hardware of operational procedures.
During the Focused analysis the earlier decision on level of analysis is reevaluated. It
may be decided at this point to change the ultimate analysis from Focused to Comprehensive or
vice versa.
COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS
A Comprehensive analysis consists of Focused analysis plus answering the following
additional questions:
(j) Analysis of Other Systems Implementations
Have other changes besides code (hardware, I-loads, crew procedures, etc.) been
correctly implemented, and do they create any new problems or risks?
(k) Complete Test/Verification Analysis
Have official tests (Levels 6, 7, 8 and SAIL) collectively demonstrated the
correctness and safety of the changes?
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All high risk and selected medium risk changes receive a Comprehensive analysis. These
generally include ones for which adequate analysis requires a look at system-level testing (Level
8 and SAIL), that have very complex requirements, or that have significant impact on other
systems besides software or on operational procedures. Also included are any late-breaking
changes to flight software introduced as patches after Final Load.
KEY FEATURES OF METHODOLOGY
The ASET IV&V methodology includes three major features to enhance efficiency and
ensure the quality of the analysis product:
1. written analysis guidelines
2. computer-based analysis tools
3. peer reviews
The analysis guidelines are published in an Interrnetrics internal document, the General
Analysis Guide, which includes, among other things:
• a checklist of analysis tasks;
• guidelines for doing risk assessment;
• instructions for preparing SIRs; and
• lists and descriptions of analysis resources.
This guide promotes uniformity and thoroughness in the work of multiple analysts.
The computer-based analysis tools were developed specifically for the ASET IV&V effort
and operate on copies of the actual Shuttle flight software downloaded from NASA to local
computer systems. Included are parameter tracing, flowcharting, structured display and printout
generation, and other tools. Also, a relational data base is used to track the status of all CRs and
DRs subject to analysis.
The mechanism of peer review is used for all analyses, regardless of level to ensure the
quality of the analysis product. When a SIR has been drafted, a group is assembled consisting
of the designated analyst and any supporting analysts that contributed to the SIR, plus an
appropriate number of other analysts (peers) from the ASET IV&V group. The draft SIR is
evaluated in a supportive atmosphere, using the analysis checklist as a framework. If significant
rework is needed a follow-up peer review may also be held. Such peer reviews are conducted
when the first stage, Limited analysis is completed prior to SASCB review, and again when the
Focused or Comprehensive level analysis has been performed. These peer reviews have been
found to contribute significantly both to the motivation of the analyst and to the quality and
uniformity of the analysis product.
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FOREWORD
Efficient management of %he Space Shuttle program dictates that effective
control of program activities be established. To provide a basis for management
of the program requirements, directives, procedures, interface agreements, and
information regarding system capabilities are to be documented, baselined, and
subsequently controlled by the proper management level.
Program requirements to be controlled by %be Director, Space Shuttle (Level I),
have been identified and documented in Level I program requirements
documentation. Program requirements controlled by _be Deputy Director, Space
Shuttle Program (Level II), are documented in, attached %o, or referenced from
Volume I through XVIII of NSTS 07700.
This document, which is to be used by members of the Flight Software community,
defines the Space Shuttle Program baseline requirements for the Flight Software
Verification and Validation process. All Flight Software Verification and
Validation activity should be consistent with this plan and %he unique items
contained herein. The top level policies end requirements for Flight Software
Verification and Validation are contained in NSTS 07700, Volume XVIII, Computer
Systems and Software Requirements, Book 3, Software Management end Control.
All changes to NSTS 08271, Space Shuttle Program Flight Software Verification
end Validation Requirements Document, in the form of change requests will be
presented to the Shuttle Avionics Software Control Board (SASCB) for
disposition. Change authority and management of the implementation strateg_j for
1_he Verification and Validation requirements and processes in NSTS 08271 are
hereby delegated to _IA/Space Shuttle Engineering Integration Office via the
SASCB. Revisions to this plan will be made as required to incorporate baseline
changes %o NSTS 07700, Volume XVIII, Book 3.
Leonard S. Nicholsom
Deputy Director, Space Shuttle Program
ii
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q .0 PURPOSE. The purpose of this document is to define and establish the Space
Shuttle Program baseline requirements for the Flight Software (FSR) Verification
and Validation (V&V) process and %o establish _he activities and the responsible
pro&ram elements in this process for both the Space Shuttle General Purpose
Computer (GPC) and the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME). This baselines the V&V
process roadmap utilized for FS_ requirements definition, FS_ development, and
FSR mission preparation.
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2.0 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS. The following documents are applicable to the
requirements contained in t2_is document. "(Current Issue)" is shown in place of
the specific date and issue when the document is under Level II PRCB control.
The current status of documents shown with "(Current Issue)" may be determined
from NSTS 08102, Level II Document Description and Status Report.
NSTS 07700,
Volume XVIII
Book 3
(Current Issue)
Computer Systems and Software Requirements
Software Management and Control
Ref. Foreword
2-1
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3.0 INTRODUCTION. SSP FN4 is defined, developed and used by the FS4 community.
Prime members of the FS_ technical community are: the NASA Space Shuttle
Program Office (SSPO), Flight Crew Operations Directorate (FCOD), Mission
Operations Directorate (MOD), Engineering Directorate (ED), Safety, Reliability,
and Quality Assurance (SR_), and their supporting contractors (IBM, Rockwell
International, Loral, McDonnell Douglas, Lockheed, STSOC, etc.). In general,
_he primary responsibilities of these organizations in the FSR development, test
and use are as follows: the NASA SSPO approves all FS_ requirements changes,
post development performance tests specifications (Level 7 & 8), and SAIL test
requirements; the Flight Data Systems Division (FDSD) of the EngineeriuE
Directorate (ED) is responsible for technical management of the Operational
Increment (OI) FSH development, verification, and maintenance and the FSH
parallel certification activity; the flight crews of the FCOD are the ultimate
end users of FSH during a Shuttle Transportation System (STS) mission; Mission
Operaticms Directorate (MOD) develops the mission FSH requirements for each STS
mission and is responsible for technical management of FS_ reconfiEuration,
Level 8 verification testing, reconfiEured FS$4 maintenance, crew training, and
Shuttle mission simulation operation; SI_ monitors FSH requirements,
documentation, and tests to ensure that they are in accord with approved NASA
standards and procedures; and the NASA supporting contractors perform the actual
translation of FS_ requirements into FS_ computer programs and integTa%ed mass
memory loads for use in the Space Shuttle general purpose computers (GPCs) and
independently verify end validate the operational FS;4 for each STS flight. MSFC
is responsible for the Space Shuttle main engine controller software (reference
Appendix A).
Two contractors, IBM and Rockwell International, respectively, are responsible
for the development and verification of the Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS) and Backup Flight System (BFS) basic software.
STSOC is responsible for the mission specific r_confiEuration of the FS_ and the
flight Integrated Mass Memory Unit (IMMU) load build. Additionally, STSOC is
responsible for the verification and validation of the reconfiEured product per
the program approved Performance Test Plan (PTP).
The FSH development contractors (IBM and Rockwell International) perform a
parallel certification activity, which consists of a parallel build of the
PASS/BFS images and a compare to that produced by STSOC. The development
contractors also perform an independent set of verification testing of the
reconfiEured flight software.
3-1
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4.0 SPACE SHUTTLE FLIGHT SOFTHARE (FSN) COMMUNITY. Each member of the FSH
technical community identified above has different objectives, goals, or
perspectives with respect to the actual development and operational utilization
of Shuttle FS_. Members of the FS_ community support FS_4 development, test, and
operations in multiple facilities. The various viewpoints and operational use,
by members of the FS_ community, provide an effective V&V function throughout
the FS_ life cycle. Examples of the different viewpoints with an indication of
its role in the V&V process are provided in the remainder of this section for
the GPC FSH and in Appendix A for the SSME FSH.
4.1 SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM OFFICE (SSPO). The SSPO has the final authority for
all the FSN requirements. As such, each change in the existing FSN must be
fully justified as a desirable and/or needed change %o accomplish the planned
mission with the minimum risk %o flight safety, crew work load, mission
objectives, and budgeted resources. A functional package concept was developed
as a means of developing a long term approach to establishing the contents of
the flight software. This approach was accepted by the program in order to
allow more efficient use of the developers and program elements resources. The
functional package concept is the implementation of a group of software changes
that accomplish a specific goal (i.e., contingency abort envelope expansion,
etc ). The process begins with the development of functional packages for
potential implementation. The package may contain Change Requests (CRs) being
proposed for %he current baseline as well as candidates for subsequent releases.
The packages are presented to the Shuttle Avionics Software Control Board
(SASCB) for prioritization and concurrence. The prioritized packages are then
taken forward %o the Program Requirements Control Board (PRCB) with the SASCB
recommendation. After PRCB concurrence/direction is obtained on the content and
priority of the packages, the SASCB community manages the implementation
strategy.
A ceiling list of CRs is established from the approved functional packages.
Each CR is %hen reviewed in de%all by the developer %o determine readiness for
baselining, impact to software memory, and impact to resources (manpower). The
requirements inspection review should identify issues with requirements or risks
associated with implementation of each CR. Hhen the CRs are determined to be
mature, _hey are scheduled to the SASCB for dispositiouing. The SASCB addresses
benefits verses risk of implementation and identifies any outstanding technical
issues with the CR and establishes an Ol baseline which is then returned to the
PRCB. Additions and/or deletions of functional packages, significant changes to
package content or priority, and schedule changes are identified. The Ol
content and schedule are then baselined by the PRCB.
Appendix A describes the preparation and development cycle for the Space Shuttle
main engine controller software. In this appendix the SASCB is identified as
the final approving authority for software to be flown on a Space Shuttle
mission.
Proposed FSN changes are presented to representatives of the technical community
during SSPO control board meetings. Any issues that arise during these meetings
are resolved prior %o implementation approval.
4.2 MISSION OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE (MOD). The MOD develops the operational
requirements for all components of a Shuttle mission. Included are the plans
4-1
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and procedures for all communications, mechanical systems, remote manipulator
system, electrical and environmental systems, flight design, flight dynamics,
navigation (ascent/entry/orbital), ground support, reconfiguration, and mission
training. MOD is composed of independent divisions of two or more branches
supported by multiple contractors. The flight planning process involves a top
down - bottom up structured approach to mission planning. Top level objectives
are broken down into individual objectives for MOD divisions and/or branches who
develop plans within their area of responsibility to attain their assigned
mission objectives. Each lower level plan is integrated into the final mission
plan and subjected to objective testing and management review prior to approval.
MOD uses the Shuttle Mission Simulator (SMS) complex located in JSC Building 5
for validation of mission plans and procedures. Hhen the FSW mass memory loads
are released for mission operations, MOD uses the SMS with this load to train
the flight and ground crews. The SMS is not used as a formal GPC FS_ V&V tool.
However, discrepancy reports (DRs) written against the SMS GPC software are
reviewed for applicability to the mission CPC FS_ load.
V&V Role: Once the mission plan has been approved, MOD organizations and/or
their support contractors review and update mission requirement documents as
required to accomplish the mission objectives stated in the areas of
communications, mechanical systems, remote manipulator system, electrical and
environmental systems, flight design, flight dynamics, navigation
(ascent/entry/orbital), ground support, reconfiguration, and mission training.
Changes are validated in MOD flight simulations using the SMS and flight
planning software tools. The evaluation and approval process within MOD
performs an effective V&V role for developing and verifying ?,he FSH
requirements.
4.3 ENGINEERING DIRECTORATE (ED). The responsibility of the ED is to ensure
that the Shuttle Vehicle and its supporting equipment car, functionally perform
the mission objectives without exceeding safety limits and to ensure that the
Shuttle FSH is developed and verified to meet all approved requirements. The ED
supports the design and development of SSP hardware and software systems.
Included are: regenerative life support systems; guidance, navigation, and
control hardware and software systems; data systems hardware and software;
electrical power, and propulsion systems; and remote manipulator systems. ED is
composed of independent divisions with two or more branches supported by systems
engineering contractors. Each Shuttle hardware or software system is subjected
to detailed analysis by EI) personnel to ensure design limitations of Shuttle
hardware and software systems are not exceeded. _ personnel use the Software
Development Facility (SDF) to perform all Level 6 and 7 verification tests prior
to the OI FSH release. After the FS_ OI is released, the Software Production
Facility (SPF) is used to generate and verify all post OI delivery changes. ED
personnel with Rockwell-_ey contractor support utilizes _he SAIL %o analyze
Shuttle avionics hardware and software interfaces and operations. If ED
determines that new hardware or software systems are required, appropriate
systems requirements specifications are prepared and then submitted to the SSPO
for approval. After the requirements have been approved, FS_ implementation, if
required, is then performed by the ED/FDSD organization with contractor support
from IBM for the Primary FSH and Rockwell-Dopey for the Backup FSH.
V&V Role: The ED has systems engineering responsibility for the total Shuttle
hardware and software systems and evaluates the capability of each system to
accomplish planned mission objectives. The ED/FDSD reviews each change in the
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FS_ (including post OI delivery patches) by means of Level 6 and 7 SDF testing
to provide an independent NASA assessment and signoff on the completeness and
correctness of all FS_ changes. The mission plan is evaluated by ED personnel
for each phase of flight operations and FS_ logic or constraints to ensure that
mission objectives can be achieved. ;_ben the FS_ mass memory loads are released
for mission operations, ED uses the SAIL with _his load to verify hardware and
software co,_atibility. The independent evaluation of mission performance by ED
ensures that the modified software is compatible wi_h the requirements as
approved by the Space Shuttle ProEreun Office.
4.4 SAFETY, RELIABILITY, & QUALITY ASSURANCE (SR&QA). The SR&QA is concerned
with Shuttle vehicle, ground support systems and personnel safety; reliability
of SSP hardware and software systems; maintainability of SSP equipment and
documentation; and SSP quality assurance of hardware, software, and
documentation. To this end, SR2_A is an active voting member of the SASCB,
ensuring appropriate dispositions for FSH issues/changes. The SR2_A tracks
Operation (OPS) Notes, User Notes, waivers associated with flight software
discrepant ies.
4.5 FLIGHT CREM OPERATIONAL DIRECTORATE (FCOD). FCOD is concerned with the
satisfactory operation of the _o_al integrated Shuttle system, including both
hardware and software in the full range of nominal and off-nominal mission
tasks. FCOD initiates changes and evaluates proposed changes and identified
discrepancies for acceptability in the following functional areas: flight
safety, crew interface suitability, closed-loop performance, and operational
effectiveness. The SMS, SAIL, and SES are the primary tools for flight crew
evaluations.
V&V ROLE: The flight crew assesses each change or discrepancy for flight safety
and operational impacts. Depending on the situation, desk_op review, SMS or SES
simulation, or some combination of the three is used in the evaluation. The
SAIL is used %o validate flight software performance in a variety of nominal and
stressed scenarios.
4.6 FLIGHT SOFTHARE DEVELOPMENT CONTRACTORS (IBM, ROCKNELL INTERNATIONAL). The
development contractors are ecmtrac%ed to the EX) FX)SD (PASS) and %he Orbiter and
GFE Projects Office (BFS). Development contractors are primarily concerned with
the implementation of FSH modules and their operation in Shuttle computers.
Each contractor uses functionally independent organizations to analyze change
requirements, design and code FS_ changes, manage FSH configuration, build FSH
OI loads, and verify that changes are correctly implemented. The development
contractors perform rigorous reviews throughout the software definition,
implementation, and verification cycles. These review processes cover
requirements, design, code, test procedures, and test results and are designed
to eliminate errors early in the software life cycle.
V&V Role: The development contractors maintain functionally independent
organizations that review and examine the FSH at each stage of development. The
requirements group ensures that the specified requirements are understood and
that the F_ module designs incorporate the intent of these requirements. The
programming group ensures that the FSPl module designs are coded properly
according %o approved development standards. The test group verifies that the
code executes properly and accomplishes the functions stated in the
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requirements. The build group ensures that only approved FSH modules are used
in loads released for verification and final delivery.
4.7 OPERATIONS CONTRACTORS (SHUTTLE TRANSPORTATION SY_ OPERATIONS CONTRACTOR
(STSOC), IBM, R_, ETC. ). Operations contractors are defined as those
contractors who reconfigure the FSH OI loads delivered by the develope_nt
contractors for use ca specific nizsicas. The STSOC is responsible for
preparing all reeonfigured mission loads fr_ the OI base delivered from the
development contractor. The STSOC personnel integrate development loads with
Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) FS_ data, initialization data, telemetry
format data, and FSH patches (late CR/DR correction) tO prepare an in_._Tated
mass memory load for the _uttle flight computers. STSOC personnel then perform
a mission specific series of tests (Level 8) to verify the final integrated mass
memory system performance. IBM and Rockwell International personnel perform
parallel reconfiguratlon load bttilds and ecHpare their resulting loads with
STSOC products in a parallel certification pro_ess (IBM also perform parallel
Level 8 testing for PASS software). STSOC prepared mission specific releases
are used by various operations contractors in JSC simulation facilities (SMS and
SAIL) to train and prepare for each specific missic_ and/or validate the ability
of the integrated mass memory loads to perfoma the specified nissic_. For
example, STSOC personnel are concerned with the telemetry and co_aa_
e¢_patibility with the MCC software. STSOC and flight crew personnel are
concerned with operational flight training for the planned mission; and Lockheed
examines the avionics hardware compatibility with the STSOC prepared integrated
mass memory load, as well as its interface with the launch processing system
software.
V&V Role: IBM and STSOC personnel independently perforn validatica testing on
the STSOC integrated mass memory loads. IBM and Rockwell International perform
a parallel build of the PASS/BFS images and conduct a bit for bit compare with
the STSOC produced images. Other operaticas cc_tractors evaluate FSM
performance in detail for each of their areas of concern. This provides many
views of' the F_ by different contractors which result in an effective V&V look
at the delivered FSN product. Problems found during operations by any user, are
documented via Discrepancy Reports (DEs) and tracked by the SSP, FSH development
contractor technical manager (ED/FDSD), FSH reec_figuration contractor technical
manager (MOD/Reconflguration Management Divisim (RMD), and the _ until
corrected or satisfactorily resolved.
4.8 SYSTEMS DESIGN CONTRACTORS (R(X2[HELL, LOCKHEED, CHARLES STARK DRAPER LABS).
Systems design contractors are defined as those contractors who utilize the SAIL
to verify: (a) The PSH loads are ccw_patihle with hardware interfaces; (b) the
FS_ performs as designed; and (o) the FS_ is compatible with the mission
requirements. These contractors include Rockwell-Downey and the ED
subcontractors, Lockheed and Charles Stark Draper Labs.
The system design contractors form the SAIL verification test team sponsors who
are responsible for recommending a series of tests for the purpose of integrated
verification of the FSH and vehicle hardware. They establish those test
requirements in team meetings and propose them to the SAIL Management Horking
Group which submits the package to the Shuttle avionics Systems Review (SASR)
board for approval. Once approved, the tests are scheduled and conducted. This
process is followed for both the engineering and flight cycles of the FSH.
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In preparation for SAIL testing, test procedures are generated and reviewed. A
series of meetings ensure proper test design. For each test, signature plots
are generated to anticipate test results. If the test results do not favorably
agree with signatures generated from independent off line simulations, anomalies
are documented and may result in FS_ DRs being generated. In addition, the
digital test results are subjected to post test pass/fail criteria which may
uncover other anomalies.
Both the PASS and BFS are tested by this process. In as much that both systems
are derived fro_ the same set of software requirements, when appropriate, they
should provide similar results given similar conditions. Flight critical
mission phases (ascent and descent) are tested utilizing identical conditions
and run scenarios for each system and the results compared at key mission points
to determine if both systems provide performance agreement. Again, if the test
results do not favorably agree, anomalies are documented which may result in FSH
DRs being generated.
V&V Role: The system design contractors independently perform verification of
the FSH loads in an integrated hardware/software manner in the SAIL. Test
requirements are independently generated and approved. Test results are
compared to independently generated signature data. In addition to the explicit
testing mentioned above, the BFS is a validation of the PASS. Since the
software for the PASS and the BFS are developed and coded by different
organizations, under different constraints and requirements, comparable critical
outputs provide for a validation and goodness of the design of both software
systems. Also, performance agreement between the two systems given similar
conditions, is a strong case of V&V. Miscoe_arisons result in FS_ DRs.
Dispositioning of the DRs are worked through the SASCB.
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5.0 DEVELOPMENT APPROACH. There are three distinct "roadmaps" for _he current
SSP FSW development process - Definition, Development, and Mission Preparation.
The FS_ Definition Roadmap identifies the activities and SSP approval processes
(SASCB/PRCB) used %o define the FSW requirements and ensure program resources
are allocated %o facilitate implementation schedules. The FS_ Development
Roadmap identifies the activities and FDSD/development contractor controls used
to implement approved SSP requirements and verifies that the delivered PSi4
correctly implements these requirements. The FS_ Mission Preparation Roadmap
identifies the activities and programmatic controls used to transform the
delivered FS_ into a Flight Computer Mass Memory Unit (MMU) Load and to validate
that the MMU is capable of properly and safely supporting the Shuttle design
mission.
The SSP FSM process is an ongoing, iterative, and dynamic process. Provisions
have been made to accommodate FSH changes throughout this FSH process.
5 .'l FLIGHT SOFI",MRE DEFINITION ROADMAP. The FS_ Definition phase begins with a
SSP requirement defined by the technical community and ends with an approved FSH
Implementation Plan. The implementation plan includes approved requirements,
resource allocations, and development schedules. The SSP FS_ provides evolving
capability to accomplish a wide range of Shuttle missions. FS_ requirements
changes are defined in SCRs. Problems found during operations of a FSM load are
documented in Discrepancy Reports (DRs) that map require changes %o the
operational code or FS_ requirements to correct. Each major capability change
set is identified as an OI. Shuttle missions use a specified OI modified by
mission or vehicle specific requirements. Mission and vehicle specific
requirements are uniquely described in Data Change Requests (DCRs) approved in
the SASCB weekly meetings. The FS_ Definition Process is allocated
approximately three months on the FSH development template, and ends with an
approved baseline CR identifying the FSH CR/DRs to be implemented in an OI (see
Figure 5. I).
5. I. I Flight Software Needs. New Ols, FSH modifications, mission data, new
designs and FS;4 corrections begin with an expressed need defined by the SSP FSH
community. These needs are identified through flight or mission plans, vehicle
or equipment modificaticms, flight or ground crew requests, program directives
or objectives, etc.
5.1.2 Needs Analysis. Once a need is defined, the FS_ community must perform
analysis to determine if these needs should become approved requirements for the
SSP FSH. These analyses are performed by knowledgeable Shuttle avionics
engineering personnel through Mode (multi-organizational design engineering)
Teems by mission planning personnel, vehicle or flight equipment designers, FSH
development personnel, payload users, or flight and ground crew personnel.
The end result of this analysis will define the actual FSH requirements for
further consideration either into an OI or adding %o a specific STS flight or
mission.
Embedded V&V Activity: V&V activity is accomplished through the system
engineering analyses performed by FS_community members. The FSHneeds
formulated by the community at large are subjected to systems engineering
analysis by other members of the FSH community to validate requirements. Once
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the knowledgeable FS_ community personnel determine a valid FS_ requirement
exists, a sponsor prepares the necessary change documentation.
5.1.3 Discrepanc_ Report Anal_si-_. DEs are problems or anomalies discovered in
_he operational FSH or potential hazards identified in the requirements design.
DEs are generated throughout the software life cycle by the various members of
the FS_ community involved in development, verification, testing and/or
operations (e.g., FS_ developers, flight crew, mission controllers, Level 8
testing, certification testing, SAIL integrated hardware/software testing,
etc. ).
DRs are analyzed to determine the appropriate disposition (i.e., waive, fix,
Protein notes, no DR). This analysis includes a determination of a need for a
FS_ requirement change. If analysis indicates that a requirements change is
needed, the DR disposition will recommend that a CR or DCR be suMmitted by the
FSH community for consideration. Otherwise, if a code fix is required, the
appropriate FSH development group will provide the necessary implementation planfor correction.
Embedded V&V Activity: Discrepancy reporting is a V&V activity performed by the
continuous utilization, evaluation, and review of the operatiQnal FSH by the
technical eternity. The FS_ evaluation DRs found are subjected to detailed
systems e_ineering analysis to determine their criticality and valid/ty. The
FSH c_ity software engineers evaluate the rmlge of opti_ available to
correct the discrepancy and prepare the necessary disposition recommendations
for action by the SA_B.
5. I.4 Space Shuttle Profram Control. The sponsor for a FSH change will prepare
the necessar_ CR/DCR and present it to the SASCB. If additional resources or
_PO approval _ required, the sl_nsor must also defend the proposed cha_e to
the PRCB.
5.1.5 Requirements Insl_ectic_. Requirement Inspections are formal requirement
reviews with FDSD analyst, FS_ contractor requirement analysts, FS_ community
peers, software proframmers, and Level 6/7 verification representatives with a
moderator for the reviews. These reviews are open to all uembers of the
technical community and will often include the author of the requirementa
documents. The l_e of this function is to ensure that the intent of the
requirements is understood and to clarify the interaction of multiple FSH
principle _unetic_s affected by the new or modified requirements. The
requirements inspection should identify issues with the requirements or risks
associated with the implementation of each CR and resolve any requirements
issues identified.
Embedded V&V Activity: The V&V activity is throb the involvement of all
organizations in the FSH comnmity. They effectively validate the interface
campatibility and appropriate interactions between all the affected functions.
As a team, they verify that the requirements are correct and complete assuring
that the intent is uniformly understood throughout the FSH community.
5.1.6 Requirements Analysis. The PSH developaent contractors evaluate The
requirements and determine an approach to implement them. Once this approach is
determined, the development contractor must evaluate the resources required for
implementation and develop an implementation schedule. This schedule becomes a
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recommendation to FDSD from the development contractor. FDSD reviews the
recommended implementation plan and approves their presentation to the SASCB.
If there are issues with the development contractor's understanding of the
requirements or their intent, these issues are resolved with the sponsor and
reviewed by the community in a formal requirements inspection. A correction CR
is submitted if required.
Embedded V&V Activity: V&V activity is accomplished through the development
contractor's system requirements analyses organization. Communications with
other FSH community members adds required insight to evaluate and identify
requirements issues. Corrective actions are recommended as necessary.
5.1.7 Space Shuttle Program Authorization. The NASA FS_ management and their
development contractor present an implementation plan for either a new OI or a
mission specific CR/DR for a current OI to the SASCB. If additional budgeted
FSH resources are required, the proposed change must be presented to the PRCB
for approval.
The output of the SASCB is an approved Ol baseline content end schedule
identifying the CR/DRs to be implemented for a specific FS_ operational
capability. The SASCB takes the recommended OI baseline content and schedule
forward to the PRCB for formal program approval. The SASCB meets weekly, and
approves mission specific CR/DCR/DRs for implementation or acceptance for flight
with waivers or user notes up to flight time.
5.2 FLIGHT SOFTHARE DEVELOPMENT ROADMAP. The FSH Development Phase begins with
the approved baseline identifying %he CR/DRs approved for implementation in a
new OI and ends approximately 16 months later with the delivery of new Primary
Avionics Software System (PASS) and Backup Flight Software (BFS) software OI
loads to the FSH Mission Preparation Phase. This OI software is released to the
NASA users by FDSD at the formal OI Configuration Inspection (CI) milestone (see
Figure 5.2).
The FS_ development is the responsibility of the Primary Avionics Software
System contractor - IBM, and the backup flight software contractor - Rockwell
International under the technical managelent of FDSD. Both contractors utilize
the NASA JSC SDF to develop and test FSH until a new OI is delivered %o NASA at
CI. The SDF activities are referred to as "Backroom" activities. The PASS and
BFS FSH is designed, coded, tested, and verified in this phase. The FSH is
subjected to two levels of independent verification - Level 6 (Functional)
testing and Level 7 (Performance) testing.
5 •2. I Design, Code, Unit/Module Test. The development contractors use separate
groups to develop FS_ in the SDF. Separate groups are responsible for all
requirements analysis and programming: one for managing configuration and
building FS_ releases; and another group is responsible for verification testing
of the F_4 for the new OI delivery. Members of these groups attend inspections
as presenter or peers, as required by the type or complexity of the changes, to
review the developed products. Each inspection follows an inspection checklist
to ensure that all procedures, and standards have been followed. Approval is
received from the moderator reflecting the direction of the inspection team.
DESIGN: Approved CRs contain the requirement specifications that the new OI
delivery is expected to provide. These requirements are the basis for FSH
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designs. IBM and Rockwell convert _be requirements stated in approved CR/DRs to
detailed software designs which are documented in Detailed Design Specificaticm
(DDS) documents. Design inspections are then held where the designers present
their designs to knowledgeable PASS or BFS FS_ engineers for review.
CODE: Upon completion of the detailed design, the PASS or BFS software
developer then writes FSH code implementin E the design. A listing of the code
is prepared and presented to knowle_eable PASS or BFS programmers for review at
a Code Inspectioc. The design inspections and code inspections are sometimes
combined for less complex implementaticms.
UNIT/MODULE: Once the code is completed, Unit (PASS Level I, BFS Level 2) tests
are performed to verify equatioms, logic paths, and/or range of values. Module
(PASS Level 2, BFS Level 3) tests are executed, if required, to verify the
module interface (Input/Output) performance. These tests are sometimes combined
for less complex changes. The results of these Unlt Tests are presented to
knowledgeable PASS or BFS programmers for review at a Test Inspection.
Embedded V&V Activity: Each activity has detailed written procedures which the
developer's software quality assurance personnel monitor for compliance.
Preparation for each inspection includes a review of the procedures and
standards utilized to accomplish a design, code a module, or perform a test.
Detailed checklists are completed and then reviewed by the attendees prior to
inspections required for code design and test reviews.
V&V is the responsibility of the development contractors. They have
accomplished this by forming independent organizatioms responsible for tracking
and verifying the approved requirement changes to the FSH. All reviews and
inspections are controlled by peer moderators, without management involvement
other than oversight review and approval of FSH development standards and
procedures.
The design is inspected to ensure that the design reflects both the stated
requirements as well as the intended requirement. The code is inspected %o
ensure conformity to F_ standards, prevent unintended functicms, and control
inefficient Central Processing Unit (CPU)/memory consumptio_. Design and code
inspectic_s are sometimes combined for less complex changes. Tests are
inspected to ensure that tests are performed at applicable levels of FSH
development (i.e., Unit, and Module) prior to beginning FS_ integration via the
load build process.
5.2.2 Load Build and System Test. The OI development cycle has approximately a
16-month template. During this period, multiple load releases will be built.
Each FSH load release co_tains the preceding load release plus update_ that have
completed the development process (design, code, unit/module test). As each
load is built, it will receive system level (PASS Level 2, BFS Level 3) testing
in the SDF. Both PASS and BFS loads receive Level 3/4 testing before release
for verification testing. The object of these tests is to test functional
interfaces, multiple functloms, timing, system interface, and mission profile.
Each new load is released to the Level 6 test group for de%ailed verification
tests upon successful completion of the system level tests. Level 7 test group
begins performance verification tests when all of the approved CR/DRs have been
included in a load release at the First Article Configuration Inspection (FACI).
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The final development OI load release is known as the Configuration Inspection
(CI) load.
Embedded V&V Activities: The PASS or BFS development contractor maintains
responsibility for all V&V activities until the CI load is released.
The development contractor FS_ configuration management ensures that FS_ modules
are never added or changed unless proper authorization and procedures have been
followed. The system level (Level 3/4) tests conducted on each new load build
consist of standardized system tests of the basic load characteristics and
capabilities. Tests are performed using SDF ground unit (nonflight) GPCs with a
functionally cosrplete FSH _ load.
5.2.3 First Article Configuration Inspection. This is a formal review
milestone in the OI development template. This milestone officially begins the
verification phase of an OI. At this point all CR/DRs have been incorporated
into the F&CI Verification Load, which normally becomes the base load for the
next OI entering development. This milestone occurs approximately 8 months
after the initial OI baseline has been approved by the SASCB. The development
contractor reports on OI development progress, Level 6/7 verification testing
planned, and any planned post-FACI work.
Embedded V&V Activity: This is the first review in the OI development cycle
where all elememts of the FS_ community participate. This review allows
appropriate members of the FS_ community %o evaluate the OI status and determine
if required development for all functions has been achieved prior to proceeding
to independent verification testing.
5.2.4 Verification Test Procedure Reviews. Two levels of testing are performed
on operational hardware by independent development contractor organizations.
Detailed functional (Level 6) testing consists of module functional tests
against requirements. System level (Level ?) performance testing is conducted
under operational flight conditions.
Inputs to this activity are the CR/DR baseline documents approved by the SASCB.
Level 6 test analysts develop Verification Test Procedures (VTPs) to be used
during testing. Level 6 VTPs are standard functional tests for FS_ Principle
Functions documented in SDF data sets. Specific tests are selected or modified
from these standards. New tests are prepared, as appropriate, by Level 6 test
analysts to test new or modified functional capabilities. Generic Level 7 tests
consist of Cuidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) System Integrity Tests,
System Services Tests, and Vehicle Cargo Systems Tests. Level 70I specific
tests are New Capability Performance Tests designed to verify the new
performance capability provided by one or more CRs implemented in the mew OI.
Level 7 Verification Tests are developed through a community review process and
are documented in a Verification Test Specification CR approved by the SASCB.
Embedded V&V Activities: During the Level 6 Verification Test Procedure
Inspections conducted by the development contractors, interested parties from
the FS_ technical community provide inputs, identify issues or review tests for
use and approved by FDSD. The Level 7 test specifications are reviewed in Test
Coordination Team (TCT) meetings attended by interested parties from the FS_
community. The resulting Level 7 Verification Test Specification is documented
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in a CR and formally approved by the SASCB. The object is to ensure that
planned tests verify requirements as well as overall system performance.
5.2.5 Functional Verification Testing. This activity is the execution of the
Level 6 Functional Tests approved in the preceding activity. Level 6 testing is
very flexible in that each test focuses on FS_ module changes. The FSH is
functionally tested by exercising, on flight equivalent operational computer
hardware in the SDF, FS_ Principle Functions affected during CR/DR
implementation. Tests can include partial trajectories and engagement
transitioning (BFS only) if a function was affected by changes. Tests may
include overriding math model inputs with out-of-limit stress co_diticQs.
Functional Test Reviews: Level 6 functional tests are reviewed independently.
Tests are conducted on all software changes throughout the development template.
Each Level 6 test ease has a review scheduled by the development contractor _o
review the test results. These reviews are attended by development contractor
personnel, NASA FDSD analysts, and other FS_ ccauunity personnel as required.
The test results are reviewed, and issues are recorded for resolution. Level 6
issues are reported by the developer at the CI. Level 6 Epilogues (Test
Reports) are published approximately 6 weeks after the CI, and delivere_, to
members of the F_/ community upon request.
Embedded V&V activities: Development contractors are responsible for performiDg
the tests according to the procedures and conditions approved in the
verification test procedure. Functional tests are designed to examine the total
functional range of specific principle functions provided by the CR/DRs
implemented in the new OI. Participation of affected parties from the FS_
community in the VTP Inspections and use of independent organizations by the
development contractor for Level 6 testing accomplish the V&U task during the
design, conduct, and review of tests. Detailed results from each Level 6 test
case are evaluated with FDSD and other interested technical community members.
5.2.6 Performance Verification Testing. This activity performs the Level 7
Performance tests contained in the Verification Test Specification CR reviewed
in TCT meetings and approved by the SASCB. Level 7 testing normally begins with
the delivery of the FACI Verification Load, and may also utilize later
verification load deliveries to complete Level 7 testing. The tests are
performed in the SDF using operational flight equivalent computer hardware, and
simulated mission conditions emulating an OIs operational mission environment.
Level ? tests place emphasis on evaluating PASS or BFS system performance
instead of Principle FSH Functious. The Level ? tests more closely resemble the
flight profile than the Level 6 tests. The tests do include engage transition
testing (BFS only).
Performance Test Reviews (PTR): Level ? performance tests are reviewed as a
group at a formal PTR. Each New Capability and Generic Test report is mailed to
members of the FS_ comRunity on the Level ? Test Report Distribution List 4 to 6
weeks prior to the PTR for review and evaluation. The PTR is held 1 week prior
to the CI and any unresolved Level ? issues are reported by the developer at the
CI. The developer will resolve all Level ? issues remaining open at the CI, and
prepare a supplemental report for the CI attendees.
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Embedded V&V Activities: By use of standardized generic Level 7 tests, each OI
delivery is tested to the same specifications under the same conditions. New
Capability Performance tests are designed to exercise the full envelope of
capabilities provided by _he specific CR/DRs implemented in the new OI.
Participation of %he FS_ community in the TCTs and PTRs in addition to use of
independent organizations by the development contractor for Level 7 testing
accomplish %he V&V tasks during the design and conduct of tests.
5.2.7 Configuration Inspection. This is a formal review milestone in %he OI
development template. This milestone officially completes %he development phase
of an OI. At this point all CR/DRs have been incorporated into the CI Load.
This milestone occurs approximately 8 months after FACI. The development
contractor reports on OI development issues, Level 6/7 verification test issues,
delivers updated FS_ documentation, sad releases the CI load %o NASA.
Embedded V&V Activity: The CI is preceded by Level 6 test results review
meetings, and a formal Level 7 Performance Test Review. Each review performs an
V&V function by including members of the technical communiZy in the review and
verification of test results. The purpose of a review is to ensure that %he
requirements contained in the CR/DRs approved by the SASCB for implementation in
an OI have been implemented correctly and verified aceordin E to approved SSP
standards for FS_ development .
5.3 FLIGHT SO_ MISSION PREPARATION ROADMAP. The FSX Mission Preparation
Phase begins with release of _he PASS/BFS OI loads from the development
contractors. Mission specific requirements documents are developed by NASA
MOD/RMD and approved by the SASCB. These inputs are integrated in the SPF into
an integrated mass memory unit software load and submitted to various
operational users for mission preparation and testing including final flight
operations. SPF activities are referred to as "Frontroom" activities. The
mission preparation phase requires approximately 9 months from the delivery of
the OI loads until the first STS mission is flown using the newly developed OI
capability. Mission preparation activities have two major cycles; one for the
initial FS_ mission reeonfiguration (engineering cycle) at approximately 6
months prior to flight (L-161 days), and the flight cycle at approximately 3
months prior to flight (L-77 days). Partial updates and corrections may be
applied as par% of the reconfiguration process. Parallel mission preparations
are performed for multiple STS missions utilizing the same FS_ OI load (see
Figure 5.3).
5.3.1 Reconfi_n_ration Data. The STSOC personnel support NASA MOD/RMD who
define the mission requirements and vehicle specific data (I-Loads), which are
used to reeonfigure the PASS and BFS OI baseline loads for specific missions and
vehicles. STSOC prepares input data for the Shuttle Transportation Automated
Reeonfiguration (STAR) and Measurement and Stimulus (MAST) FSH reeonfiguration
tools. MSFC personnel develop Space Shuttle Main Engine Controller (SSMEC)
software to be used with each Shuttle engine and deliver the SSME software %o
the mission preparation process as GFE software (Reference Appendix A). SSMEC
software configuration is managed by the MSFC NASA SSP Project Office, similar
to the SASCB at JSC. Reconfiguration also includes providing SPF simulator
initial conditions and simulation model preparation data.
Embedded V&V Activities: I-Loads are audited by I-Load owners prior %0 approval
and after flight cycle load build. Identical simulator test conditions are
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provided to STSOC and IBM for their Validation (Level 8) Test groups.
Performance tests are independently executed by STSOC and IBM to perform
parallel certification of the reconfi&nared FSH.
5.3.2 Vehicle Cargo S_stem (VCS) Reconfifuration Date. STi_/M_'T data am
independently processed by two different contractors, IBM and STSOC, using
configuration controlled pro_essing tools to generate the VCS software inputs
required for a mission specific FS4 load. STSOC is the STS operations
contractor responsible for producing the IntegTa%ed Mass Memory Unit (I_g4U)
loads used during an STS mission. An IBM orEanization separate from the
development organizaticm is respoflsible for independently duplicating and
ccmpa2ing STSOC software products during the mission preparation phase.
Embedded V&V Activities: Each contractor verifies the data source inputs,
checks the resulting syntax, and verifies comsistency of individual products.
The independently produced products are compared and any unexpected results are
reported to the FS;4 Integrated Baseline Control Board (IBCB) community and
resolved.
5.3.3 Reconfik-,ration Activities. The FSH development contractors are
responsible for developing and maintaining all software tools which can affect
the reconfi&n_red FSH memory loads. At CI, STSOC receives FSH build tools that
are under SASCB control.
The OI validated loads are reconfigurmd by the i,plementation of Mission/Vehicle
unique data, and the VCS Reeon products. IBM and STSOC independently
reconfiEure the baseline PASS OI FSH while Rockwell-Downey and STSOC
independently reconfigure the baseline BFS Ol FSH. The STSOC BFS FS_ load is
then delivered 1;o IBM for application to the I)_U.
Embedded V&V Activities: IBM and Rockwell-Downey parallel certification groups
compare the STSOC developed FS_ loads to theirs and report any unexpected
results to the IBCB community.
5.3._ Intefrated Mass Memor 7 Unit Load. The Intefrated Mass Memory Unit (IMMU)
load contains the actual flight programs cycled in the Space _uttle GPCs and/or
flight equivalent hardware used in SSP ground facilities. The PASS, BFS, S_E,
etc. software are integrated by STSOC into a mast er I)_4U load for operational
use by all FSH users. IBM parallel certification builds an independent I_U
load for cce_arison with the I_U load built by STSOC.
Embedded V&V Activities: A copy of the STSOC I)%4U load is compared to the IBM
I_U load and any unexpected results are reported to the IBCB community by IBM
parallel certification via the certification audit report. IBM then uses this
copy of the STSOC I_U load for their parallel certification process
certification tests. The STSOC produced I_4U load is provided to the SAIL,
Shuttle Mission Simulator (SMS), KSC Cargo Integration Test Equi_ent, KSC
Avionics Test Set (raTS), Orbiter, and other FSH users for operaticms and/or
mission testing. The Shuttle Engineering Simulator (SES) does not receive a
copy of the ID_4U load but does use a fortran equivalent build of the I_%4U load.
This fortran equivalent build is independently supplied by ED.
5.3.5 Operational Validation and Certification Testing. Level 8 (Mission)
testing is performed in the SPF using flight equivalent GPCs interfaced wlth a
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mainframe computer containing Shuttle math models simulating the mission
conditions necessary %o test the FS_. The SPF simulator conditions and math
model data are built into a simulation load prior to beginning FS_ testing.
Level 8 testing, whose requirements are controlled by the SASCB in the
Performance Test Plan, is conducted using the final (L-77) reconfiEuration load
which contain mission unique I-loads. The SPF simulation does not provide a
realtime simulation of mission operations which requires scripting of test
scenarios. Validation testing is performed by STSOC using STSOC prepared SPF
simulation and test scenarios. Parallel certification testing is performed by
IBM using IBM prepared SPF simulation and test scenarios. The IBM SPF simulator
build is compared to the STSOC equivalent.
Operational testing is defined as the operational use of the FS_ during mission
preparation (i.e., flight and ground operations training, mission procedures
development, etc. ) and SAIL testing. Operational testing is a realtime
operation using flight equivalent and simulated flight hardware, as well as a
full cumplement of flight computers. The SAIL, SMS and SES all provide a flight
crew interface. The entire mission is flown in the SMS during flight crew
training. Problems found during operational testing are recorded in DRs, and
submitted %o the appropriate organization for analysis or resolution.
Embedded V&V Activity: The STSOC SPF simulator datasets are compared to those
developed by IBM to ensure functional compatibility. IBM performs parallel
certification test cases which are similar, but not identical, to the STSOC
Validation Level 8 test cases to ensure software mission performance.
Crew and mission operations training in the SES and SMS exercise the
man-in-the-loop FS_ interface to validate mission capability. SAIL is used to
verify the integrated hardware/software interfaces as well as mission capability
and the man-in-the-loop FSN interface testing.
5.3.6 Performance and Certification Test Reviews. These reviews are milestones
leading to the release of the FSN for use in a STS mission. STSOC conducts the
Performance Test Review (PTR) and presents the results of their analysis of the
Level 8 tests conducted during Performance testing to the FSH community for
concurrence. IBM prepares a Certification Test Report (CTR) for each STS
mission %hat presents the results of their analysis of the test cases executed
during certification testing.
5.3.7 Flight and Software Readiness Reviews. The Software Readiness Review
(SRR) is held approximately 3 weeks prior to flight. The SRR is conducted by
NASA to allow all members of the FSH community to review FS_ open issues
relating to the software's ability to perform the planned mission. The results
of ?_he Level 8 and certification testing are reviewed, as well as any software
issues encountered during operations.
The Flight Readiness Review (FRR) is held approximately 2 weeks prior to flight,
with a follow up FRR held approximately 2 days prior %o flight %o resolve any
remaining issues that may affect the planned mission. The FRR is held by the
SSPO to allow all members of the STS community to review and disposition open
STS hardware and software issues related %o the planned mission. All aspects of
flight vehicle preparation are reviewed and flight or mission related concerns
recorded and dispositioned.
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Embedded V&V Activities: Each FSH contractor and NASA FSH organizatio_ having a
role in preparation of FSH for the flight/mission is required %o certify that
preparations are completed and that to the best of their knowledge there are no
known problems 1_ha% affect the safety of the flight or comple_ion of the STS
mission.
5.3.8 Mass Memory Dump and Compare. Five days prior %o launch, the Orbiter
_Us are dumped and compared: (I) To the STSOC aission baseline load (by STSOC);
and (2) to the IBM parallel certification mission baseline load (by IBM). All
differences are analyzed and evaluated to e_sure that only approved changes have
been iwplemented in the final flight t_4U. The IO(Us are mass storage devices
(magnetic tapes) in the Orbiter on which the I_g_U load is loaded and from which
the flight computers receive the FSH load for mission support.
Embedded V&V Activities: The MMU loads are compared bit by bit by the
reconfiguration and parallel certification contractors, and any difference must
be explained prior %o flight authorizatic_ by the SSPO.
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APPENDIX A
SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINE CONTROLLER
SSME FLIGHT SOFT_EE DEVELOPMENT
AND VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION
1.0 PURPOSE. The purpose of this report is to describe the Block I M
flight software development process and identify the role of embedded V & V in
this process.
2.0 INTRODUCTION. The Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in Huntsville,
Alabama is the NASA center and Rocke%dyne of Canoga Park, California is the
prime contractor responsible for the Space Shuttle Main Engines including %he
SSMEC flight software. The SE flight software, currently used in the Space
Shuttle Program (SSP), consists of a baseline assembly, and chaxlges which
implement approved requirements and/or correct minor problems. Hhen sufficient
changes have accumulated, a new assembly is developed and baselined. SSMEC
software provided to JSC/KSC is customized for use on a specific SSME through
the incorporation of Logic Change Notices (LCN) and Operaticmal/Adap%ation Data
(CAD) values provided for individual STS flighta.
SE software changes, released as LCNs, are packages containing the definition
of the change as described in a Controller Logic Change Request (CLCR); the
generating Unsatisfactory Condition Report (UCR), if applicable; and the
appropriate requirements and/or design document changes or redlined mark-ups.
Also, the Verification Test Outline and the appropriate Test Requirement
Document Changes are generated. The LCN number is assigned when a CLCR is
approved by Rocketdyne Software Change Control Board (SCCB).
The software is developed at Canoga Park, California, is verified/validated in
the Hardware Simulation Laboratory (HSL) at M_'C, and is certified at Stennis
Space Center (SSC). Software verification/validation/certification is performed
prior to release to JSC/KSC. Software Quality Assurance (SQA) monitors the
software development process through the life cycle. Honeywell is the
subcontractor responsible for %he design and development of the SE hardware
and provides independent engineering assessment of SE software changes.
The Software Review Group (SRG) is an informal review group cansisting of MSFC,
JSC, KSC, Rocketdyne including SSC, Honeywell, and other personnel which
addresses the concerns of the appropriate M software community in the
software development process. The SRG meets weekly via %elecon to review the
SSMEC software status/schedule, discuss software changes or potential software
changes and any UCRs. Through the SRG, the SSMEC software community is able to
provide technical assessments of possible system impacts and/or areas of concern
early in the development process.
3.0 DEVELOPMENT APPROACH. There are four distinct "Roadmaps" for the current
SSMEC software development process: Requirement Definition, Software
Development, Verification/Validation/Certification and Mission Readiness. The
Requirement Definition Roadmap identifies the activities end related control
mechanism used %o control changes to the SSMEC software. The Software
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Development Roadmap identifies the development contractor activities and
controls used to develop an LCN package at the Rocke_dyne Canoga Park facility.
The Verification/Validation/Certification Roadmap describes the activities and
controls used to verify that the software delivered to MSFC meets approved
requirements. The Mission Readiness Roa_ap describes the activities associated
with insuring that the software products delivered to JSC are ready for use with
the target STS flight.
3.1 SSM_C REQUIREMENTS DEFINITION. Prospective changes are generated by _he
entire SSMBC software community. These prospective changes consist of
requirement enhancements or corrections to SSMEC software discrepancies. S_EC
software discrepancies are documented in Software Problem Reports (SPRs) and
UCRs. SPRs are a Rocketdyne mechanism for tracking discrepancies which are
discovered during the verification process. UCRs are written directly against
problems found in released software or converted from open SPRs when the
software is released. Rocketdyne Engine Systems group documents proposed
changes in a Controller Logic Changes Request (CLCR). The CLCRs are presented
to Rocketdyne's SCCB for review and disposition, and the CLCRs and any UCRs are
presented to the SRG for its review. The SCCB dispositions the CLCRs as:
revise, approved, or canceled. They are signed by the System Software Manager,
the _ Flight Operation Manager, and the SCCB Chairman. CLCRs which are
disposltioned to be revised are iterated with the SCCB until they are approved
or canceled. Approved changes are provided to the software development group
for implementation and will become part of an LCN package. The SCCB consists of
system analysts, flight performance specialists, avionics integration personnel,
Canoga software persam_el, and Software @_mlity Assurance (S@A) personnel.
Embedded V & V: Rocke_dyne evaluates SPRs/UCIts or changes proposed by the M
software community to ensure that the SPRs/UCRs are valid and that the proposed
changes reflect valid SM system changes and/or SSP changes. Honeywell ensures
compatibility of software changes with the M hardware and verifies that no
single point failures are introduced. The SRC members assess the impact in
their area of responsibility and will address any concerns at the SRC. Approval
of requirements are defined in the Embedded V & V Paragraph 3.3.
3.2 M SOFMRE DEVELOP_EFI. The Canoga Software Group prepares LCN
packages which contain the CLCR and marked-up pages from all affected
requirements and design documents. Also, the test requirements document, which
is not a part of the LCN package is updated. If the CLCR is the result of a
UCR, the UCR is also included. The LCN package goes through three
implementation phases: requirements, development, and test. The CLCR is
analyzed and the requirement documents are marked-up to reflect the requirement
changes. The LCN marked-up requirements are analyzed and the design documents
are marked-up to reflect the updated design. The marked-up requirement/design
documents are reviewed in an informal development contractor Critical Design
Review (CDR) and the design is coded and assembled. The code receives an
internal desk audit of the source code listings. Once the code is approved, the
software patch is tested in the Canoga Software Laboratory (CSL) with the
appropriate baseline. The Verification Test Outline (VTO) is prepared to
identify suggested verification activities for each change. The LCN package is
then reviewed, and delivered along with the software patches, the VTO, and the
marked-up test requirements document to the HSL for verification test with the
specified SSMEC baseline assembly.
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Embedded V & V: Personnel from software, Engine Systems, and SQA review and
sign the LCN package to ensure that the intent of the requirements is understood
and can be implemented correctly. Rocketdyne ensures that all modifications to
the SSMEC software are compatible with the current SSME and SSMEC hardware.
Rocketdyne verifies that the design correctly implements the requirements. The
code is inspected and analyzed %0 ensure the design is implemented properly and
efficiently. SSMEC software integration test results are reviewed and problems
encountered during tests are corrected and the software is retested. Rocketdyne
verifies that all development activities have been completed. The LCN package
is signed off by personnel responsible for requirement/design and code.
Honeywell S_EC systems engineers review %he LCN %o ensure that the modified
design is compatible with SSMEC hardware operations and that no single point
failures are introduced.
3.3 S_4EC VERIFICATION/VALIDATION/CERTIFICATION. SSMEC software verification
is conducted in the HSL at MSFC and software certification is conducted on the
engine Hotfire test stand at SSC. LCN packages are delivered %o Rocketdyne HSL
personnel at MSFC, who review the software requirement changes and %he VT0 from
the Canoga Park Software Group. Pran the analysis of the requirement changes,
the test procedures are updated, as required, and reviewed for approval. Each
LCN is then verified in the HSL. All discrepancies encountered during
verification are reported by SPR and, if necessary, corrections are made to the
LCN and the verificaticm is then repeated. Upon successful completion of the
verification, which includes all data analysis, the test procedures and test
results are transmitted to Rocke%dyne at Canoga Park for review. Upon
completion of this review, the LCN Verification Complete Block is signed by the
Software, Engine Systems, and _A personnel. Complete LCN packages are provided
to the SSMEC software community. Rocketdyne at Canoga Park prepares a Hotfire
Simulation Request Package that specifies the software configuration, test
profile, and special tests, as required. These tests are performed in the HSL.
In addition, a Data Base Compare is performed on the software that is to be used
for engine hot fire test. Upon completion of these tests and approval by MSP_,
the software is authorized for use at SSC for engine hotfire test. Engine
hotfire tests certify the SSMEC software.
Upon completicm of the software certification and approval of the BCP and the
associated Verification Complete Package (VCP), the software is then acceptable
for use for STS flight. A SSMEC software delivery, with the appropriate OAD amd
LCNs incorporated, is prepared for the STS flight. The software configuration
is verified by Rocketdyne and MSFC to be the configuration required by the Field
Engimeering Change (FEC). This SSM_C software delivery, including the FEC and
Software Authorization Notice (SAN) is authorized by MSFC for specified
functions: check-out, Flight Readiness Firing (FRF), or flight. Updates to a
software delivery are made when changes %0 the OAD are required or when new LCNs
are approved. An updated SAN, and FEC if required, is provided with the update
to the software delivery.
Embedded V & V: Rocketdyne Engine Systems and software personnel review the
test procedures and results prior to final approval of the LCN. The test
procedures are reviewed by Honeywell and SOA. Rocketdyne reviews the results of
the Hotfire Simulation and Data Base Compares prior to approval for engine
hotfire. SQA ensures 1_ha% any issues are resolved. MSFC verifies that all
verification is complete prior to use of the software for engine hotfire.
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MSFC approves all logic changes for flight via an Engineering Change Proposal
(ECP) and all changes for a specific STS flight by FEC. MSFC approval is
documented by a Configuration Change Board Directive (CCBD). The review by
Rocketdyne and MSFC assures that the software delivered for an $T$ flight is
correct and complete and _hat the software meets any engine unique requirements.
3.% _ soFr_iARE MISSION READINESS ROADMAP. JSC SASCB receives the LCN
package from MSFC. A baseline Change Request (CR) is prepared by JSC personnel
citing the LCN package for incorporation into the FSM. The SASCB then reviews
and provides technical concurrence of the LCN in the SASCB meeting minutes. A
load for each mission is received approximately 6 months prior to a scheduled
mission. The SASCB does not approve LCN packages, however, as the SSPO, they
concur 1_at the LCN package is technically required, and acceptable for use in
the FSH. SSMEC software is delivered to the STSOC I_4U load build process. As
OAD and LCN updates are received, these changes are loaded into each FSH HRU
build, as required, to maintain a load for all _ operations. The SSI_C
software received from MSFC is supplied I;o the STSOC load build activity for
inclusion into the integrated mass memory load build. Periodic updates may be
received in the form of OAD changes or LCN changes for specific S_E or mission
upgrade. Hhen MSFC delivers S_ changes, the appropriate SSME configuration
is also provided. The S_ configuration is used both to configure the FS_, and
establish test conditions in the SALE, if appropriate. Once the S_4EC software
is integrated into a _ load, it is included in SAIL avionics integration
testing and is considered at all STS mission FRR/SRRs. If a S_ capability has
been modified, or expected operational environment has changed, the test
environment (JSC tools such as SPF, SAIL, SHS S_ hardware and/or performance
simulation models) may have to be modified.
Operational testing is defined as the operational use of the _ FSH during
mission preparation testing in the SAIL. Operational testing is a real-time
operation using flight equivalent and simulated flight hardware, as well as a
full complement of flight computers. The SAIL provides a flight crew interface.
Operational avionic system hardware/software integration test scenarios and
mission scemarios are performed at SAIL. Problems found during testing are
recorded in DRs and submitted to the appropriate organizations for analysis or
resolution.
KSC builds a SSMEC software load compare tape, using the memory configuration
that is specified by MSFC SAN, that consists of a file for each memory
configuration for each _C. The _ compare tape is trensmitted fz_m _ to
MSFC HSL where a bit-by-bit comparison is made to the originating database _hat
produced the SSM_C software. The compare tape is used by KSC to verify that the
SSMEC software was correctly loaded into the SSMEC. "
The Software Readiness Review (SRR) is held approximately 3 weeks prior to
flight. The SRR is conducted by NASA to allow all members of the FSH community
to review FS_ open issues relating to the software's ability to perform the
planned mission. The results of SAIL, Level 8 and certification testing are
reviewed, as well as any software issues encountered during operations.
The Flight Readiness Review (FRR) is held approximately 2 weeks prior to flight,
with a follow up FRR held approximately 2 days prior to flight to resolve any
remaining issues that may effect the planned mission. The FRR is held by the
SSPO to allow all members of the STS community to review and disposition open
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STS hardware end software issues related to the planned mission. All aspects of
flight vehicle preparation are reviewed and flight or mission related concerns
recorded and dispositioned.
Embedded V & V: The software builds are validated through bit by bit tape
comparisons. S3MEC software is included in the IMMU loads, end exercised in the
SAIL. Hhen changes are made to test tools, the simulated hardware and/or
performance operational data is verified against the real world. Two Eroups
provide independent sets of software mission performance tests - STSOC performs
an approved set of validation tests while IBM, in parallel, performs a separate
set of certification tests on the fliEht load. Tests in the SAIL are avionics
integration tests performed under sponsors from the F_R community. Specific
tests are not performed in the SMS, however, Flight Crew training usually
exercises the full range of missions operations, and a subset of off-nominal
operations which have the potential of occurring during the mission. Any
discrepancies encountered during SMS training or SAIL testing, are documented in
DRs.
The comparison of the compare tape bit-by-bit to the SSMEC software at MSFC
verifies that the compare tape reflects the SSMEC software configuration
authorized by the SSMEC SAN. The use of the compare tape to verify the SSMEC
software load verifies that the _SMEC was loaded correctly.
Each contractor or NASA organization having a role in preparation for the flight
and mission is required to certify _hat preparations are completed and that %o
the best of %heir knowledge there are no known problems that affect the safety
of the fliEh% or completion of the STS mission.
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APPENDIX B
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
BFS Backup Flight System
CCB
CCBD
CDR
CI
CPU
CR
CTR
Change Control Board
ConfiEnaration Control Board Directive
Critical Design Review
Configuration Inspection
Central Processing Unit
Change Request
Certification Test Report
DCR
DDS
DPS
DR
Data Change Requests
Detailed Design Specification
Data Processing System
Discrepancy Reports
ED
EPDC
ET
Engineering Directive
Electrical Power Distribution and Control
External Tank
FACI
FRR
F_
First Article Configuration Inspection
Flight Data Systems Division
Flight Readiness Review
Fligh_ Software
GFE
GLS
GN_C
GPC
Government Furnished Equipment
Ground Launch Sequencer
Guidance, Navigation and Control
General Purpose CoMputer
IISL
HSLI I
Hardware Simulation Laboratory
Hardware Simulation Lab II
IBCB
IMMU
Integrated Baseline Control Board
Integrated Mass Memory Unit
KCR KSC Change Request
LCC
LPS
Launch Control Center
Launch Processing System
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MCC
MMU
MOD
Measurement and Stimulus
Mission Control Center
Mass Memory Unit
Mission Operations Directorate
OI
OMRS
OPS
Operational Increment
Orbiter Maintenance Requirements Specification
Operations
PASS
PRCB
I_CBD
PTR
Primary Avionics Software System
Program Requirements Control Board
Profrem Requirements Control Board Directive
Performance Test Reviews
RCN
RMD
RSS
Requirements Change Notice
Reconfiguration Management Division
Range Safety System
SAIL
SASCB
SASR
SCCB
SCR
SDF
SES
SMS
SPF
SQA
SRB
SRG
SRm_
SRR
SSC
SSMEC
SSP
SSPO
STAR
STS
STSOC
SVP
Shuttle Avionics Integrati_ Laboratory
Shuttle Avionics Software Control Board
Shuttle Avionics Systems Review
Software Change Control Board
Software Change Request
Software Development Facility
Shuttle Engineering Simulation
Shuttle Mission Simulator
Software Production Facility
Software Quality Assurance
Solid Rocket Booster
Software Review Group
Safety, Reliability, Haintainability & Quality Assurance
Software ReacLtness Review
Stennis Space Center
Space Shuttle Main Engine Controller
Space Shuttle Program
Space Shuttle ProEram Office
Shuttle Transportaticm Automated Reconfiguration
Shuttle Transportation System
Shuttle Transportation System Operations Contractor
Software Verification Procedure
TCT
TCTI
TDCC
TRP
Test Coordination Team
Time Compliance Technical Instruction
Technical Directive Change Control
Technical Review Panel
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V&V
VCS
VTP
Verification and Validation
Vehicle Cargo System
Verification Test Program
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